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The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones 
John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
 
Regulating the diffusion of renewable energy technologies: Interactions 
between community energy and the feed-in tariff in the UK 
 
An ever increasing body of legislation and regulation is transforming the UK’s 
energy system and its surrounding national energy framework. Depending on 
the mechanisms that result from this process, new forms of engagement with 
energy, particularly electricity, might emerge. The current trajectory of UK 
energy policy leans towards a centralised scenario with a portfolio of centralised 
renewable energy technologies (i.e. geographically concentrated such as 
offshore wind), nuclear power stations and gas fired power stations with the 
option of Carbon Capture and Storage technologies if it becomes a 
commercially viable option (CCC, 2011). Forecasts predict that a combination of 
these technologies could place the UK on the right path to reach its 2050 
carbon reduction commitments (UKERC, 2008). However, this approach fails to 
take broader benefits of decentralisation and localisation into account and many 
official documents such as the Microgeneration Strategy (DECC, 2011a) and 
those surrounding Community Energy Online (DECC, 2011b) point to a need for 
greater public engagement in the generation of energy in order to ‘derive 
greater benefits locally’ (DECC, 2011a: 45). The question remains in how far 
these diverging objectives can be achieved within the current regulatory 
environment as there is a lack of coordinated incentives in place to facilitate the 
development of new scales and ownership structures capable of promoting new 
forms of engagement at scales below the point at which economies of scales 
apply. This thesis seeks to establish what barriers are preventing community 
energy with the capacity to increase acceptance of renewable energy 
technologies while also contributing towards climate change action, energy 
security and the strengthening of local economic cycles from becoming more 
widely embedded in the UK. The main focus is on how ‘niche creation’ policies 
such as the feed-in tariff might provide the basis for overcoming these barriers 
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by diffusing new scales and ownership structures of renewable energy 
technologies. Accompanying social innovations could potentially include more 
meaningful engagement with energy in general and renewable energy in 
particular, while also enabling communities willing to invest in renewable energy 
technologies to build resilient local energy infrastructures with the capacity to 
reduce the impact of increasing energy insecurity, fossil-fuel depletion and 
climate change constraints. In order to appreciate the potential of community 
energy in the UK, parallels are drawn to the governance of national energy 
frameworks in other European countries, Germany and Denmark in particular, 
that have provided the basis for successful community energy engagement. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction to Community Energy in the UK 
 
1 Introduction 
In light of climate change, energy security concerns and the ongoing economic 
crisis, this thesis bridges the gap between market-based approaches to 
decarbonisation, improving and diversifying supply and the drive towards the 
diversification of local economic resource bases successfully promoted in other 
countries through the vehicle of decentralised energy generation. Specifically, it 
focuses on how the diffusion of renewable energy technologies (RETs) and 
associated social practices is influenced by the growing niche of community 
energy and how scales and ownership structures thereof relate to energy policy 
and the surrounding national energy framework (NEF). 
Community energy represents an experimental niche where desires for 
localised involvement in energy generation, the prospect of diversifying energy 
supplies and the challenges these concepts pose to a competitive and 
liberalised energy market interact. The small-scale UK feed-in tariff (FiT) plays 
an important role in developing and sustaining this niche by providing a price-
based incentive which stands at odds with the quantity-based instruments 
favoured by the UK’s liberalised market economy. 
This piece of research aims to place various forms of community and 
decentralised energy capable of challenging systemic incumbency, albeit at a 
small and possibly not system relevant scale, in a holistic framework of policy 
support and technological innovation within this context. An extensive literature 
review and interviews with actors representing the various scales of 
technological diffusion and policy support within this framework provide the 
empirical backing for this thesis. This approach is necessary as too narrow a 
focus on community energy experimentation would ignore the wider institutional 
framework in which this experimental niche is embedded (Markard and Truffer, 
2008). 
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The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the national energy framework 
surrounding the UK feed-in tariff influences the diffusion of decentralised 
renewable energy technologies in community settings and the role of change 
agencies in the technological and social innovation process. 
The thesis will fulfil this aim by addressing the following objectives: 
 To identify how energy policy, specifically the feed-in tariff and the 
surrounding national energy framework, influence the diffusion of 
community energy; 
 To critically examine the role of change agents in developing the niche 
for technological and social innovation associated with the diffusion of 
community energy within a changing energy policy landscape embedded 
in a liberalised energy market; 
 To evaluate the capacity of community energy within the wider national 
energy framework in relation to the diffusion of decentralised renewable 
energy technologies. 
This introductory chapter provides an overview of energy policy in the UK by 
placing scales and ownership structures of technological diffusion in a 
comparative European context. It is followed by an analysis of governance, 
transition and technological diffusion theories that underlie the UK’s NEF 
surrounding energy policy for RETs. Specific focus lies on the regulatory 
provisions for new market entrants and generation capacities where economies 
of scale do not necessarily apply. 
 
1.1 Challenges to the UK energy system 
Energy systems and their accompanying NEFs are coming under increasing 
pressure due to mounting concerns regarding climate change, energy security 
and affordability in light of liberalisation and public unease with large-scale 
infrastructure developments. Efforts required for the energy system’s necessary 
transformation towards more sustainable and flexible generation capacities are 
in excess of most infrastructural transformations attempted in the past (Geels et 
al., 2008; RAENG, 2011). The UK’s NEF faces its particular set of challenges. 
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By 2020, around 50-60GW of baseload capacity will need to be replaced (CCC, 
2012a) due to age or the impact of the EU’s large combustion plant directive 
(European Parliament, 2001b). This loss of generation capacity is often referred 
to as the ‘energy gap’ (MacKay, 2009). Demand, meanwhile, is projected to 
decline slightly until 2020. Thereafter, however, it is likely to increase again with 
consumption set to double by 2050 (Huhne, 2011), despite continuing efforts in 
energy efficiency (DECC, 2012n). 
These challenges are exacerbated by the fact that the power sector currently 
accounts for around 25% of UK greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. According to 
the Committee on Climate Change’s projections, power sector emissions would 
account for almost all GHG emissions under its 2050 targets without significant 
emission reductions (CCC, 2012a). Their recommendation is to nearly entirely 
decarbonise the electricity sector by 2050 in order to achieve the legally binding 
target of 80% CO2 emissions reductions across all sectors on 1990 levels by 
2050 (CCC, 2011). 
This can only be achieved by encouraging early investment in low-carbon 
technologies given the significant capital stock turnover in the coming two 
decades, much of which is expected to still be contributing to the UK’s 
generation portfolio in 2050 (CCC, 2012a). This combined task of replacing 
ageing infrastructure and significantly reducing the carbon intensity of the 
electricity sector will require investments ranging between £100bn (CCC, 2011) 
and £200bn (REA, 2011; Ofgem, 2009), which is exacerbated by economic 
uncertainties and the particularities of energy systems analysed in the following 
section. 
An opportunity for a system transformation towards greater sustainability and 
resilience may lie in the legally binding requirement to increase the share of 
energy demand to be covered by renewable sources to 15% by 2020, which will 
see the share of renewable electricity rise to around 30% (House of Lords, 
2008). According to the UK Renewable Energy Roadmap (DECC, 2011b), this 
will require a 13GW expansion of installed wind energy capacity by 2020 but 
major challenges in achieving this target relate to investment and planning risks. 
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1.2 General energy system challenges 
A more fundamental difficulty of altering and decarbonising energy systems 
such as the UK’s lies in their systemic incumbency. They have developed 
incrementally and path-dependently (Mahoney, 2000) in a centralised manner 
with markets, infrastructures, regulatory institutions and consumption practices 
creating and sustaining stable cycles of ever-increasing supply and demand 
(Smith et al., 2005), which also reflects wider economic development processes 
(Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010). With respect to NEFs, the transformation of 
energy generation and electricity distribution infrastructures is restricted by a 
wide range of challenges. 
Energy systems are conditioned by geography and history, with historical 
patterns of production and use reflecting current infrastructures (UKERC, 2009). 
Changes have primarily come about in response to economics, followed by 
technology policy (Koonin, 2012) and as energy technologies are bound by 
infrastructure, their diffusion is inherently more difficult than the diffusion of 
products that do not share this property (Wuestenhagen et al., 2007). 
A further challenge to systems transformation lies in the long infrastructural 
replacement timescale. A replacement rate of 1%/a in the US electricity system 
points towards a large technical system replacement timescale of around 100 
years (Koonin, 2012) while the timescale for individual infrastructures is 30-65 
years (Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1991) as investments generally take several 
decades to pay off. Incumbents are therefore reluctant to take ageing 
generation infrastructure off the grid as long as it is economically viable to 
continue operation due to the windfall profits this practice ensures (Unruh, 2000; 
2002). 
At the same time, system incumbency increases the tendency to replace 
infrastructure on a ‘like-for-like’ basis (Vaze and Tindale, 2011) while uniform 
approaches to scale reduce flexibility in investment patterns and increase the 
inherent irreversibility of many energy system investments (Fielder, 1996). 
RETs face a particular set of challenges as they are characterised by high 
investment costs and low running costs, which increases investment risk due to 
high percentages of sunk costs from the onset of generation (Hvelplund, 2006). 
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1.3 Putting renewable energy support into context 
To appreciate the capacities and potentials of energy policy within NEFs and 
energy system incumbency, it is necessary to take a step back in the analysis of 
the wider institutional framework of UK energy policy and the capacities for 
system transformation by placing them in an international context. Due to highly 
variable resource endowments (Eberlein and Doern, 2009), governance 
frameworks (Hvelplund, 2001), planning systems (Toke, 2005a), energy policy 
regimes (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006), innovation priorities (Foxon and 
Pearson, 2007), infrastructural and economic lock-ins (Unruh, 2000), historical 
development trajectories (Nelson and Winter, 1982), national innovation 
systems (Nelson, 1993) and prevailing regulatory state paradigms (Mitchell, 
2008), however, it is also necessary to bear in mind that a comparison of 
country specific energy innovation and development particularities in terms of 
scale and ownership structures on a like-for-like basis will always remain a 
vague science. 
Throughout this thesis, the most frequently recurring cross-country comparison 
is between the UK, England in particular, and other European countries, 
especially Germany and Denmark. Comparing the UK to Germany relates to the 
success of the German FiT in stimulating the development of various scales 
and ownership structures of community and decentralised energy (Mitchell, 
2008; Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008; Pollitt, 2010; Vaze and Tindale, 2011). 
Particular reference to the concept of energy generation ‘by citizens for citizen’ 
(HMG, 2009a: 64) in Germany, which fosters widespread support and 
participation from communities and councils, is also made in the UK Renewable 
Energy Strategy (HMG, 2009a) along with the desire to make generation 
derived benefits available to everyone.  
In combination with widespread political support and a favourable planning 
environment, Germany’s FiT provides a framework that enables a diverse range 
of actors to tap into energy generation and become involved in the development 
of renewable energy projects (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; Vaze and Tindale, 
2011). The German framework of financial support and incentives is also 
indiscriminate towards new entrants, ranging from small and independent 
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initiatives lacking private financial backing to established developers and utilities 
(Rydin, 2011a; Vaze and Tindale, 2011). Structural facilitation for these 
developments within Germany’s NEF therefore provides strong encouragement 
for citizens and communities to invest in renewable energy generation. 
In the UK, on the other hand, the development and diffusion of RETs has been 
left in the hands of established developers and utilities, although some 
independent companies are also involved (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008). Their 
success is hampered by structural and regulatory bias towards large-scale 
developments and the drive towards early commercialisation has led to the 
emergence of a problematic investment environment, particularly for less well 
established developers (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007). The UK NEF therefore 
encourages system optimisation rather than transformation and innovation 
(Arentsen et al., 2002) and community energy has a negligible role to play in 
this process. 
The introduction of the UK FiT in April 2010 (DECC, 2010a) marks a 
considerable change in energy policy as it provides a niche for new ownership 
structures at scales below the 5MW threshold. The FiT protects <5MW 
developments from the more competitive environment fostered by the 
Renewables Obligation (RO), which applies to renewable energy developments 
above this threshold (Ofgem, 2012). The FiT has spurred interest in various 
forms of decentralised and community energy but the surrounding framework 
and associated institutions are still lacking the capacity to facilitate these 
developments as they are more geared for the RO’s competitive nature and 
resulting scales of development. 
 
1.4 Community energy 
One of the main problems associated with the lack of community energy’s 
institutionalisation in the UK lies in the lacking recognition of its potential. 
Advantages associated with various forms of community energy development 
include a variety of economic, social and environmental benefits. 
 Economic impacts, particularly if community benefits are enshrined 
through planning and government incentives, relate to local income, 
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regeneration and lower energy costs (Hoggett, 2010b). Further economic 
spinoffs include opportunities for local skill and job development and as 
knock-on effects from technological diffusion in areas where national 
economies perform strongly also at a national level (DTI, 2005; Vaze and 
Tindale, 2011). Long-term savings, greater inward investment, the 
promotion of social enterprises and alternative organisational structures 
with the capacity to breach incumbent energy system structures as well 
as improved business practices are also associated with community 
energy (Park, 2011a). Local aspects particularly of community-led 
developments can also lead to less contested planning processes and 
greater local control (Walker, 2008). The contribution to the delivery of 
local, national and regional targets and effective load management can 
also be a feature of community energy if sufficient scales of RET 
deployment are achieved and if they are adequately integrated within the 
grid infrastructure.  
Local ownership of generation assets rather than investor, utility and 
energy company ownership also reduces the necessity to sell as much 
energy as possible in order to maximise the returns for shareholders. In 
the absence of opportunities for local ownership, local tax may be a 
useful way for communities to gain financially from RET deployment but 
local tax raising power in the UK is usually limited to residential property 
tax. In Germany, many communities and municipalities especially benefit 
from RET deployment through business taxation. Reforms of the UK 
planning system currently are underway to allow communities hosting 
new (RET) developments to retain additionally occurring business rates 
(DCLG, 2013, see Chapter 3 for more details). 
 More fundamentally, community energy allows for capacity building at a 
local level by transferring skills to participants so that renewable energy 
and low-carbon schemes can be independently developed in the future. 
Surpluses generated by community energy projects, both by community-
led and community buy-in projects may be allocated for re-investment in 
further local renewable energy capacity. Community energy projects 
developed with broad community support can also deliver benefits 
through community funds and income for local community investors. 
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Community-led projects in particular also have the benefit of encouraging 
development at scales relevant to the local population and may provide 
opportunities to tackle social and economic challenges and breach 
traditional producer/consumer divides essential for consumer 
engagement and, ultimately, behavioural change (see DECC, 2011c; 
Conaty, 2011). 
Further social impacts associated with community energy include 
improved social cohesion and community leadership, the opportunity to 
tackle fuel poverty, engagement and education opportunities as well as 
health benefits (Park, 2011a; Saunders et al., 2012). In general, it is 
assumed that community energy helps build resilience through social 
organisation such as trust, norms and networks (Adger and Brown, 
2009). With a stable support framework, community energy can also be 
considered an external trigger for social regeneration, empowerment and 
the establishment of local identity (Hain et al., 2005; Warren and 
McFayden, 2010). 
 Environmental impacts of community energy are associated with GHG 
emission reductions as RETs supplant fossil fuel generation and reduced 
requirements of transmission infrastructures between generation and 
load centres in the long term, although centralised generation will 
necessarily play a part in a highly decentralised energy system. While 
local environmental impacts are likely to be negative as a result of 
constructing and maintaining energy generation and transmission 
infrastructures, local RET deployment is likely to make an impact in 
terms of carbon savings and reduced ecological footprints if they are 
integrated appropriately in an energy system with a NEF embracing 
renewables and decentralisation. 
The overall benefit of community energy lies in the amalgamation of social, 
economic and environmental impacts that combine to make a positive overall 
contribution to some of the major challenges of our time and to enhance the 
legitimacy to act accordingly. Assuming that the onus of energy system 
transformation lies in the hands of utilities and banks and the capital they 
provide for, on the other hand, fails to take the wider system transformation 
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requirements into account that lie ahead in line with the need to decarbonise 
and dematerialise our existence. 
 
 
1.5 Scales and ownership structures of renewable energy 
technologies 
The role that community energy can play in energy system transformation is 
evident in countries such as Denmark and Germany. In Denmark, around 
100,000 people own shares in wind farms and the wind industry was developed 
on the back of cooperative wind farm ownership (Vaze and Tindale, 2011; 
Sørensen, 2012). As shown in section 1.3, the benefits of community energy 
have also been recognised in Germany from an early stage. Its current energy 
system transition known as the “Energiewende” (BMU, 2012a), or “energy turn” 
(Schwaegerl, 2011), is considered ‘a community and citizen project’ by the 
current parliamentary secretary of state (‘Die Energiewende ist ein Kommunal- 
und Bürgerprojekt‘, BMU, 2013). 
This transformation process of Germany’s NEF foresees communities playing 
an active role in facilitating and planning energy projects. Decentralised and 
community energy in many cases lay the foundation for local economic 
regeneration and encourage up-skilling for the exploitation of localised energy 
derived economies. Municipal utilities in particular often provide a bridging 
element between local generation and energy markets (Bulkeley and Kern, 
2006). This in turn spurs on the production sector and its momentum is 
sufficient to place decentralised renewable energy generation at the heart of 
regional political decision-making which has challenged the incumbent energy 
framework along with other pressures to an extent that the Energiewende is 
now framing market conditions derived from its benefits (Buchan, 2012). By 
integrating large sections of their supply chain, both Germany and Denmark 
have succeeded in retaining larger shares of benefits associated with 
community energy which contribute to low-carbon transitions that extend 
beyond the decarbonisation of electricity generation (adapted from Greenacre 
et al., 2010 and Vaze and Tindale, 2011).  
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The example of wind energy is particularly revealing and comparative figures for 
wind turbine ownership structures provide a good insight into the discrepancies 
between NEFs. Germany and Denmark in particular have a much greater 
market share and diversity among non-incumbent suppliers of electricity. Many 
proponents of more decentralised energy generation infrastructures therefore 
point towards energy political and regulatory models applied in these countries 
for guidance in the development of a supportive governance structure capable 
of diversifying scales and ownership structures of RETs (El Bassam and 
Maegaard, 2004; Toke, 2005a; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Vase and 
Tindale, 2011). Table 1 shows the ownership structure of wind turbines in 
selected European countries (adapted from Pollitt, 2010): 
  
Onshore wind ownership in % 
Utilities/ 
corporates 
Farmers Cooperatives 
UK 98 1 0.5 
Germany 55 35 10 
Denmark 12 63 25 
 
 
Table 1.1 points towards a near monopoly of utility and corporate ownership in 
the UK compared to much more diverse ownership structures in Denmark and 
Germany. In particular, the strong presence of cooperatively owned wind 
energy in Germany and Denmark has received considerable attention over the 
last 20 years and many countries have been seeking to emulate and replicate 
their success. Primarily, this has involved the introduction of similar governance 
structures and policy instruments capable of encouraging diverse scales and 
ownership models of development, especially FiTs (Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008; 
Tindale and Vaze, 2011). 
The UK, however, has been slow in adapting or altering its governance 
approaches to energy. The result is that its regulatory framework favours 
infrastructural replacement on a ‘like-for-like’ basis. The favoured technologies 
for the replacement of current infrastructure, gas generation, nuclear and 
offshore wind (CCC, 2011), principally benefit from economies of scale and 
reflect notions of scalar lock-in and path dependency (adapted from Mitchell, 
Table 1.1: Ownership structures of wind turbines in selected countries (Toke, 
2005a; Pollitt, 2010) 
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2008). They represent ‘like-for-like’ replacements as supply chains and 
transmission infrastructures do not require significant transformations with 
replacements or increases in generation capacity. Offshore wind is an exception 
in terms of geographical location, which requires significant investments in 
transmission infrastructures, but nevertheless represents a ‘like-for-like’ 
replacement in relation to scale. This favoured development trajectory, even 
regarding the diffusion of RETs, therefore reflects the UK’s liberalised energy 
market’s bias for scale as the diffusion of RETs in coordinated market 
economies, such as Germany or Denmark, followed more decentralised 
trajectories (Vaze and Tindale, 2011; Sørensen, 2012). Table 1.2 shows how 
this structural bias has influenced the deployment of offshore wind energy in the 
UK compared to Germany and Denmark: 
  
MW 
Number 
of sites 
% 
Capacity 
UK 598 9 40.78 
Germany 12 3 0.81 
Denmark 425.2 8 28.57 
 
 
Interestingly, the UK’s very successful deployment of offshore wind evident in 
Table 1.2 has been accompanied by significant cost increases since 2005 
(UKERC, 2010; van der Zwaan et al., 2012), rather than a cost reduction as 
might be expected with the successful diffusion of innovations and economies 
of scale (Rogers, 1995). This points towards technology forcing, even though 
the UK’s liberalised energy market’s competitive nature has aimed at avoiding 
‘picking winners’ (Mitchell, 2008; Gross et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
coordinated market economies, such as Germany or Denmark, followed more 
decentralised trajectories which is partly the result of technology pull (‘picking 
winners’) in terms of support structures provided (Mitchell, 2008; Fuchs and 
Wassermann, 2009). This is reflected by different ownership structures 
highlighted in Table 1.1 as wells as higher onshore wind turbine densities, as is 
evident from Table 1.3 on the following page: 
 
Table 1.2: Offshore wind turbine deployment and installed capacities (Snyder 
and Kaiser, 2009) 
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MW Turbines 
Area       
(sq km) 
Watts/ 
capita 
WTs/ 
100sq 
km 
UK 3580 2664 244,755 58 1.09 
Germany 26302 21226 356,840 320 5.95 
Denmark 2851 4675 43,075 518 10.85 
 
 
The diverging deployment patterns are further indication of inherently different 
development trajectories of NEFs. These tables point towards a dominance of 
utilities in the wind energy sector in the UK, although ownership structures are 
changing in Germany and Denmark due to economies of scale relating to the 
size of wind turbines, the geographical expanse of windparks and their location, 
which is increasingly offshore, making cooperative ownership (as opposed to 
co-ownership) models less likely in light of financial provisions and at-risk 
finance requirements (Vaze and Tindale, 2011; Sørensen, 2012). Onshore, 
however, ownership structures remain more diversified in both Germany and 
Denmark due to tried and tested organisational forms that encourage diversity. 
It is also evident that the UK lags behind many other northern European 
countries in the location of electricity generation capacity close to the end 
consumer (Roberts, 2008). 
Diverging development trajectories in relation to wind energy as indicated in 
Table 1.1-1.3 provide a good example of how particular lock-ins play out in 
practice as wind energy is the most mature and therefore the cheapest form of 
low-carbon generation available (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; Woodman and 
Mitchell, 2011). This thesis also covers other technologies, solar PV in 
particular, to provide an indication of technological diffusion possibilities across 
a wider range of scales and ownership structures and because solar PV is 
experiencing the fastest drop in price along with increasing diffusion and 
associated economies of scale as a result of the FiT (DECC, 2012l). 
 
1.6 Escaping lock-in and path-dependency 
Arguably, the Danish and German examples point towards country-specific 
path-dependencies as communities and individuals played important roles in 
Table 1.3: Onshore wind turbine densities and installed capacities (BWEA, 
2011) 
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developing wind projects well before this technology was in a commercial stage 
of development. Both countries experienced subsequent institutional capacity 
building parallel to wind power implementation following local support and 
bottom-up mobilisation initiating development and creating favourable local 
planning conditions. This encouraged the evolution of a heterogeneous yet 
tightly knit policy community which supported the development of institutional 
capacity important for the formation of new industries, which further broadened 
the basis for support. In both countries, path-dependency developed from this 
setup by embedding wind power as an environmentally and socially acceptable 
energy source as well as a new economic sector (Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; 
Sørensen, 2012). 
Path-dependency hereby describes the availability of policy options as a result 
from capabilities adopted during earlier periods (Mahoney, 2000). Available 
options are a function of capabilities, which were adopted at a time when 
alternatives were still available but are now reinforced and maintained by the 
status quo since empowerment is limited to actors aligned with institutional 
values at the expense of other actors (Breukers and Wolsink. 2007). This thesis 
argues that the introduction of the FiT in the UK marks an attempt at developing 
a protected experimental niche similar to the German and Dutch examples 
which follows a different development trajectory to the one favoured by the UK’s 
liberal market economy. 
In fact, the introduction of the UK FiT, despite its capacity limitations to below 
5MW, marks a more general shift towards increasing government intervention 
(adapted from Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). FiTs had already been 
implemented in 19 other European countries before their introduction in the UK 
and its introduction stands in contrast to the development of the UK energy 
market in the previous 20 years. 
During this period since electricity market liberalisation was finalised in 1989 
(HMG, 1989), UK energy governance has been characterised by encouraging 
investment (Helm, 2004), particularly from established utilities. As a result of 
rising energy prices, climate concerns and energy insecurity relating to the 
ending of the UK’s status as energy exporter in 2003, this governance 
framework has come under increasing pressure (Pollitt, 2010). Mounting 
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evidence of greater control replacing the invisible hand approach towards 
energy policy and investment in energy infrastructure reflect this notion 
(Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). 
Official energy policy related documentation provides further evidence for this 
transformation. In 2007 the Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007a) stated that 
‘independently regulated, competitive energy markets, are the most cost-
effective and efficient way of delivering our objectives’ (DTI, 2007a: 8). In 2010, 
the Energy Markets Assessment (DECC, 2010c) stated that ‘the characteristics 
of energy markets create a role for government intervention in order to ensure 
security of supply, to deliver carbon emissions and to ensure markets work fairly 
for consumers’ (DECC, 2010c: 9). Government is now committed to provide 
‘powerful new financial incentives’ which are set to make land available for the 
development of ‘smaller scale infrastructure that is needed’ (DECC, 2011b: 35). 
The government’s stance on energy policy is therefore still to let the market 
decide but it is increasingly accepting the need to slip back into the role of 
principal facilitator by providing a framework capable of guiding the invisible 
hand of the market (adapted from Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). In the case of 
the FiT, it appears as though government is even willing and able to override 
competitive market forces in favour of protected niche development with the 
potential of breaching path-dependency and lock-in, at least at the <5MW scale. 
 
1.7 Situating communities in the UK energy policy landscape 
The result is that community action is increasingly finding itself at the receiving 
end of public resources rather than being exclusively grassroots niche 
experimentations. In particular, sustainable energy generation and energy 
efficiency at a community level are making increasing appearances in 
mainstream politics and media, which has prompted some researchers to 
consider community renewable energy projects in the UK as ‘technically proven’ 
(Walker and Devine-Wright, 2006: 9). Since the late 1990s and especially since 
the 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003), ‘local’ and ‘community’ have also 
made regular occurrences in energy related publications in the UK (Walker et 
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al., 2010), suggesting that community energy is also a recognised concept in 
the policy context surrounding the governance of energy. 
Another example for this development is the acceptance that communities may 
be concerned by local impacts of windfarms (DECC, 2011b). In particular, it is 
acknowledged that the current situation whereby 50% of <50MW renewable 
energy developments, which are initially rejected by local planning committees 
but eventually get approved, may be altered by giving communities ‘both a say 
and a stake, in appropriately-sited renewable energy projects like windfarms’ 
(DECC, 2011b: 35). With the right approach and depending on the setting, it is 
also assumed that economies of scale can be achieved by community-led 
projects with associated local benefits (DECC, 2011d). 
This thesis argues that despite this recognition, both community-led and 
commercial RET deployment with significant community benefits are not yet 
widely diffusible innovations in the UK, although attempts at decentralising and 
localising electricity and heat generation are by no means a recent 
phenomenon. Current attempts at mainstreaming the vague concept of 
community energy can therefore assumed to be a consequence of the rapid 
growth of various forms and scales of community action on energy and climate 
change (EST, 2012). It might also reflect an increasing realisation that the 
decarbonisation of energy, especially electricity, through entirely centralised 
channels of diffusion and communication might give the false impression that a 
business-as-usual (BAU) approach of passive consumerism can be continued 
by society in light of climate change mitigation and adaptation requirements 
(adapted from DECC, 2010a). 
 
1.8 What is UK community energy? 
As the political recognition of community energy appears to be underway, the 
purpose of pursuing community energy is as variable as the choice of 
technology and the scale of generation. Some forms of community energy may 
be revenue generating, some may reduce energy bills or offset rising energy 
costs while others again may play a decisive role in providing local energy 
needs (Hargreaves, 2011a). In some cases, community energy represents the 
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sole source of electricity for off-grid communities (with backup capacity from 
fossil fuel generators) (Gubbins, 2007; Munday et al., 2011). The scale of 
community energy projects varies accordingly, ranging from single PV arrays on 
school halls or parish churches to wind turbines, even wind farms. Ownership 
structures are equally diverse, including community-owned and self-funded 
projects, energy self-sufficient island communities based on grant funding or 
renewable energy farms only partly (share-) owned by communities 
(Hargreaves, 2011a; Munday et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012).  
Table 1.4 indicates the wide range of project activities and aims from a study 
performed by Hargreaves (2011a) for the Community Innovation for Sustainable 
Energy (CISE) project, which involved the analysis of 113 community energy 
case study reports.  
  
 
 
Specific technological interest may reflect the banding of specific technologies 
according to the FiT as well as the maturity of technological applicability. The 
motivations for community energy in its various forms are depicted in Table 1.5 
on the following page. 
Table 1.4: Engagement with renewable energy technologies according to 
technology (n= 113, multiple nominations possible) (adapted from 
Hargreaves, 2011a: 17) 
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What all these forms of community energy and decentralised energy provision 
in general have in common is the potential to switch passive consumers to ‘co-
providers’ (van Vilet and Chappells, 1999). These new ownership structures 
bridge not only the spatial but also the psychological distance between 
generation and consumption, a major characteristic of our current energy 
provision system (Pasqualetti, 1999). 
The vagueness of these assertions nevertheless begs the question of how 
community energy can be defined. Its broad scope is encapsulated by the 
concept of grassroots community energy developments, defined by CISE as the 
experimentation with new consumption practices (Hielscher et al., 2011), and 
the technical definition of decentralised energy provided by the DTI (2006b), 
which covers developments that connect to the low voltage power distribution 
network at 132kW and below as well as Combined Heat and Power 
Technologies. 
For the sake of this thesis however, these two definitions do not cover the 
specific policy framework surrounding the FiT nor potential community energy 
development scales. It requires an expansion to include individuals, businesses, 
community groups, local authorities and utilities as well as cooperatives, 
development trusts, community charities and limited companies at the bottom 
end of the scale (Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010) and hybrid or entirely 
commercial developments with community benefits at the top end. According to 
Table 1.5: Engagement with project aims (n=113, multiple nominations 
possible) (Hargreaves, 2011a: 20) 
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the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), community 
interest groups include: 
A parish council or a body with a local connection which is constituted in one of 
the following ways: a company limited by guarantee, or an Industrial and 
Provident Society (of either sort – a co-operative or a community benefit 
society), a Community Interest Company or any other body which is registered 
as a charity, including a Charitable Organisation. A community interest group 
will be considered to have a local connection if its primary purpose is concerned 
with the local authority’s area, or the neighbourhood in which the asset is 
situated where this is in more than one authority’s area. (DCLG, 2011a) 
Community generally refers to geographical communities but certain 
communities of interest, such as the farming community, are also included in 
this analysis as similar opportunities and barriers arise regarding the 
development of decentralised energy projects. Once a project moves beyond 
the planning stage, community refers more specifically to stakeholders, joint 
ownership and liability. Nevertheless, the comparison of community energy 
projects is by no means a straightforward process as a wide range of scales 
and ownership structures are grouped under this heading. What all these 
definitions have in common is that energy provision is linked in some way or 
another to a community and that ownership inevitably represents a devolution of 
power from government, incumbent actors and industry to a local area. 
In how far this devolution of power encourages the creation of social networks 
that enable the provision and diffusion of energy through learning processes is 
a similarly controversial topic. According to Walker et al. (2007: 2655), 
‘community’ embodies ‘implications and assumptions about the nature and 
quality of relationships between people and organisations’ that are part of ‘the 
community’ (adapted from Hoffman and High-Pippert, 2005). Government 
appears to assume a more simple definition relating to geographical 
communities as the following areas of community energy are of particular 
relevance to energy policy: 
 ‘Development of commercially owned schemes at a community scale; 
 Development of community led (and potentially owned) schemes; 
 Development of take up of community scale energy technology [NB – 
community energy technology is not always Microgeneration – often 
community scale technologies are larger]; 
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 Provision of information and support to develop community energy 
projects’ (Allcorn, 2010b) 
The renewable energy diffusion potential arising through, and in relation to, 
these community (share and co-) ownership variations is heavily influenced by 
the FiT in terms of bottom-up development and other support mechanisms, 
such as the RO for top-down developments. The primary focus of this thesis 
therefore lies on FiT eligible electricity generating technologies and community 
projects but explorations into the areas of heat generation and demand 
reduction as well as scales in excess of the UK FiT also feature to complete the 
picture. 
 
1.9 Thesis structure 
Following this introduction to the NEF surrounding FiTs, community energy and 
the diffusion of RETs, the following chapters analyse and evaluate related 
theories and policies which form the basis for the methodology. The second half 
of this thesis contains two analytical chapters and a discussion and conclusion 
chapter. 
The next chapter introduces, analyses and evaluates theories surrounding the 
governance of energy, technological diffusion and social innovation. In 
particular, the diffusion of innovations theory, transition theory and niche 
management theory are used to place policies and technologies relating to 
community energy within overarching energy systems and NEFs. By 
embedding community energy within these theories, the theoretical framework 
explores the capacity of governments to shape technological diffusion 
trajectories and associated social practices through the governance of energy 
policy and regulation. This chapter also marries technological and social 
innovation concepts resulting from multi-scalar and diverse approaches to 
technological diffusion with the capacity of NEFs to enable non-incumbents to 
tap into these innovation systems in terms of localised technological diffusion 
and derived benefits. Various concepts ranging from Science and Technology 
Studies to evolutionary economics are merged into a framework that both 
explains and hypothesizes the governance of energy generation infrastructures 
through diverse approaches to scales and ownership structures. Change 
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agents, or intermediaries, are also introduced as diffusion drivers and facilitators 
converting top-down facilitation into bottom-up action. 
Chapter 3 – The Policy Framework – analyses the development of renewable 
energy support mechanisms within the UK’s NEF. By comparing the UK to other 
European countries, this approach allows country-specific energy infrastructural 
development trajectories to be placed in the context of internal and external 
pressures, which in turn provides explanations for the specific development 
pathway of the UK FiT, its position within the UK’s NEF and its strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to the surrounding regulatory framework. It also provides 
an introduction to the changing UK energy policy landscape and the position of 
community energy. By comparing the UK’s community energy niche and the 
diffusion of RETs in general with that of other countries, a framework for 
analysis of energy policy, particularly the FiT, is developed. 
Chapter 4 – Methodology – provides an overview of methodological approaches 
used in this thesis. It commences by exploring the study area, followed by 
methodological options adopted in previous studies in some way or another 
related to this thesis’ approach. They are contrasted in order to determine and 
support this thesis’ methodology considering the scope and scale of the study 
area in relation to the Aims and Objectives outlined in this chapter. The 
introduction of the empirical element of this thesis is designed to enlighten how 
the findings for the following analysis chapters have been obtained and 
analysed. Details of the interviewee sample and the sampling strategy are also 
outlined, along with categorisations and coding procedures. 
The methodology chapter is followed by two analysis chapters which are based 
on the objectives outlined at the beginning of this chapter. These chapters 
analyse the interviews conducted with actors representing various aspects of 
the NEF according to this thesis’ aims and objectives and the theories that are 
developed and analysed in the preceding chapters. 
The first analysis chapter evaluates the role that the FiT has played in the 
recent growth of interest in community energy. It also assesses what barriers 
remain in place preventing more widespread diffusion of community energy, 
especially in relation to policy, planning and investment uncertainty. The role of 
change agents in the diffusion, transformation, transition and niche-building 
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process is of particular interest. The term is loosely applied to activists at the 
community level, intermediaries involved in developing community energy and 
facilitators ranging from planners to government representatives that enable this 
niche to develop and sustain itself. Their capacities to determine the scale and 
ownership structure of community energy is analysed in relation to the large-
scale and centralised ownership bias of the UK’s liberalised energy market as 
well as the increasing devolution of power and responsibility that accompany 
the scaling-back of state intervention. 
The second analysis chapter draws upon several aspects of the previous 
chapter and assesses how technological innovations are diffused within the UK 
NEF. In particular, the capacity for various scales and ownership structures of 
community energy and related developments are analysed with regard to 
applicable support measures. Throughout, several comparisons are drawn to 
other European countries in order to distinguish path-dependent developments 
from those that appear to be capable of fostering new development trajectories 
and determine the capacities of governments to influence these developments. 
In the discussion and conclusion, various important findings throughout the 
thesis are synthesized and interwoven with the aims and objectives along with 
theoretical and practical implications. It concludes by highlighting areas where 
further research is necessary considering the time and scalar restrictions that 
limit the scope of PhD theses. 
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Chapter 2 – Theories of Governance and Innovation 
 
2 Introduction 
The difficulties of developing certain scales of renewable energy development in 
the UK relate to a myriad of factors and the exact barriers are difficult to 
pinpoint. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the governance arrangements 
in the UK play a crucial role in determining the policy landscapes, which in turn 
are at least partly responsible for the scales and ownership models of 
development that are likely to succeed. This chapter analyses energy policy 
through theories and concepts of governance, transitions, innovations and 
niches in relation to scale and ownership. It starts with the overarching 
framework of multi-level governance and multi-level perspectives of governance 
and innovation as well as Science and Technology studies in which these 
theories are embedded. This is followed by more specific ideas surrounding the 
governance of socio-technical regimes, transition theories, the diffusion of 
innovations theory and strategic niche management. These form the basis of 
the argument developed throughout the following chapters. 
 
2.1 Governance and multi-level perspectives 
The origins of governance concepts lie in new institutional economics (North, 
1990), economic sociology (Polanyi, 1944; Ganovetter, 1985) and regime 
theory relating to international relations (Rosenau, 1991). Governance can be 
conceptualised and understood in many different ways. From a political 
economy perspective it may be interpreted as an immanent process, embedded 
in the social relations of production, or as an intentional process, whereby the 
state seeks to secure a particular outcome through active intervention (Bridge 
and Perreault, 2009). Either way, it acts as an enabler for the coordination of 
‘rules and collective action within the political realm’ (Stoker, 2004: 22). Further 
interpretations of governance range from an implicit focus on ‘governing 
mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of 
government’ (Wilson, 2003: 318) to the encompassment of many forms of 
governing, ranging from the hierarchical state through coordination and 
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cooperation among networks of actors to self-governing mechanisms (Kooiman, 
2003), which draw back on the immanent/intentional dichotomy.  
This is a slightly different interpretation from Jessop’s (1998) assertion that 
central government maintains its dominance by governing the rules of the game 
but it nevertheless assumes that political authority is multi-layered, operating 
across overlapping spatial and hierarchical scales (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). 
Various spheres of governance reflect multiple tiers of government (Bulkeley 
and Betsil, 2005), which problematise ‘state-centric notions of regulation’ 
(Bridge and Perreault, 2009: 476). Ultimately, governance refers to the 
‘fundamental question of how organisations, decisions, order and rule are 
achieved in heterogeneous and highly differentiated societies’ (Bridge and 
Perreault, 2009: 476). 
Despite the varying definitions and interpretations of governance there appears 
to be an acceptance of the notion that we are witnessing an increasing shift 
from government to governance (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999, author’s 
emphasis), which is reflected by the relative decline of the state’s direct 
interventionary capacity. Authority may be either increasingly limited to a 
number of non-overlapping jurisdictions at various levels or governance might 
be conceived as a more fluid and complex setting involving innumerable yet 
flexible overlapping jurisdictions that emerge and disappear with demands for 
governance (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). The dissolution of previously clearly 
demarcated areas of ‘private’ and ‘public’ can also be interpreted as a reflection 
thereof by stressing the importance of governance in shaping social and 
economic processes of change (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). This has led to 
some views claiming a ‘post-political condition’ where the sole purpose of 
politics is reminiscent of tactical practices for consensus building in light of 
appropriate and necessary actions required to tackle external threats 
(Swyngedouw, 2007). 
In taking a similar point of view, Howlett (2009) interprets governance as the 
overarching long-term structure, while policy is more prone to change, possibly 
reflecting this notion of tactical practice within a path-dependent and locked-in 
governance framework (adapted from Mahoney, 2000; Mitchell, 2008; Unruh, 
2000): 
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While the specific content of abstract policy goals will change from context to 
context, it has often been observed that high level government goals and 
implementation preferences are not random but rather tend to cluster over time 
into favoured sets of ideas and instruments, or governance modes [...]. The 
existence of these fairly long-term and stable governance arrangements helps 
explain relatively constant general implementation preferences. (Howlett, 2009: 
76) 
Concerning the diffusion of innovations, governance may be interpreted as an 
interwoven element of the prevailing innovation system, or regulatory state 
paradigm (Mitchell, 2008), both shaped by and feeding back into its trajectory. 
 
2.1.1 Environmental governance 
When governance is perceived as a form of collective action for resource 
management it may be interpreted as a critique of Hardin’s (1968) notion of ‘the 
tragedy of the commons’ and the failure of collective ownership since some 
examples of forestry, pasture and fisheries governance point to at least limited 
resilience rather than entire failure of collective resource management (Bridge 
and Perreault, 2009). According to the state regulatory perspective on 
governance, regulation, including environmental regulation, does not 
necessarily stem from state-centric administrative and legal structures but may 
develop through multi-scalar interactions and negotiated consents from various 
state and non-state actors (MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). 
Parallel to the decline of the state’s interventionary capacity, the role of non-
state actors (change agents) in carrying out actions previously monopolised by 
the state is increasing. It can therefore be argued that the concept of 
‘environmental governance’ captures the multi-scalar nature of the existing 
neoliberal governance framework (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). Environmental 
governance is used as an analytical framework for the analysis of institutional 
arrangements, spatial scales, organisational structures and social actors within 
a wide range of environmental and resource related frameworks (Bridge and 
Perreault, 2009). Market-liberal environmental governance is privileging market-
based over state-led approaches, which might be interpreted as the 
abovementioned shift from government to governance. One example is the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). As the name implies, the 
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scheme seeks to reduce GHG emissions through a market-based trading 
scheme as it is assumed that regulated market mechanisms will do a better job 
at finding innovative and effective environmental solutions, thanks to the profit 
motive, compared to solutions devised, implemented, and enforced by states 
(Mansfield, 2004: 313). The same holds true for the RO as it was originally 
devised (Mitchell, 2008). 
However, environmental governance also seeks to challenge incumbent power 
structures ranging from the national to the regional and local level. It covers 
aspects of decentralisation as this is seen as both a way of promoting efficiency 
through increasing competition at sub-national units as well as a means of 
localising  decision-making to those affected by governance in order to promote 
higher participation and accountability. This arguably allows for the more 
efficient use of precise time and place-specific knowledge, particularly in 
relation to natural resources (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006:303), although it once 
again points to the erosion of centralised decision-making structures. This is in 
line with the shift towards neoliberal modes of environmental governance, 
whose origins lie in New Institutional Economics (Coase, 1998). It is assumed to 
be scale free but it seeks to address many different scales of environmental 
concern, ranging from global environmental problems such as climate change 
to regional pollution standards and resource management principles (Bridge 
and Perreault, 2009). 
Changes within this complex system, according to Bergek et al. (2008), come 
about by influencing the direction of search in relation to innovations. Pressures 
associated with the governance framework direct actors’ activities towards 
certain areas within the technological innovation system. Resulting 
entrepreneurial experimentation moves the function towards new technologies 
and social learning processes required to reduce uncertainty. Legitimisation 
moves innovations towards social acceptance and compliance with relevant 
institutions, while resource mobilisation enables human capital and 
entrepreneurship to gain access to adequate management and financial capital. 
Despite this apparent linearity, however, ‘regimes do not determine the 
development but provide for alignment of actions performed by the actors of the 
system’ (Hillman et al., 2009: 6). 
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2.1.2 Energy governance 
Energy provision and energy governance address a wide range of scales and 
innovation trajectories in the pursuit of diffusing energy developments for the 
wider public good. In doing so, energy governance needs to ensure leadership, 
steer innovation, change behaviours and ensure accountability among many 
other important objectives. The governance of energy therefore requires the 
coordination of networks and interlinking of organisations, people, technology 
and practices across multiple scales, for both generation and demand. Despite 
its potentially wide range of application and effect, energy governance is 
generally located at the meso-level between the national political economy and 
specific policies (Smith, 2009). According to this interpretation, the nature of 
governance at the local and national level shape the governance of our system 
of energy provision and technological deployment, which is referred to as the 
national energy framework (NEF) in this thesis, and associated policy and 
regulatory trajectories as well as the scale at which energy systems develop by 
reflecting social and economic values and behaviours (Watson and Devine-
Wright, 2010). 
The reciprocal relationship between NEFs and infrastructures determines the 
nature of ‘policy instruments’ as mechanisms shaping governance 
arrangements. ‘Policy settings’ refer to the scope and scale of a mechanism 
(strong/weak, prescriptive/suggestive). Path-dependency and lock-in hereby 
refer to technology as well as the policymaking institutions that were either 
developed or prioritised when other objectives dominated (Unruh, 2000; 
Mitchell, 2008). This is particularly relevant within contemporary UK energy 
governance as the following chapter points towards an energy system 
development trajectory along the distinct governance pathway of free market 
principles of liberalisation in the last 30 years (Mitchell, 2008). 
The exact governance and policy arrangements have yet to develop for more 
radical change with the capacity to encourage large-scale investment and the 
behavioural changes needed for the transition to a sustainable energy system 
on the pathway to a low carbon economy but some have already been hinted at 
by comparing the UK’s approach to that of other countries. Changes will 
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inevitably involve many losers as winners will emerge and be created in the 
process of re-regulation in line with the different governance framework required 
(Smith, 2009; Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). The losing side will most definitely 
encompass many aspects of the fossil-fuel based production and generation 
system currently sustained through liberalised market frameworks due to the 
different, if not opposing nature of sustainable energy systems (Hvelplund, 
2006). It is therefore not surprising that the privatised energy market is 
struggling with the sustainability and particularly the renewables challenge as 
the institutions developed to promote liberalisation are not necessarily capable 
of promoting the transition towards a sustainable energy system (Mitchell, 
2008). 
As indicated in the previous chapter, low-carbon and renewable technologies in 
particular are heavily front-end loaded, which implies high investment costs and 
low running costs, thereby increasing the investment risk due to high 
percentages of sunk costs from the onset of generation (Hvelplund, 2006). As 
an example, from the first day of generation less than 50% of a coal fired power 
stations’ life-cycle costs for the next 20 years have been paid compared to 
around 80% for wind turbines. The electricity market therefore determines only 
20% of the total costs for wind turbines (Hvelplund, 2006). 
As a result, RET diffusion necessitates the establishment of a competitive 
equipment market, as their physical structures represent the largest cost 
fraction (Hvelplund, 2006), as well as a protected niche market where related 
at-risk investments do not compete on equal terms with those of the fossil-fuel 
industry (adapted from Kemp et al., 2009; Fuchs and Wassermann, 2009). 
Prescriptive rather than suggestive policy mechanisms are required for 
overcoming these obstacles. However, this might not be possible within the 
current governance arrangement as the major barriers to a successful transition 
of this system relate to entrenched free market principles of the liberalised 
energy system which is struggling with the concepts of explicit technology 
choice (‘picking winners’), direct interventions for infrastructure provision and 
prescriptive policies constraining consumer behaviour (Mitchell, 2008; Smith, 
2009).  
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The UK’s focus on market-based instruments (i.e. the RO), rather than other 
instruments, such as a price-based systems (such as FiTs), and associated 
governance approaches relate to the institutional arrangements developed for 
and during the phase of energy market liberalisation. However, sustainable 
energy governance needs capacity and institution building to open up 
technological diffusion towards new scales and ownership structures along with 
more sustainable energy systems that weak and suggestive technological 
policies are currently not capable of delivering. The question is whether energy 
governance within the UK’s NEF has the capacity or sufficient critical mass to 
transform the energy system and whether there is the will to increase diversity 
through non-market-based support mechanisms (Watson et al., 2006). The 
introduction of the small-scale FiT alongside the RO is interpreted as a tentative 
step in this direction, although energy policy decision-making ultimately needs 
to recognise the complex interdependencies that determine policy success and 
failure while exercising authority with regard to the increasingly wide range of 
actors involved with energy (Smith, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 The governance of new technologies 
Energy governance has traditionally started with the governance of (existing) 
technology, which in turn is often conceptualised as a subsection of innovation 
policy. It is useful to conceptualise technology both in terms of its importance for 
resilience (Young et al., 2006), even though the term resilience is still contested 
(Stirling, 2008a), and its threat to resilience as technology can have both an 
enabling and a restricting function (Smith and Stirling, 2008). 
Berkhout and Goulson (2003) identify four ways in which technologies interact 
with our ecosystem. These include technologies used for monitoring, analysing 
and evaluating the ecosystem; those that stimulate economic growth and the 
restructuring of social development which potentially impact several socio-
technical systems such as mass aviation, internet as well as the mutually 
reinforcing growth in factory fishing and fish consumption; efficiency improving 
technologies which include production technologies (such as renewables) and 
consumer technologies (such as A++ household goods); and technologies 
specifically aimed at reducing environmental impacts of existing activities, such 
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as an alteration of agricultural practices to encourage biodiversity (Berkhout and 
Goulson, 2003). 
Within a socio-ecological framework, technology plays a more or less 
ambiguous role while the socio-technical literature considers sustainable 
technological change an important element in the transition to a low-carbon 
system (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Rotmans et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2005). The 
challenges both face are similar but the favoured response varies between 
adaptive governance, which is seen as a means of improving the resilience of 
socio-ecological systems, and transition management, which seeks to promote 
sustainable socio-technical systems (Foxon et al., 2008). Fuchs (2012) takes a 
similar approach to governance responses by distinguishing between the 
pathway of adaptation to external pressures and the pathway of exploring new 
technologies, albeit with a more socio-technical focus in both cases. 
The technological pathway of adaptation modifies conventional technologies 
according to changing circumstances (e.g. CCS in Norway) (Fuchs, 2012). 
Associated governance arrangements are conceptualised as an integral 
process as it relies on the scalar interlinking between stakeholders whose 
participation integrates planning, experimentation and implementation among 
various institutions (Olsson et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 2009). This is necessary 
due to the complex, non-linear and unpredictable nature of innovation systems 
(Leach et al., 2007). Responses by government may partly reflect the fact that 
emerging technologies never appear fully formed and in obvious working order 
(Bijker, 1997). 
The pathway of exploration, on the other hand, sees the development and 
diffusion of new (cleaner) technologies (e.g. renewable energy in Germany) 
(Fuchs, 2012), as ‘predicated on facilitating changes in broader social, 
economic and political systems’ (Smith and Stirling, 2008: 6). Its holistic 
approach also acknowledges the more widespread changes required rather 
than the sole application of individual technologies, including individual RETs, 
such as offshore wind. Social processes play an important role in shaping the 
development and use of technologies but artefacts in turn may also provide a 
basis for the development of new social practices (Russell and Williams, 2002). 
Our fossil-fuel based electricity system has been effectively shaped by 
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governance and institutions originally developed to facilitate the operation and 
expansion of these systems. This in turn reinforced the development and 
usefulness of an increasingly growing variety of electricity-using goods and 
services (Smith and Stirling, 2008), which arguably represents technological 
lock-in (adapted from Unruh, 2000). 
Those without access to the grid, on the other hand, are excluded but this 
socio-technical system now provides socially valued functions, even though 
they condition the ways these functions are conceived. The socio-technical 
systems perspective allows technological development to be understood ‘in 
terms of the complex adaptive processes constituting the interdependencies 
between the material and the social’ (Smith and Stirling, 2008: 6). 
 
2.1.4 The governance of the diffusion of innovations 
The governance of energy is intrinsically linked to these technologies as well as 
the diffusion of technological and associated social innovations (Henderson, 
1996) capable of changing or at least challenging the current carbon-intense 
lock-in. Achieving the latter, however, requires the alignment of energy 
governance with the diffusion of innovations capable of addressing societal 
objectives, such as sustainability, climate change mitigation and resource 
efficiency. According to Hillman et al. (2009) there is a lack of research of 
governance arrangements capable of steering innovation processes, 
particularly with the abovementioned internal pressures and external challenges 
in mind. 
Environmental and sustainable technologies (defined as technologies capable 
of radically reducing environmental impacts without sacrificing societal and 
economic standards) therefore require a specific governance framework. This is 
partly due to the environment being a public good and environmental and 
sustainable technologies being associated with a wide range of externalities 
(Hillman et al., 2009) and partly down to the abovementioned issues of 
structural disadvantage raised by Hvelplund (2006). According to the concepts 
of large technical systems (Hughes, 1987), socio-technical systems (Geels, 
2004) and regulatory state paradigms (Mitchell, 2008), however, the 
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development, promotion and diffusion of these technologies is essential to 
overcome their disadvantages when competing (economically) with incumbent 
technologies in the absence of either environmentally internalising or niche 
markets (adapted from Raven, 2005). 
In line with the changes from government to governance, the last 20 years, 
according to Treib et al. (2007), have witnessed a shift from traditional 
regulatory approaches (standards, taxes, bans) to ‘softer’ measures focussing 
on consensus, voluntarism and procedure in order to gain stronger ownership 
and implementation capacity. This again points towards the policy setting 
shifting from strong prescriptive policies towards weak and more suggestive 
policies. There are signs that this is being increasingly reversed (i.e. ban of 
incandescent light bulbs) and it remains a heavily contested concept. It now 
appears that hybrid forms of governance are emerging that combine traditional 
top-down prescriptive regulation with more voluntary, suggestive and informal 
measures (Hillman et al., 2009). 
 
2.1.5 The governance of diffusion niches 
Where these measures are unlikely to succeed, however, there is still the need 
for top-down prescriptive and managerial intervention. Strategic niche 
management (SNM) is described by Kemp and Loorbach (2003) as a 
governance arrangement in itself in light of diminishing capacities to determine 
or steer trajectories. It is a theory surrounding the creation, protection and 
promotion of innovative niches which ultimately increase the choice of 
instruments and actions available to help society escape lock-ins (Kemp and 
Loorbach, 2003). Niches can refer to individual technologies and the individuals, 
communities, organisations and businesses involved in their development and 
promotion. Niches can also refer to market niches reminiscent of ideas put 
forward by Porter and van der Linde (1995, Porter Hypothesis) surrounding the 
triggering of innovation through strict environmental regulation. The latter can 
act as ‘incubation rooms’ for the former by enabling technologies to mature 
without the pressure of market selection (Verbong and Geels, 2010). 
In this thesis the niche concept is expanded further to include social innovation 
associated with community energy which depends both on the FiT dependent 
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technological niche and the FiT itself as a market niche (see 2.3.4 for more 
information). In relation to innovation, community energy is more likely to come 
up with radical solutions while the technology itself is generally supplied by 
incumbent companies dependent on changes in supply and demand in line with 
incumbent economical structures. These potentially radical solutions result from 
the channelling of expectations towards community energy. This leads to the 
development of mutually supportive networks which share experiences and 
lessons that develop within the community energy niche (adapted from 
Hielscher, 2011). 
The FiT provides the market niche enabling this variety of community energy 
concepts to develop but the policy niche for community energy goes beyond 
economic incentives. It includes the removal of barriers such as those within the 
planning system and the development of system-innovations along long-term 
policy goals which in turn will mainstream the concept and give direction to R&D 
and innovation (adapted from Kemp and Loorbach, 2003 and Buchan, 2012). 
The existence of the FiT is therefore responsible for the existence of the 
community energy niche as RETs at the FiT scale resemble strategically 
managed individual technological niches due to the 5MW restriction and the 
limits to technological application in communities as a result of planning laws 
and ownership issues. 
The strategic management of technological and/or market niches marks the first 
step in the creation of a community energy sub-niche and in the field of energy, 
niches generally deal with technologies that have yet to reach the point of 
commercial break-through (commercialisation). Experimentation within this 
niche is expected to randomly expand hands-on knowledge and certain 
subsidies may be interpreted through this lens. Jacobsson and Lauber (2006) 
analysed price fixing as an example of a technology-specific market measure. 
In general, however, it is a normative theory which offers little guidance to 
empirical testing but niche creation can be analysed in relation to their influence 
on functionality (Conen et al., 2009). 
Hegger et al. (2007), for instance, use the SNM concept to promote policies 
rather than technologies by looking into conceptual new regimes with both 
social and technical elements, which makes it applicable to various scales of 
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change, ranging from economy-wide decarbonisations to community energy 
projects. This theory assumes that governments have the power and political 
will to incentivise and manage niches through a variety of prescriptive and 
suggestive policies such as tax exemptions, subsidies, public private financing, 
relaxing existing regulations, and other mechanisms, such as social learning 
which results in the social embedding of innovative technology. It therefore 
offers the possibility of synthesising a wide range of geographical concepts in 
relation to innovations as it deals with both regional innovation systems and 
clusters or agglomerations.  
SNM is critiqued by Lovell (2007) as being top-down and lacking recognition of 
the ‘messiness’ of real world politics. Case studies also question whether niches 
can become powerful enough to overturn existing regimes, particularly if these 
niches are radical and difficult to translate into regime practices (Smith and 
Stirling, 2006). As an analytical tool, SNM nevertheless provides an insight into 
governance frameworks capable of mainstreaming emerging sustainability 
innovations by creating the space for niche experimentation with the possibility 
of encouraging consecutive up-scaling. Networks of actors play an important 
role in diffusing technologies further afield (i.e. decentralised energy) by making 
them more applicable beyond the niche through de-contextualisation and the 
development of shared rules and models independent of local contexts (Coenen 
et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 The governance of decentralised energy generation 
The management of (challenging) niches by government may be interpreted by 
market incumbents as a challenge/vote of non-confidence that centralised 
generation structures can provide for a more sustainable society and economy 
and lay the foundation for a transition (Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010). It 
stands in opposition to the integration of sustainability aspects into existing 
energy infrastructures. Hvelplund’s (2006) two discourses on the governance of 
renewables point towards the properties (limitations) of renewables and other 
forms of decentralised generation as well as the limitations of NEFs in which 
implementation is taking place. The governance of political authority in relation 
to renewable energy is effectively multi-level and multi-scalar (Bridge and 
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Perreault, 2009), ranging from external top-down pressures to managed or 
challenging bottom-up niches (adapted from Fuchs, 2012; Parag and Janda, 
2010). It reflects the multi-level perspective (MLP) of system innovations as 
theorised by Geels (2002). 
Centralised energy generation is a reflection of the economic development 
process and this trajectory is also indicative of social and economic values and 
behaviours and the nature of governance at sub-national levels and scales. As 
indicated throughout this thesis, it is questionable whether this approach can 
provide for a more sustainable society and economy and lay the foundation for 
a transition towards a truly low-carbon economy. A major problem associated 
with centralised technology options lies in their limited capacity to facilitate more 
decentralised governance structures and service-based business models that 
could foster significant demand-side cuts in energy use (Vaze and Tindale, 
2011). It is also questionable whether the greening of centralised energy 
provision is capable of fostering greater engagement in energy and developing 
concepts of resilience (Pasqualetti, 1999). 
The main challenges of setting up decentralised electricity generation within our 
liberalised market framework are the high costs, as indicated by Ofgem (2007-
2009; 2009), particularly if it challenges a dominant centralised structure already 
in place (see Chapter 1). However, if increasing decentralisation is considered 
part of a large scale transformation of the UK energy engagement system it 
would be one project among many not mutually exclusive developments. The 
centralised option represents very much a BAU scenario in terms of 
infrastructure provision and reinforcement and it is questionable in how far other 
parts of the economy can move beyond their BAU trajectory if the system 
sustaining it remains incumbent, path-dependent and characterised by lock-in 
(see techno-institutional complex that fosters lock-in in electric power networks 
by Unruh, 2000: 826-827). A decentralised power grid will still rely on 
centralised power infrastructure, especially gas fired generation, to help balance 
supply and demand patterns within and between local areas (Vaze and Tindale, 
2011; Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010), as well as large generation capacity 
close to production and population centres. It nevertheless has greater 
capacities for increasing engagement and with appropriate storage technologies 
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some of these shortcomings may be overcome in the medium to long term to 
make way for a more sustainable energy system (Vaze and Tindale, 2011). 
As decentralised generation is generally based on RETs, the governance of 
these technologies needs to take the dispersed nature of the natural resources 
into account that RETs tap into. Unlike conventional power stations, renewables 
may also be located within residential areas. Their deployment therefore 
requires an entirely different set of consultation and participation models, 
especially once renewables represent an increasing market share (Hvelplund, 
2006). Decentralisation through the deployment of renewable energy sources 
also entails various organisational, regulatory, governance and social 
components, of which engagement through scale and ownership are probably 
the major differences to centralised structures. Renewables and decentralised 
energy in general can be in the hands of businesses, individuals, community 
groups, local authorities as well as energy companies, though usually not of the 
multinational type, as government is increasingly recognising (see the next 
chapter for more details). Markets and regulations can also be decentralised to 
reflect different regional or local priorities (Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010). 
At the governance level, there is considerable scope for sub-national institutions 
to play a greater role but so far, few good examples exist in the UK such as the 
local authorities of Woking and London. In general, Local Authorities in the UK 
have very little influence over the shape of energy systems and therefore, local 
energy generation is rare (Vaze and Tindale, 2011; Watson and Devine-Wright, 
2010). 
 
2.2.1 Market incentive programmes and the diffusion of innovations 
These examples of governance point towards a tendency to use suggestive 
policy settings to encourage decentralised energy generation and the diffusion 
of innovations. Purely technical barriers within this system, on the other hand, 
tend to be addressed by introducing and maintaining prescriptive legislation, 
which is known as technology forcing. Regarding RETs, legislation and policy 
tend to either relate to environmental considerations or they focus on creating 
and managing the abovementioned niches where technologies can be 
46 
 
developed beyond the pressures of the market, or socio-technical regime 
(Verbong et al., 2006). 
Market incentive programmes, which have been launched in several countries 
in order to promote the uptake primarily of RETs that are expected to reach grid 
parity within a reasonable time limit, usually 20 years, can be considered 
policies promoting the development and management of such niches (adapted 
from Coenen et al., 2009). The two principal market incentive programmes for 
RETs in the EU are the ‘feed-in model’, which was pioneered in Germany in the 
early 1990s, and the ‘certificate market model’ based on a politically set quota 
and price model (Hvelplund, 2006). The primary objective of the latter is to drive 
down prices while feed-in models take the opposite path of not exposing 
projects developers to price competition (Butler and Neuhoff, 2004), and this is 
expanded on in the following chapter. 
Either of these market incentive programmes by themselves, however, fail to 
address resistance and conflicting views from a wide range of stakeholders. 
Purely technological projects are therefore less likely to succeed if they fail to 
address the societal diffusion process (Verbong et al., 2006) necessary for 
socio-cultural transformations required for addressing macro-scale problems 
(Geels, 2002). The creation of social networks and accompanying learning 
processes allow for the adjustment of technologies as well as the societal 
embedding of technologies, which increases the chances of successful diffusion 
of innovations (Verbong, et al., 2006). Embedding this development requires a 
social science approach which looks beyond vested interests and the 
technological resource base to include political, institutional, societal, cultural 
and environmental aspects of technological diffusion. This can both contribute 
to the enhancement of transitions and diffusion theory as well as help develop 
and promote social networks of niche diffusion (Verbong et al., 2006). 
The role that geographical communities can play in the creation of social 
networks that enable the provision and diffusion of energy through learning 
processes is quite a controversial topic and the difficulty of defining community 
is elaborated on in the previous chapter. Many studies and reports relating to 
community energy have shown that the relative failure of the diffusion of 
onshore RETs is linked to the difficulty of getting communities on board (see 
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Verbong et al., 2006; Gray, 2011; Pineo and Shaw, 2011) and this forms one of 
the backdrops of this analysis. 
 
2.2.2 The governance of community energy 
Community energy, the smallest scale of collective renewable energy 
deployment, relies on a governance framework very much focused on fostering 
understandings between the material and the social. According to Geels et al. 
(2008), new modes of governance are contributing to the unlocking and 
proliferation of diffusion, development and deployment pathways but due to the 
lack of a coherent governance framework, there remains a considerable variety 
of possibilities in any specific geographical location (Rydin et al., 2011). Some 
of these pathways are developed through agency, often involving different 
organisations and individuals that are initiating change. However, this poses 
difficulties for the planning system, particularly for local infrastructure planning. 
New governance arrangements may be necessary, which enable more adaptive 
and reflexive forms of governance in planning local energy systems (Rydin et 
al., 2011). 
Walker et al. (2007) interpreted government approaches to community energy 
within a predominantly liberalised energy market as a change in governance 
‘towards a more cooperative, multi-actor and bottom-up distributed model, 
linking national policy to local activism and providing spaces for innovation in 
both the process and form of carbon reduction activity’ (Walker et al., 2007:65). 
The UK approach was only considered marginally successful due to the 
difficulties of developing an adequate, coordinated and consensual framework. 
This has been of particular relevance regarding the different scales of 
intervention, action and short-term and long-term energy policy objectives. 
Community energy finds itself struggling to balance climate change and security 
of supply concerns in the midst of a discourse regarding the benefits of new and 
distributed supply infrastructures versus existing centralised energy 
infrastructures and supply chains. At the same time, community energy needs 
to negotiate priorities between demand reduction and supply transition 
approaches (Walker et al., 2007; Vaze and Tindale, 2011). 
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Government rhetoric in this area of energy governance and policy is changing, 
as indicated in the previous chapter and elaborated on in the following, yet 
government commitment to community energy remains questionable, in 
particular regarding the increasing complexity of the energy policy debate 
indicated in this thesis. Increasing government commitment is nevertheless 
evident throughout but it remains to be seen whether this points towards a slight 
shift in the UK energy system’s characteristics from a centralised generation 
and distribution trajectory through the National Grid to a slightly more distributed 
model. This is still heavily contested as the general reliance of large-scale 
technologies reinforces existing governance processes, market rules, business 
models and social norms (Rydin et al., 2011). 
This has led some commentators (Walker et al., 2007) to ask whether the 
climate change model of community energy is beyond the dictates and remit of 
government. For bottom-up, grassroots models this is of particular relevance 
but it also challenges the governance arrangements in which local authorities 
and councils are embedded. From a hierarchical perspective, competencies 
and authorities are shared between distinct hierarchical scales and levels of 
governance. The nation-state remains crucial in the negotiation of powers 
between various levels of authority, ranging from supranational levels to sub-
national hierarchies (Bulkeley and Betsil, 2005). 
Local authorities or county councils, whose powers and competencies extend 
beyond the usual remit at this level of governance, such as unitary councils, 
might be capable of providing a greater enabling role in the development of 
renewables, rather than being entirely prescriptive. The Development of Large 
Scale Solar PV Arrays in Cornwall, published by Cornwall County Council is a 
good example as it indicates what local authorities with sufficient capacities are 
capable of. According to Bulkeley and Betsil (2005), however, the devolution of 
‘hard’ political powers to the local authority level, including the possibilities of 
implementing demand management measures, has not been proven successful 
as there tends to be reluctance to putting these measures into practice. The 
polycentric model involves multiple overlapping and interconnected levels or 
coalitions of governance, which can include coalitions of state and non-state 
actors (Bulkeley and Betsil, 2005). Multi-level governance might provide an 
appreciation of why the rhetoric of community energy is not being translated into 
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appropriate policy and regulation due to the imprecise discourse surrounding 
the scale and competencies of community energy and the fact that many local 
authorities are increasingly lacking the power to decentralise governance 
politically. 
 
2.2.3 International comparisons of local and community governance 
Ongoing developments in other European countries, however, indicate that this 
development is not necessarily inevitable. Germany once more proves that the 
governance of renewable energy can be developed favourably towards 
decentralised and community infrastructures, both in terms of top-down and 
bottom-up initiation (Vaze and Tindale, 2011; Schoenberger, 2013). The 
following international comparison primarily draws on the decentralisation 
experience of both Germany and the UK. A study by Bulkeley and Kern (2006) 
argues that overarching issues along with the changing nature of the local state 
reduce the ability of local government levels in both Germany and the UK to 
establish capacities for acting and procuring (enabling) in order to achieve 
climate protection goals. 
The comparison is appropriate as local governments are directly elected bodies 
with a wide range of roles in both countries. They also cover areas such as 
education, health, regeneration, waste management, land use planning and 
transport but the competencies in Germany tend to be more extensive. This is 
because municipalities are operated federally by the Laender while in the UK 
they are operated by the central state. Local authorities in the UK are only able 
to do what they are statutorily, either compulsory or discretionary, permitted to 
do by central government despite a degree of financial independence. Local 
authorities in Germany, on the other hand, are not restricted to their duties. The 
right of ‘self-government’ is guaranteed by the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) but 
statutory duties can be compulsory or discretionary. This allows for a certain 
scope for flexibility in the priorities given to specific measures (Bulkeley and 
Kern, 2006). Unlike their UK counterparts, German local municipalities have 
therefore also played an important role in electricity, gas, water and public 
transport provisions as well as the disposal of sewage and waste through quasi-
monopolies (Wollmann, 2003). 
50 
 
As a consequence, local resource policies have been effectively shaped 
through networks of service provision (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). At the same 
time, local authorities in the UK are increasingly involved in local governance, 
rather than government. This implies that their involvement in providing services 
is increasingly replaced by a facilitating role, enabling other agencies, such as 
the private sector, to provide these services (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). 
Bulkeley and Kern (2006) distinguish between four different forms of local 
governing:  
 self-governing by local authorities which relies on organisational 
management, 
 governing by provision whereby local authorities shape practices through 
the delivery of practical, material and infrastructural services, 
 governing by authority through traditional top-down regulation and 
sanctions and 
 governing through enabling which is based more on argument and 
incentives.  
Bulkeley and Kern (2006) argue that the majority of measures in relation to 
climate change focus on self-governing, such as the energy management of 
municipal properties. Table 2.1 is adapted from Bulkeley and Kern (2006: 2243) 
and shows modes of governing and local climate change policy. 
  
Governing by 
authority (strong 
prescriptive) 
Governing by 
provision (weak 
prescriptive) 
Governing through 
enabling 
(suggestive) 
UK 
Supplementary 
planning guidance on 
renewables 
Energy Service 
Companies (Top-
down) 
Provision of 
government-backed 
grants 
  Community energy 
projects (Bottom-up) 
  
Germany 
Compulsory planning 
guidance on 
renewables 
Energy Service 
Providers (Middle-out) 
Provision of 
government-backed 
loans 
  Community energy 
projects (Bottom-up) 
  
 
 
Self-governing in the energy sector is usually restricted to estates owned and 
used by the local government but it might also include the idea of promoting 
Table 2.1: Modes of governing and local climate change policy (adapted from 
Bulkeley and Kern, 2006: 2243) 
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best practice from particularly successful programmes or processes (Bulkeley 
and Kern, 2006). According to Huber (1997), German municipalities have a 
comparative advantage in their position as (often majority) shareholders of 
Energy Service Providers, known as Stadtwerke. This implies that the political 
conditions are ideal for local action on climate change although their role has 
been diminished due to liberalisation and privatisation in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The provision of direct services has enabled municipalities to 
control the nature of infrastructure development and shape the associated 
practices of public consumption and waste generation as well as associated 
GHG emissions (Bulkeley and Kern, 2006; Schoenberger, 2013). 
With the push towards liberalisation in line with EU Directives (EU Directive of 
European Electricity Markets, 1997) and the 1998 Power Industry Act 
(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz), however, the Stadtwerke have restricted 
themselves primarily to the distribution of energy, rather than generation. On the 
other hand, there is evidence that this is slowly being reverted with 40 new 
municipal utilities having been found since 2007 and 36% of the surveyed 
municipalities stating that they are considering ‘re-communalisation’ of utilities 
and 41% considering co-operative models (KOWD, 2011). 
There is nevertheless evidence that German municipal governing bodies and 
their associated Stadtwerke have been switching from a provisioning role to a 
regulatory or facilitating function, though the KOWD (2011) study points to a 
possible amalgamation of these two functions. When taking a facilitating role, as 
is increasingly the case in both the UK and Germany, local governments 
engage in promotional activities, public-private partnerships and the provision of 
subsidies or other forms of financial incentives to encourage others to act in line 
with specific objectives. However, it also implies that certain frameworks and 
provisions have to be in place, such as adequate policies and policy goals, as 
well as appropriate infrastructure and services. Apart from these direct 
interventions, facilitating local governments also need to take stakeholder 
engagement into account. 
The success of local governance is effectively down to the capacity of 
governing bodies to ‘learn new practices and create new capacities’ (Coafee 
and Healy, 2003: 1982) as the challenges of securing financial resources, 
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developing capacities and persuasion, co-ordination and learning requires a 
different set of facilitating rather than provisioning roles. More specific political 
support and guidance is required to make sure local governing bodies can 
continue using traditional forms of authority to tackle the new requirements of 
local governing within the bigger framework of a transition to a low carbon 
economy (adapted from Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). This is particularly relevant 
not only in relation to energy provision but also in light of the abolishment of 
Regional Spatial Strategies and the upcoming challenges associated with the 
Green Deal and the RHI. 
The diffusion of RETs is considered to be primarily constrained by technical and 
economic barriers but it is evident that governance frameworks at various levels 
need to adapt if the responsibility for development, diffusion and potential 
transitions is not to be entirely concentrated within the realm of incumbent 
commercial utilities. 
 
2.3 Multi-level perspectives of the socio-technical regime 
The theories behind varying scales of government responses and intervention 
to the macro-scale problems such as energy security, resource depletion and 
the need to decarbonise the economy have been developed further to include 
the multi-level perspective (MLP) for understanding innovation for system 
changes, which includes niche innovations, socio-technical regimes and macro-
level landscapes (Geels, 2004: 914, highlights by author). Interactions between 
these three levels can foster transitions from incumbent systems, such as the 
current energy system, to new regimes. However, transitions fail to diffuse as 
long as overarching landscape structures, which determine the rule of markets, 
patterns of consumption, institutional and regulatory systems and the existing 
infrastructure, are characterised by lock-in and path-dependency with limited 
space for change (Mitchell, 2008; Smith et al., 2005; Unruh, 2000, 2002). A 
successful transition to a low-carbon economy will therefore not be achieved 
incrementally along established technological trajectories within macro-level 
landscapes (Berkhout, 2002; Elzen et al. 2004; Loorbach 2010) but through 
successful innovation challenges, both technological and social. 
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The landscape level comprises external macro-economic, macro-political and 
macro-cultural factors. Changes at this level occur slowly and are associated 
more with evolution than with revolution. Regimes are relatively stable 
configurations of certain technological artefacts, infrastructures, institutions, 
user practices, market structures, regulatory framework, cultural meanings and 
scientific knowledge (Rip and Kemp, 1998) situated below the landscape level. 
Together, they fulfil certain societal needs, such as the provision of energy 
services (Kern and Mitchell, 2010). Niches are found within regimes, which 
again are embedded in the landscape. New practices and technological 
innovations emerge at niche level thanks to protected spaces or market niches 
in which they evolve over time and start competing with the dominant regime. 
Incremental changes tend to be influenced by changes at the higher level (Kern 
and Mitchell, 2010) but once a regime has been successfully challenged and 
substituted through fundamental changes at niche level, further innovation 
diffusions can potentially occur at the landscape level (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 is an adaptation from Geels (2002) MLP on innovation, which is 
analysed in more detail in relation to the UK’s energy system according to the 
research findings in the analysis chapters and the conclusion. Interactions 
between all three levels lead to systems innovations (Geels and Schot, 2007) 
with the capacity to challenge the regulatory state paradigm (adapted from 
Mitchell, 2008). The changes necessary to challenge regimes, and ultimately 
macro-level landscapes, require the potential to shape the political acceptability 
Landscape                    
Economic, ecological and 
cultural conditions, climate 
change, energy security,  
Socio-technical regime                    
Environmental governance, 
governance of energy, 
international agreements, 
national priorities 
Technological and social 
niche                             
Governance of technologies, 
scales and ownership 
structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Multi-level perspective of innovation (adopted from Geels, 2002 and 
Niykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008) 
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of interventions that influence the diffusion of innovations and the effective 
governance of transition (Hall, 1993). Changes in infrastructure, institutions, 
behaviour and networks are primary tools in the facilitation of transitions 
necessary to challenge dominant policy paradigms (Loorbach et al., 2008) but 
several scholars (Rotmans et al., 2001; Rotmans and Loorbach, 2008; Kern and 
Mitchell, 2010) suggest that transitions through governance of socio-technical 
systems towards sustainability are also possible. 
 
2.3.1 Socio-technical regimes 
Traditional economic theory, on the other hand, tends to consider innovation a 
result or product of interactions between science, technology and economic 
growth (Schumpeter, 1962; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Bergman et al., 2010), 
rather than the abovementioned governance arrangements. Within this 
paradigm, or socio-technical regime, the growth of gross domestic product is 
seen as the ultimate objective and impact of innovation. The dominance of 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics (Ashford, 1989), sometimes also linked to what 
is known as the Washington Consensus (Beder, 2006), is reflected by 
structures of national governments and to a certain extent also by transnational 
organisations such as the European Union and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Beder, 2006; Bergman et al., 2010). Changes 
within this framework tend to be based around incremental technical innovation 
but the changes needed to tackle macro-scale problems, such as climate 
change, are assumed to require new approaches (see argument above 
regarding BAU and incremental technological change). These need to combine 
technical innovation with reinforcing institutional, socio-ecological and socio-
cultural transformations (Geels, 2002) as traditional approaches in line with the 
current economic growth paradigm are more likely to exacerbate these macro-
scale problems (see also the dilemma of replacement on like-for-like basis 
mentioned in the previous chapter). 
Keynesian economics set the foundation for modern-day concepts of 
government intervention in the market but the macro-economic framework has 
witnessed a continuous shift from Keynesian to monetarist modes of 
macroeconomic regulation (Hall, 1993). This went hand in hand with the 
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deregulation of the energy market (Helm, 2004) and the resulting NEF foresees 
the sole application of innovative low carbon technologies. This approach, 
however, fails to promote social engagement and embedding to make 
technologies work beyond the realms of incumbents and the path-dependent 
lock-in of energy systems (adapted from Bergman et al., 2010). In order to 
move beyond the technological fix (Weinberg, 1966), state intervention beyond 
the facilitation and commercialisation of technological diffusion is required and 
this concept of policy actively influencing economic trajectories and the diffusion 
of innovations has recently regained recognition, particularly with the ongoing 
financial crisis (Costabile, 2009; Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). 
Even before the economic downturn of recent years there have been many calls 
in favour of stronger government intervention. In light of the carbon reduction 
commitments and the sluggish political and regulatory response to its 
implications, a report from the Tyndall Centre bemoans the ‘clear void between 
the scale of the problem characterised by the government’s target and 
accompanying literature, and the actual policy mechanisms in place or 
proposed in the near term’ (Bows et al., 2006: 18). According to their 
calculations, rapid decarbonisation of unprecedented 9%/a will be required for 
around 20 years or even more radical cuts will be required to reach our 
commitments in the future. Crucially, this decarbonisation will require a new 
drive for innovation concerning electricity generation in regard to grid 
infrastructure to facilitate decentralised generation alongside large-scale 
renewable energy generation (Bows et al., 2006). 
 
2.3.2 Socio-technical innovation in the energy sector 
In the energy sector, demand innovation depends on central government, 
energy suppliers and energy users (Parag and Darby, 2009). Transitions tend to 
come about by exerting pressure for change or by resourcing and coordinating 
responses to pressure. Arguably, the introduction of the Non Fossil-Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO), followed by the RO and now the increasing diversification of 
policy instruments is a result of external pressures in terms of renewable energy 
targets, commitments of GHG reductions and the failure to exploit renewable 
resources in the past. 
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This change in setting of energy policy, while the overall goal and the 
instrument of policy (i.e. market liberalisation) remains unchanged, can be 
categorised as a first order change within the framework of economic 
policymaking as social learning (Hall, 1993). Particularly the RO and to a lesser 
extent the preceding NFFO have been the most significant policies for 
promoting renewables in the UK and their structure was set to work in tandem 
with the prevailing notion of liberalised electricity and gas markets (Pollitt, 
2010). The introduction of the FiT, even though it is limited to new installations 
below 5MW, arguably marks the introduction of a second order change as the 
goals of the policy remain the same but the instrument and the settings (regime) 
might be changed as a response to experiences relating to the FiT’s non-market 
based constitution (adapted from Kern and Mitchell, 2010). Third order changes 
mark a paradigmatic change of all three levels of goals, instruments and 
settings akin to system innovations (Geels and Schot, 2007) or changes in 
regulatory state paradigms (Mitchell, 2008). 
Germany’s ‘Energiewende’ (see next Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 for more detail), 
may partially resemble such a concerted approach to change. The result of the 
concerted drive, in this case the technological push thanks to the FiT resulting 
in large-scale deployment of renewables, is requiring the energy system to 
adapt to an extent where the changing element, decentralised RETs, is now the 
dominant feature of the energy system. Its dominance does not relate to 
absolute generation figures but more to the balancing required and the need to 
adapt the entire infrastructure accordingly. 
It is a long way from UK small-scale FiTs to third order changes but changes in 
regulation and policy shape the definition of policy problems, which in turn 
promote particular policy agendas and public interactions. In the long run, these 
transitions must allow information to be filtered differently and attentions to be 
refocused on issues that were not the remit of the previous framework (Wilson, 
2001). Innovations at niche level can therefore provide the potential to reshape 
perceptions of what is feasible, possible and desirable (Hay, 2001). 
Government power alone, however, is not the only key determinant of paradigm 
change. By making the case for a shift (Hay, 2002) and encouraging cumulative 
behaviour of actors, new opportunities for governing transition within the context 
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of multi-scale governance and regulatory state paradigms arise (Bulkeley and 
Betsill, 2005; Mitchell, 2008; Kern and Mitchell, 2010), though not all social 
innovations prove useful. A focus on user-centred innovation is sometimes put 
forward as a measure capable of decentralising and democratising economic 
trajectories. However, a focus on wants and associated behaviours, especially 
those relating to existing products, it is more likely to sustain unsustainable 
practices that drive our consumption based economy, rather than solutions. 
Looking at user wants alone is therefore unlikely to lead to sustainable 
behaviour (Verganti, 2010). 
Public support nevertheless remains a decisive factor for implementation 
(Haggett, 2009), even though economic measures such as fiscal regulation, 
subsidies, technical efficiency and political commitment remain essential for the 
deployment of renewables. With the introduction of the FiT, the UK government 
has opted for technology-specific support and a generally more active role in 
the UK’s climate and energy strategy. In particular, the public engagement 
potential is enhanced through the tariff’s more secure return on investment 
potential. Compared to the RO its influence on the deployment pattern of RETs 
beyond the traditional scope of energy policy, at least at the community-scale, is 
profound. 
 
2.3.3 The diffusion of innovations 
As highlighted throughout this thesis, altering the energy system towards a 
more decentralised and inclusive system requires a shift in attitudes and 
perceptions that goes beyond the remits of energy policy. What is required, if 
energy is to take a more embedded position within our society, is a change in 
our socio-technical perspective. In order to explain the potential transition from 
one socio-technical system to another it is important to understand how 
technological and social innovations are diffused through society.  
In this thesis, diffusion relates primarily to the geographical diffusion of ideas 
across space and time. Geographical diffusion concepts include relocation 
diffusion which explains how ideas spread through voluntary or forced spatial 
relocation of individuals or groups. Expansion diffusion, on the other hand, does 
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not rely on relocation but rather on regular mobility patterns and communication 
channels. It can either take the form of contagious diffusion, which spreads from 
a source to surrounding areas, or hierarchical diffusion, which spreads among 
hierarchies (Cliff et al., 1981; Alderman, 2012). The latter is useful for explaining 
the diffusion of solar PV panels linked to the FiT as the ‘hierarchy’ in this 
instance refers to those owning a south-facing house with sufficient funds or 
incomes to support a loan for purchasing the panels. Reverse hierarchical 
diffusion helps explaining bottom-up innovations challenging incumbent 
perceptions and eventually becoming mainstream (adapted from Alderman, 
2012 and Smith, 2006). These innovations, however, do not rely as heavily on a 
regulatory framework for their diffusion and only feature as such in this thesis. 
Other types of diffusion include social diffusion and theories of change going 
back to Lewin’s description of the need to alter group standards in order to 
promote lasting individual change (Lewin, 1951). The focus has since shifted 
towards external conditions that are likely to be more influential than group 
decisions (Darnton, 2008). Political diffusion deals with the spread of policies 
and governance approaches across jurisdictional boundaries which come about 
as a result of external pressures and/or internal pressures relating to quests for 
legitimacy (Weyland, 2005). More fundamentally, diffusion defines the often 
random movement of a characteristic. 
The most useful concepts in theorising changing patterns of energy provision 
are those based on the diffusion of innovations theory, which is concerned with 
the process of adoption of innovations by society (Rogers, 1983, 1995). Rogers 
(1983: 5) defined diffusion as ‘the process by which innovation is communicated 
through certain channels over time among members of a social system’ and 
innovation as ‘an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption’ (Rogers, 1983: 11). The rate of diffusion is 
measured through the time it takes for an innovation to reach a certain 
percentage of the population and this process is characterised by the following 
five sequential stages: knowledge, persuasion, decision to adopt, 
implementation and confirmation. In simplistic terms, the successful diffusion of 
a widely diffusible product that is not constrained by supply-chain or application 
issues may follow the famous s-curve (Rogers, 1995) in Figure 2.2 on the 
following page. 
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The lack of specification of ‘Time’ and ‘Magnitude’ implies that new ideas may 
require as much as several decades to diffuse within a specific industry (i.e. 
variable speed pumps) or considerably less throughout society (i.e. mobile 
phones). Diffusion pathways are often determined by the scale and investment 
required for implementation. The diffusion process is therefore intrinsically 
linked to the perception of risk. Rogers’ (1983) attribute perception model gives 
five characteristics of innovations to explain different rates of adoption: 
 ‘Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
better than the idea it supersedes, which may be measured in economic 
terms, social prestige factors, convenience and satisfaction 
 Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being 
consistent with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of 
potential adopters 
 Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult 
to understand and use 
 Trialability is the degree to which an innovation may be experimented 
with on a limited basis. New ideas that can be tried on the instalment 
plan will generally be adopted more quickly than innovations that are not 
divisible 
 Observability is the degree to which the results of an innovation are 
visible to others. The easier it is for individuals to see the results on an 
innovation, the more likely they are to adopt’ (Rogers, 1983: 15-16). 
Figure 2.2: The process of diffusion (Rogers 1983, 1995) 
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The diffusion of innovations theory suggests that both society and the physical 
environment influence attitudes and behaviours relating to innovations, although 
it is necessary to distinguish between telecommunication technologies, such as 
mobile phones, and infrastructural bound technologies, such as wind turbines or 
power stations. When people do not actively participate in the adoption of 
technology (i.e. wind turbines) at the initial stage, it is important to raise 
awareness in order to reduce confusion and false risk perceptions. The 
persuasion stage of adoption is therefore crucial for the formation of perceptions 
and attitudes towards technology (Rogers, 1983). In relation to place, 
renewables such as wind turbines can be perceived positively because of the 
perceived homogeneity, economic benefits and regeneration effects (Nielsen, 
2002). Acceptance may therefore be enhanced by stressing the financial 
benefits and possibilities of regeneration, rather than emissions reductions (see 
Munday et al., 2011 for a wind turbine example). 
 
2.3.4 Moving from technological to social innovation 
The diffusion of innovations theory provides a detailed theoretical framework for 
the analysis of community energy within a changing NEF and a challenging 
governance regime. Social innovations, on the other hand, might require an 
entirely different diffusion process as they tend to be driven by social needs 
such as empowerment and resilience, rather than the prospect of commercial 
success. They therefore tend to benefit society rather than commercially 
oriented individuals or businesses (Mulgan, 2006). 
Social innovation, according to Mumford (2002), ‘refers to the generation and 
implementation of new ideas about how people should organise interpersonal 
activities, or social interactions, to meet one or more common goals’. Diffusion 
processes inevitably involve a social component but Bergman (2011, see Figure 
2.3 on the next page) distinguishes between innovations where the 
technological content is the main focus and those where social aspects are key. 
New wind turbines or solar PV cells are examples of technological innovations 
while Transition Towns are examples of socially focussed innovation. 
Community energy, particularly if the means of generation is community owned, 
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is an example of social innovation employing technical solutions, thereby 
marrying social and technological innovation (Bergman, 2011). 
 
 
Diffusing RETs by shifting the focus from technical innovations towards social 
innovations through these forms of social organisation not only provides 
benefits in the areas of emissions reduction but also in terms of local ownership, 
empowerment and the establishment of local identity (Warren and McFayden, 
2010). The often haphazard diffusion process at the local or regional 
cooperative level also implies that unconventional organisational forms, 
technological design variants and forms of implementation are experimented 
with to suit the characteristics of specific locations and societal arrangements. 
According to Kemp et al. (2001), the Danish example of wind turbine 
development shows that this parallel development of technological and social 
innovation has led to the co-evolution of policy support, which in turn fostered 
the further evolution and diffusion of successful design variants. Within this 
framework, community energy can be conceptualised as the possibility for 
environmentally minded people to channel their interests by engaging in low-
carbon energy provision through bottom-up governance, rather than mobilising 
and lobbying for their specific interests (Schreuer, 2010). 
 
2.3.5 The transition to a Low Carbon Economy 
As an evolution of the diffusion of innovations theory, the transition theory 
considers the diffusion of change, or transitions, not necessarily as the product 
of revolutionary innovation. Revolutionary changes are likely to start small and 
may initially appear incremental but through the active closure of existing 
Figure 2.3: Socio-technical axis of innovation focus (Bergman et al., 2010) 
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regimes and a process of co-evolutionary processes, technologies define new 
regimes for themselves (Berkhout, 2002). 
Transition theory, and transition management theory in particular, is based on 
the notion that stakeholders from all levels of the transition process need to take 
coordinated action within a transition arena in order to bring about change (van 
de Kerkhof and Wieczorek, 2005). This framework is designed to advise policy-
makers on what to do in light of macro-scale challenges, such as climate 
change and the transition to a low-carbon economy, and it involves complex 
systems thinking coupled with ‘learning by doing’ among different participating 
actors in order to induce a specific systems change (Kemp and Rotmans, 
2004). It advocates control policies to put pressure on existing regimes by 
creating a more level playing field in which different practices and technologies 
compete (Kemp and Rotmans, 2004: 152). Its focus therefore lies more on the 
governance of transition rather than on the diffusion process itself. 
Due to the complexity of system change through the diffusion of innovations 
and associated governance practices, many proponents of transition theory, 
such as Rotmans et al. (2001), Geels (2004b; 2005), and Hegger et al. (2007) 
in particular, focus on the governance of diffusion at the level of niches, rather 
than throughout society. As mentioned in previous sections, technological 
innovations such as RETs tend to emerge in protected market niches and as 
they evolve over time, they might start competing with the dominant regime 
(Kern and Smith, 2007). Interestingly, there are examples where large-scale 
innovation projects funded by incumbents have been set up to fail. A good 
example is large-scale wind technology, in particular the German GROWIAN 
project, which was arguably launched by large utilities in the early 1980s to 
prove that the technology was not viable (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). 
Compared to the diffusion of innovations theory, transition theory takes a less 
monodirectional focus of how innovations are diffused. It allows for more 
precise explanations of how the interaction of various actors at different levels 
delivers outcomes that might, or might not have been anticipated through a 
policy decision based on the diffusion of innovations with the ultimate objective 
of encouraging a transition towards a low-carbon economy. 
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2.3.6 Reframing the diffusion of innovations theory 
The institutionalist approach to the diffusion of innovations takes an even 
broader view by linking niches, regimes and socio-technical landscapes. It 
assumes that a process of deliberation defines socio-technical objectives, which 
leads to a broad process of systems innovation through integrated changes and 
adjustments across multiple levels (Kemp and Rotmans, 2005). In the process 
of developing an adequate theory based on the diffusion of innovations it is 
precisely these systems innovations that one has to consider in relation to 
issues surrounding economies of scale and associated institutional and 
policymaking learning effects. They can result in a variety of path-dependencies 
and lock-ins that systematically exclude competing and possibly superior 
processes, methods and technologies (Arthur, 1989; Unruh, 2000, 2002) or 
prevent certain members of society to actively contribute towards or benefit 
from technological or social diffusion. 
The commitment required for overcoming barriers and channelling innovation 
towards the substitution of an incumbent regime can lead to the creation of new 
economic and institutional lock-in (Walker, 2000). However, lock-ins in the ‘right’ 
technological trajectory do not necessarily conflict with wider sustainability 
objectives but might not provide for outcomes which might be considered 
socially just or equitable. This goes back to the point raised about incremental 
‘like-for-like’ changes favouring and sustaining BAU. 
This is not to say that transitions necessarily come about as revolutions but 
rather as small reorientations that pose a series of indirect conflicts with 
incumbent systems. Once these conflicts have reached a critical mass sufficient 
for triggering technological succession, a process of substitution is under way 
(Berkhout, 2002). Heavy commitment by government and commercial 
organisations in favour of the formation of technological trajectories, however, 
bares the risk of technological dominance not entirely purposefully for the 
outcomes originally anticipated (Berkhout, 2002), although it is always 
questionable what anticipation and outcome imply within political short-termism. 
Technologies and their institutional context therefore guide change along 
preferred channels of a given regime. Switching to an alternative regime 
requires these institutional barriers to be overcome but the necessary conditions 
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under which change occurs within technological regimes are difficult to pinpoint. 
The analysis of switches and changes in path-dependency, their management 
and drawing out possible generalisations remains a difficult task for researchers 
in this area and it is necessary to consider cumulative and often incremental 
changes within regimes. As there are no general or agreed innovation scales, 
the analysis of innovation requires the researcher to decide on how 
operationalisations should differ for different innovations (Rogers, 1995). 
 
2.4 The role of change agents in climate change response 
No matter how good the argument for technological and social innovations and 
the diffusion thereof is, however, it is crucially dependent on individuals 
conceptualised as ‘change agents’ (Rogers, 1995) or ‘intermediaries’ (Howells, 
2006). An innovation intermediary, according to Howells (2006) is: 
An organisation or body that acts an agent or broker in any aspect of the 
innovation process between two or more parties. Such intermediary activities 
include: helping to provide information about potential collaborators; brokering a 
transaction between two or more parties; acting as a mediator, or go-between, 
bodies or organisations that are already collaborating; and helping find advice, 
funding and support for the innovation outcomes of such collaborations. 
(Howells, 2006: 720) 
As this quote indicates, their scope and potential for action varies as much as 
the favoured development trajectory of their specific interventionary niche. In 
the case of new scales and ownership structures of energy technology diffusion 
within incumbent systems, such as community energy, the diffusion process is 
embedded within the framework of the overarching socio-technical system, 
which in the case of the UK is a deregulated and liberalised energy market. 
Change agents’ and intermediaries’ (hereafter change agents) position is key 
not only in diffusing social and technological innovations but also in exploiting 
niches capable of challenging the dominant regime. Change agents have the 
capacity to encourage the radical changes to happen that governments and 
society as such require but may not assume necessary. In line with the 
increasing devolution of responsibility (shift towards governance and suggestive 
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policy instruments), change agents and innovation intermediaries are essential 
for the multi-level energy and climate change responses required. In particular, 
their interventions allow government to assume a less dominant position within 
the overall governance framework as opposed to the prescriptive top-down 
responses associated with the imposition of more traditional top-down 
governance, or rather government responses of top-down intervention (Bulkeley 
and Kern, 2006; Fudge and Peters, 2011).  
Change agents are crucial within this dynamic framework which requires multi-
layered interventions rather than dealing with point-sources of pollution. The 
latter are associated with traditional state-centric end-of-pipe approaches to 
environmental issues (adapted from Bridge and Perrault, 2009) while the 
governance of environmental policy and regulation is increasingly dealing with 
complex and interlinking threats to the stability of our ecosystem (Fudge and 
Peters, 2011). This is mirrored by the challenges energy systems and NEFs are 
facing. When the current centralised energy system was devised, the emphasis 
was on cheap and abundant end-of-pipe energy, particularly electricity. As 
multi-layered concerns (and priorities) such as energy security and 
environmental challenges as well as public unease with large infrastructure 
developments are increasingly being prioritised, traditional governance 
approaches are failing to promote and deliver the changes required. In the UK, 
this challenge is exacerbated by its liberal market framework as climate change 
response within this market framework usually takes the form of centralised 
large-scale technological innovation in line with the economic growth paradigm 
(Weinberg, 1966; Bergman et al., 2010). 
Responsibility at scales below the regulatory facilitation of rules, however, lies in 
the hands of markets and the actors that make up the markets and 
responsibility in relation to climate change action beyond the technological fix is 
therefore being passed from central government towards non-governmental 
intermediaries and change agents as well as consumers themselves (Fudge 
and Peters, 2011). Even more so than technological innovations, new diffusion 
challenges and processes depend on communication between channels, or 
actors, in a two-way process over time (Rogers, 1995). The key point, however, 
is that these actors are essential for the social embedding of increasingly multi-
layered technological innovations. By fostering and promoting change, these 
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intermediaries broker and organise their diffusion, often as third parties and 
agencies (Howells, 2006). As representatives of such agencies, many of the 
interviewees introduced in more detail in Chapter 4 and analysed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 5 are conceptualised as change agents. 
 
2.4.1 Change agents and the socio-technical system 
Within the multi-level framework of energy policy and RET diffusion, the 
complexity of change agents’ embeddedness within the socio-technical system 
is exacerbated by cognitive frameworks, routines, resources, knowledge and 
skills that form a network of actors (Seyfang and Smith, 2007b). According to 
Seyfang and Smith (2007b), key determinants of change agents’ capacities, 
motivations and actions relate to their perceptions of what technology is likely to 
be socially acceptable (adapted from Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982). 
Further determinants of the success or failure within the regime include the 
difficulty or opportunities of altering embedded practices and facilitating the 
development of new infrastructures (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000; Unruh, 
2000), the scalability of incumbent practices thanks to positive network 
externalities (Dosi, 1982), the co-evolution of institutions and practices relating 
to technological and social embeddedness (Walker, 2000) and reinforcing 
market and social norms determining the further embeddedness of 
performances and practices (adapted from Seyfang and Smith, 2007b; Shove, 
2003). 
As this complex interaction between actors, niches and innovations shapes our 
socio-technical regime (Smith et al., 2005), rules, materials and technical 
elements therefore determine and shape and the incumbency of technological 
innovation systems. The scope of change agents’ influence within this system is 
determined by their position within the regime, ranging from technology 
suppliers, producers and consumers to policy makers (Geels, 2006). According 
to Scott (1995), their capacity to influence change within the technical 
innovation system also depends on regulative rules that steer interactions, 
normative rules relating to values and belief systems and cognitive rules 
shaping understandings and perceptions in relation to operative characteristics 
of the system (risks, costs, technology potentials) (adapted from Geels, 2004). 
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Some of the interviewees fall into Scott’s (1995) first category, particularly 
planners, others aim at embedding RETs and climate change action in our 
value and belief systems, particularly through social diffusion, while others 
again aim at embedding technological resilience, thereby shaping 
understandings and perceptions. However, in relation to the UK community 
energy niche, the technical innovation system is yet to develop fully and it is the 
response by interested communities and change agents to a variety of issues 
that is aligning actions with the regime. 
 
2.4.2 Change agents in the diffusion of renewable energy technologies 
Integrated local and community responses to the threat of climate change are 
expected to foster resilience in the energy sector in line with government 
expectations. The recent changes in energy policy and regulation elaborated on 
in the previous and following chapters are pointing towards this exact shift in 
responsibility and agency in the areas of energy consumption and provision 
(DECC, 2009; O’Brien and Hope, 2011). Due to the widespread, if not radical, 
changes envisaged for the system of energy provision, this requires the 
response and involvement of a wide and diverse range of actors capable of 
shaping the transition (O’Brien and Hope, 2011). 
At the most decentralised collective level of energy management, community 
energy provides a niche for experimentation with resilience and potentially more 
widely adaptable technological and social diffusion models. Change agents at 
this level are involved in the promotion of the following functions (adapted from 
Howard, 2006: 720 and Hielscher, 2011) with further explanation of the 
categorisations provided in Chapter 4: 
 initiators of community activities, which includes foresight and 
diagnostics, scanning, information processing and 
combination/recombination (activists) 
 providers of project-networking by gatekeeping and brokering (change 
agents) 
 providers of specific professional products such as accreditation, 
financial provision and planning (change agents and facilitators) 
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 providers of technology options (facilitators) 
 funders for commercialisation and up-scaling (change agents and 
facilitators) 
 organisations that interface with policy-makers (change agents) 
 energy business actors (change agents and facilitators) 
 providers of support mechanisms for testing, validating and regulation 
(facilitators) 
The categorisation in brackets indicates this thesis analytical framework 
analysed in more depth in throughout Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Before 
embarking on the analysis, however, it is necessary to take a step back in order 
to appreciate both the vagueness of this concept and the difficulty of pinpointing 
what constitutes successful intermediation that positively affects socially 
appropriate diffusion processes. It is also necessary to bear in mind that both 
the literature surrounding transition and diffusion of innovations theories 
(Seyfang and Smith, 2007b), as well as this analysis itself, point towards the 
embeddedness of the concept of innovation within the conventional market 
economics framework, no matter how radical or unconventional an innovation 
might appear. 
  
2.5 Scales of change 
By analysing the change agent concept through the theoretical framework of 
transitions it is possible to track decision-making relating to and resulting from 
policies and regulation as well as to map barriers relating to the diffusion of 
technological and social innovations throughout the multi-level governance 
structures and associated scales of infrastructural development. Within the MLP 
on energy provision (Parag and Janda, 2010), the change agents’ positions in 
relation to the scale of renewable energy deployment (bottom-up, middle-out, 
top-down) and positions within the centralised/decentralised diffusion systems 
(Rogers, 1995) imply a great variety of views on energy policy and the 
liberalised approach to energy markets, as is evident from Figure 2.4 on the 
following page: 
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At the smallest and most decentralised scale there are examples of bottom-up 
technological experimentation leading to the advancement of technological 
development and the diffusion of innovations. Prominent examples are the DIY 
experimentation with solar thermal technology in Austria (Ornetzeder, 2001) 
and wind turbines in Denmark (Olesen et al., 2004; Sørensen, 2012). In these 
cases, locally confined initiatives evolved into commercial market players or 
providers of energy. This diffusion was achieved by setting up locally owned 
and managed generation facilities, usually based on cooperative principles and 
their success points to the capacity of new socio-economic organisational forms 
in providing energy at a local level (Sørensen, 2012). These developments can 
be defined as social innovations due to their attributes of providing ‘new ways of 
satisfying societal needs, in particular new forms of organisation, new regulation 
or new lifestyles’ (Zapf, 1989, adapted from Schreuer, 2010). In general, 
however, such innovations remain exceptions and various middle-out and top-
down facilitations remain necessary to move projects from idea to 
implementation. 
Figure 2.4: Multi-level perspective of energy provision (Parag and Janda, 2010: 8) 
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2.5.1 Commitment to change 
A major challenge concerning the protection and expansion of the community 
energy niche is its precarious standing within the UK’s liberalised market 
governance arrangements and the resulting NEF. Dynamic constellations and 
interactions between policy, planning, finance and motivation shape the 
capacity of community energy and associated change agents to gain a sufficient 
foothold in the energy system and to solidify this niche. These spaces and 
networks of interactions essentially determine community energy’s development 
trajectory within the NEF as well as the entire system of governance and energy 
itself as it comprises ‘network(s) of agents interacting in a specific technology 
area under a particular institutional infrastructure for the purpose of generating, 
diffusing, and utilizing technology’ (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991: 21). 
Changing at least certain aspects of the UK’s energy system requires change 
agents influencing technological adaptation at a highly decentralised and often 
non-technical adoption scales. These change agents need to be embedded in 
the NEF, such as by supplying technology and expertise, by acting as ‘prime 
movers’ or by functioning as system builders. Alternatively, they act as 
facilitators with the technological, financial or political power to influence the 
diffusion process and diffusion attributes of specific technologies (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004). The following paragraph by Unruh (2000) indicates the role 
that the multitude of roles and positions taken by these actors. 
Users and professionals operating within a growing technological system can, 
over time, come to recognize collective interests and needs that can be fulfilled 
through establishment of technical [...] and professional organisations [...] 
These institutions create non-market forces [...] through coalition building, 
voluntary associations and the emergence of societal norms and customs. 
Beyond their influence on expectations and confidence, they can further create 
powerful political forces to lobby on behalf of a given technological system. 
(Unruh, 2000: 823) 
Within the UK’s system of community related decentralised energy provision, 
these coalitions, or networks of vested interests share and determine the flow of 
tacit and explicit knowledge. The incumbent networks within the sector of 
energy provision tend to favour technical solutions based on market principles 
while new coalition networks might favour non-market principles geared more 
towards the diffusion of information relevant to the development and alteration 
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of institutional set-ups. Integration in either coalition implies access to a large 
resource base of information and knowledge from other actors although 
networks favouring non-market principles are more likely to push or remove 
barriers in terms of perceptions of what is desirable or possible. Either network’s 
desired spheres of influence usually extends to government level institutions, as 
they tend, provided they have the capacity, to be primary determinants 
(facilitators) of technological niches, pathways and trajectories as well as of the 
growth of associated industries (adapted from Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). 
Without the presence of a niche, system builders would get nowhere [...] Apart 
from demonstrating the viability of a new technology and providing financial 
means for further development, niches help building a constituency behind a 
new technology, and set in motion interactive learning processes and 
institutional adaptation [...] that are all-important for the wider diffusion and 
development of the new technology (Kemp et al., 1998: 184) 
This point raised by Kemp et al. (1998) reflects the complexity of our socio-
technical regime and the need for governments to move beyond one-size-fits-all 
policies, particularly with respect to infrastructural path-dependency and lock-in 
on the one hand, and decentralised governance arrangements and growing 
interest in community energy on the other. This is complicated by the diversity 
of actors within the regime and the different outputs that are expected from 
technological innovations (Smith et al., 2005). Making a direct connection 
between policies and outcomes (i.e. the FiT and the deployment of RETs in 
community settings) is difficult but there is evidence that specific policies can 
act as a motivator, even if they do not necessarily fulfil their function as a 
facilitator. This points to Geels (2006) notion that apart from rules, material and 
technical elements it is actors that shape technological innovation systems. 
Within the framework of UK energy policy, change agents therefore represent 
essential determinants of the trajectory of adoption and diffusion of innovation 
as their actions partly determine and are partly determined by support from 
principal government facilitators. In some cases, action may even materialise 
despite considerable changes in the support system, as is evident from the 
analysis chapters. Their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, not only 
relating to market mechanisms, but particularly to the regulatory framework 
surrounding energy policy, is key for the development of innovative projects 
below the threshold where economies of scale apply which are capable of 
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outweighing regulatory changes (policy noise). This might reflect the dynamic 
changes capable of promoting creative destructions (Schumpeter, 1942). The 
analysis of the diffusion of technological and social innovation as well as the 
governance arrangements capable of facilitating new development trajectories 
therefore needs to take the role of individuals involved in the diffusion process 
into account. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This theoretical chapter indicates how the diffusion of innovation and associated 
theories explain diffusion rates through characteristic of the innovation and the 
surrounding social system (Wolfe, 1994). The main factors determining the 
community energy diffusion process in the UK include the consistency and 
predictability of energy policy, the development of support structures capable of 
providing a niche for RET deployment below the threshold where economies of 
scale apply and the alignment of local planning decision-making with local 
renewable energy resource potentials. This in turn is determined by adopter 
characteristics, the capacity of social network and communication processes to 
sustain the momentum for community energy development, the characteristics 
and capacities of change agents in relation to political decision-making 
processes, political facilitation in itself and the innovation attributes, which in 
relation to RETs cover a wide range of increasingly contentious technologies.  
This chapter also analysed the broader implications of the governance of 
energy systems through energy policy within NEFs. In particular, it highlighted 
how theories of governance, innovation diffusion and transitions and what a 
progression towards a low-carbon economy entail in terms of energy policy, 
energy generation infrastructure, scales and ownership structures. The next 
chapter introduces the UK’s energy related regulatory state paradigm that helps 
explain the particularities of the UK’s NEF and its resulting energy system. 
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Chapter 3 – The Policy Framework 
 
3 Introduction 
By providing an overview of energy policy and regulation relevant to community 
energy in the UK, this chapter allows the development of community related 
energy policy, particularly the FiT to be traced and positioned within the UK’s 
liberalised market framework. Starting with a brief overview of the development 
of policies influencing community scale electricity generation, this chapter sets 
out to analyse UK community energy in more detail, which is achieved by 
placing UK energy policy in an international context. This allows conclusions to 
be drawn regarding the potential and capacities of community energy in light of 
ongoing energy policy reforms and the critical evaluation of policy developments 
and the interactions between the governance and the development of 
infrastructures and large technical systems. 
 
3.1 UK renewable energy policy and community energy since 1990 
To appreciate the relative lack of co-evolution of policy, community energy and 
other scales of decentralised energy generation in the UK (adapted from 
Breukers and Wolsink, 2007) it is necessary to take a step back and analyse 
the underlying developments of UK energy policy and regulation. The following 
timeline of renewable energy policy in the UK since 1990 should enable the 
reader to place communities and associated policies, particularly the FiT into 
the UK’s energy policy context. It also indicates the changing nature and 
purpose of support that RETs in general are receiving in a European context 
and what changes in recent years can tell us about the capacity of liberalised 
energy markets to diffuse technologies through decentralised ownership 
models. 
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3.2 The two strands of energy policy 
In recent decades, renewable energy policy in the UK has followed liberal 
market economy principles (Helm, 2004; Pollitt, 2010) and the UK has 
pioneered liberalisation and deregulation in this sector (Helm, 2004; OECD, 
2011). Its support measures for the diffusion of RETs follow these principles by 
encouraging competition to bring down the price of technology. The UK’s 
principal policy for the diffusion of RETs is the RO, a market-based (quantity-
based) policy following the ‘certificate market model’. Many other countries have 
introduced policies based on the ‘feed-in model’, which represents a fixed price 
(market-pull) measure capable of protecting technologies from competition in 
the process of technological maturing and the achievement of grid parity 
(adapted from Hvelplund, 2006). The point at which RETs can compete against 
incumbent technologies without the need for dedicated subsidies is also known 
as materiality (Kramer and Haigh, 2009. 
The former tend to favour corporate, rather than locally owned generation 
(Toke, 2005a; Hvelplund, 2006; Breukers and Wolsink, 2007), while the latter 
provides greater scope for new entrants to benefit from their relative simplicity, 
as they offer secure and predictable returns (Mitchell, 2008). In terms of 
installed decentralised small-scale electricity generation capacity in a European 
comparison, the RO has proven to be less successful than fixed price 
measures, such as the FiT (see tables 1.1-1.3). Certificate market models and 
feed-in models therefore constitute contrasting approaches, each entailing 
considerable knock-on effects in terms of geographical distribution, scales and 
ownership structures which in term also reflect the regulatory state paradigms of 
the economies in which they were devised (adapted from Mitchell, 2008). 
Quantity-based instruments, such as the UK’s RO, are generally technology-
neutral, whereas price-based mechanisms, such as Germany’s FiT, the EEG 
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz or Renewable Energy Act), tend to be structured 
to encourage specific technology promotion. Both aim at achieving cost 
reduction, quantity-based instruments rely on competition between producers in 
the electricity market while price-based mechanisms through stepped 
reductions in tariffs (IEA, 2008). Put simply, the RO encourages competition, 
while the EEG ‘picks winners’ (Fuchs and Wassermann, 2009; Mitchell et al., 
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2006; Woodman and Mitchell, 2011). The result is that ownership is dominated 
by corporates/ utilities in the UK while Germany has a high proportion of local 
and decentralised ownership (Toke et al., 2008; Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008), 
which is also evident from tables 1.1-1.3. The UK’s path-dependency 
(Mahoney, 2000) can therefore be placed in line with free market principles of 
the UK’s liberalised market policy. 
‘Picking winners’ (Gross et al., 2012) has arguably been more successful under 
price-based mechanisms (Mitchell, 2008), not only in terms of installed 
capacities (see Table 1.3) but also regarding the variety of scales deployed and 
the heterogeneity of ownership structures. Recent figures indicate that around 
51% of Germany’s 53GW installed renewable electricity capacity is owned by 
citizens (40% by individuals and 11% by farmers), 6.5% by the four large 
market incumbents (E.On, RWE, EnBW and EWE) and 7% by other utilities 
(BMU, 2012a). As 20.1% of electricity in Germany comes from renewable 
sources (BMU, 2012b), at least 10% of total electricity generation is in the 
hands of communities and individuals while the total share of electricity 
generated by municipal utilities stands at 12.6% (VKU, 2012). Germany’s four 
market incumbents are therefore left with a market share of less than 80%. In 
the UK, the share of community owned wind turbines has been placed at 
around 10% (Carrington, 2012) although operational community renewable 
energy projects represent only 0.25% (200MW out of an operational renewable 
energy capacity of 8,000MW in 2011 figures) of the UK’s renewable energy 
market and 0.5% of the regional renewable electricity capacity in the Southwest 
(RegenSW, 2011a). The total amount of electricity (including non-renewable 
sources) generated by the Big Six utilities (British Gas, EDF, E.On, nPower, 
Scottish Power and Scottish and Southern) stands at 99.7% (Mitchell, 2012). 
Despite the theory behind liberalisation encouraging more competition through 
diversity (Helm, 2004; Pearson and Watson, 2012), reinforcing ownership 
patterns and market structures therefore make it extremely difficult for new 
market entrants to establish themselves in the UK energy market (Mason, 
2011). This incumbent framework also limits the incentives available to break 
this deadlock. Communities interested in generating energy have a particular 
set of obstacles to overcome due to the unfamiliarity of the concept and this is 
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partly the result of the historical development of energy policy and renewable 
energy support mechanisms in the UK. 
 
3.2.1 The development of quantity-based support mechanisms in the 
UK 
The origins of the UK’s renewable energy support framework can be traced 
back to the Electricity Act (HMG, 1989) and the consequent introduction of the 
NFFO. Set up in 1990, it enabled the establishment of competitive tenders to 
provide winners with a fixed price per kWh (Mitchell and Connor, 2004). 
Following five competitions, however, its inadequacies in achieving policy 
objectives became apparent as less than a third of the winning bids being 
realised. This has been put down to both local opposition and awkward and 
prolonged planning procedures (Meyer, 2003; Mitchell and Connor, 2004). The 
policy itself can be interpreted as a reflection of the lack of government interest 
in renewables due to the rapid decarbonisation of the UK energy sector in the 
1990s as a result of the ‘dash for gas’ (Pollitt, 2010). In 2002, the NFFO was 
replaced by the RO, an energy policy mechanism based on tradable green 
certificates (Platchkov et al., 2011). 
The introduction of the RO can be traced back to Directive 2001/77/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 27 September 2001 (European 
Parliament, 2001a). It specifies the promotion of electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market and recognises 
renewable energy generation as a priority measure given that their exploitation, 
apart from other benefits, contributes to sustainable development, creates local 
employment and has a positive impact on social cohesion (European 
Parliament, 2001a). The Directive foresaw that eligible renewable sources 
should account for 10% of UK electricity consumption by 2010. 
The consequent introduction of the Renewables Obligation (RO) in 2002 (HMG, 
2002) resulted in the doubling of renewable electricity’s generation share of 
overall electricity generation. Government, however, has admitted that 
constraints to the availability and deployment of cheaper forms of renewable 
energy provision made the achievement of a 10% share of electricity generated 
77 
 
from renewables, the specified UK share according to the Directive, impossible. 
Recently, the share of renewables in the UK’s overall energy mix has increased 
thanks to various offshore wind projects going online as well as higher than 
average wind speeds and higher than average rainfall in 2011, jumping from 
7.7% in the first quarter of 2011 to 11.1% in the first quarter of 2012 (DECC, 
2012c). According to these figures, in appears as though the UK is on track to 
meet its 2020 15% renewable energy targets (House of Lords, 2008) but the 
exceptional weather conditions need to be statistically adjusted before a definite 
trend can be identified. 
The main constraint of the RO in relation to small-scale generators such as 
community energy projects is associated with the tradability of ROCs 
(Renewable Obligation Certificates). If suppliers want to exploit the maximum 
subsidy amount, it pays off to remain below the target number of ROCs. The 
policy framework therefore assumes failure to meet targets (Pollitt, 2010). The 
complexity of this arrangement acts as a barrier for new entrants and 
developers that cannot benefit from economies of scale. In recognition of this 
flaw, specific provisions have been arranged for new scales such as 
‘microgeneration’. 
 
3.2.2 The RO and Microgeneration 
The Energy Act 2004, particular section 82, foresaw a long-term 
microgeneration potential of 30-40% of the UK’s electricity needs, resulting in a 
15% reduction of annual household carbon emissions (HMG, 2004). 
Microgeneration is defined as renewable energy generation with a capacity of 
less than 50kW. This does not specifically relate to particular ownership 
structures such as community energy development but it does not exclude them 
either. In 2005 the RO was amended to allow microgenerators to claim ROCs 
on an annual or monthly basis. First the microgenerator must gain accreditation 
from Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets) and, on an ongoing basis, 
supply output information to Ofgem. The ROCs can then be sold to electricity 
supply companies for a price that is subject to the market to help them meet 
their obligation (DTI, 2006a). However, this change aiming to benefit 
microgenerators failed to address the disproportionately high costs faced by the 
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electricity supplier for the grid exportation of excess electricity from 
microgeneration. 
DTI’s Microgeneration Strategy 2006 admitted that planning policy and Building 
Regulations, apart from costs and technical issues, prevent wide-scale 
deployment. Among the policy measures assessed for these publications were 
a Low Carbon Buildings capital grant programme, the possibility of 
implementing a smart metering system and a review of the permitted 
development scheme (DTI, 2006a). In 2006 the support measures for 
microgeneration included a 5% VAT level applicable to most microgeneration 
technologies, simple claiming procedure for ROCs and the possibility for local 
authorities to set targets for on-site renewable energy in residential, commercial 
or industry projects (DTI, 2006a). 
This move reflected the increasing recognition that ‘local authorities and 
regional bodies are pivotal in delivering change in their communities’ (DTI, 
2003: 112). The same text passage also pointed to the importance of 
‘independent organisations and voluntary bodies’ in communicating ‘messages 
to the public and help them to get involved in decision-making’ as well the 
importance of government itself in changing its approach ‘so energy policy is 
looked at as a whole’ (DTI, 2003: 112). 
 
3.2.3 Reforming the RO 
In 2007, the RO was reformed to ‘increase the level of the Obligation above the 
level previously announced if actual generation requires, to a maximum level 
equivalent to 20%’ (DTI, 2007b: 3). The biggest change was the introduction of 
banding. This allows ROC allocation according to technological maturity by 
providing differentiated levels of support for different technologies. Banding was 
designed to maintain Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) prices in a 
situation of ROC oversupply. Arguably, this has prompted a priority shift from 
technological neutrality towards differentiation for different technologies (DTI, 
2007b: 3). Additional funding through separate mechanisms at this stage was 
ruled out as the RO was still considered a technology-neutral instrument but the 
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introduction of banding can be seen as a concession towards more successful 
support measures such as FiTs. 
The House of Commons also recognised the need for a more fundamental 
alteration of energy policy in order to foster the potential of energy produced by 
individuals, businesses and communities for their own consumption. It proposed 
that action should take place at all levels of society. However, the relevant 
policy statement does not put the liberalised nature of the UK’s energy market 
at stake, even though the authors admit that due to the liberalised nature of the 
energy market it might be easier for ‘Government to provide incentives for the 
construction of relatively few nuclear power plants than to change the behaviour 
of millions of UK households’ (House of Commons, 2007: 12). Despite this 
admittance, however, this report does indicate a greater appreciation of various 
scales of generation as it consequently concedes that ‘awareness of the 
potential of local energy as a viable form of low-carbon energy is currently 
confined to a niche market’ (House of Commons, 2007: 35). The introduction of 
the therefore FiT marks a consequent step in the development of new 
generation potentials. 
 
3.2.4 The birth of the Feed-in Tariff 
The Energy Act 2008 (HMG, 2008b) granted the Secretary of State the powers 
to establish a ‘scheme of financial incentives to encourage small-scale low-
carbon generation of electricity’ and ‘requiring or enabling the holder of a 
distribution licence to make arrangements for the distribution of electricity 
generated by small-scale low carbon generation’ (HMG, 2008b). Government 
thereafter declared that it was committed to having FITs in place in April 2010 
(HMG, 2008b). 
Previous attempts to boost small generators included the Clear Skies 
Programme, which was in place until 2006 and provided one-off grants to 
encourage the deployment of local RETs. This programme was later replaced 
with BERR’s (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), 
later DECC’s (Department of Energy and Climate Change), Low Carbon 
Buildings Programme, which also provided grants for microgeneration for 
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householders, community organisation, schools, the public sector and business. 
Due to vast oversubscription to these programmes, government decided on a 
radically new approach by implementing the FiT, which saw the closure of the 
Low Carbon Buildings Programme on 3 February (DECC, 2010d), and a shift 
from grants to a fixed price mechanism. 
The introduction of the FiT marked a new approach to the deployment of RETs 
in the UK as it is explicitly not technologically neutral, in the sense that certain, 
less mature technologies enjoy higher tariffs than those close to market 
maturity. This marks the first introduction of a policy specifically focussing on 
‘picking winners’ (adapted Mitchell, 2008) in the UK and it stands in stark 
contrast to governments’ previous attempts at promoting renewable energy 
generation even though the Reform of the RO 2007 (DTI, 2007b) implicitly 
pointed towards change in this direction. Its implementation indicates 
government recognition of the need for more support for smaller generators. 
Change therefore is underway in the general regulatory framework but the 
introduction of the FiT possibly points to a more radical realisation that market 
forces alone cannot provide the beneficial outcomes from the exploitation of 
renewable sources that are required in order to cope with the problems 
surrounding climate change and energy security. 
 
3.3 The Feed-in Tariff 
The FiT provides a fixed return for every kWh of electricity generated from 
renewable sources below 5MW included in the technology differentiated tariff 
structure for up to 20 or 25 years, depending on technological maturity. HMG’s 
Renewable Energy Strategy states that the FiT will increase public engagement 
and foster behaviour change by ‘bringing renewable electricity generation into 
communities around the country’ (HMG, 2009a: 43). The FiT has been 
designed accordingly so that the tariff structure represents an incentive rather 
than a barrier for the uptake of small-scale RETs (HMG, 2009a: 62; DECC, 
2010a). 
By encouraging electricity generation by actors who have not traditionally 
engaged in the electricity market, the policy is also designed to breach the 
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traditional producer/consumer divide (DECC, 2010a: 5). The tariff is linked to 
the Retail Price Index and further benefits for domestic properties generating 
primarily for domestic consumption arise from the fact that FiT income is not 
taxable for income tax (DECC, 2010a: 6). The official purpose of this small-
scale UK FiT is also to ‘empower people and give them a direct stake in the 
transition to a low-carbon economy’ (DECC, 2012b: 8) as well as the 
aforementioned capacity to contribute to diversity of supply and energy security 
(DECC, 2012a). 
 
3.3.1 The Feed-in Tariff and community energy 
According to government, it is anticipated that the banding of tariffs reflects 
‘farm scale’ (<500kW) anaerobic digestion projects and ‘community scale’ wind 
(500kW-1.5MW) and hydro (100kW-2MW) projects (DECC, 2010a: 6) while the 
1.5-5MW scale for wind and 2-5MW for hydro is expected to be primarily 
developed by commercial and professional developers (DECC, 2010a: 24). It 
therefore appears that larger community energy developments are not 
anticipated and this notion is reinforced by the fact that whenever community 
energy is mentioned in UK government documentation, the talk is usually about 
small to medium size wind, PV, or hydro systems (DECC, 2010a; Element 
Energy, 2009). 
This ‘community scale’ banding is nevertheless intended to narrow the gap 
between the FiT and the RO, without making the FiT more attractive for purely 
commercial developers willing to downscale to make use of the higher FiTs at 
lower capacities. This gap, however, is not restricted to scale due the 
aforementioned opposing market philosophical position that these support 
mechanisms are based on. With respect to the ROs antagonism towards small 
scale developments lacking the capacity to trade at competitive scales, the 
specific community focus within the FiT is therefore designed to take into 
account the lack of expertise outside the realm of incumbent utilities by 
encouraging technological diffusion below the point which commercial 
developers are likely to consider viable (DECC, 2010a: 24). 
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For both commercial and grassroots community energy developments, local 
authorities are deemed very important intermediaries by government in tackling 
climate change as they play an important role in planning and building control 
(see Chapter 2). Their potential leadership function relating to their own estates, 
social housing, and procurement also provides a solid foundation for new forms 
of energy provision (DECC, 2010a: 30). Their position also enables cooperation 
and collaboration with various partners at the FiT community energy scale, as is 
specifically mentioned in the FiT consultation document (DECC, 2010a: 30). 
 
3.3.2 The Feed-in Tariff and new entrants 
A further aspect specifically mentioned in relation to the FiT is the possibility of 
fostering a greater diversity of electricity generators. This is to be achieved by 
protecting the generators’ rights in the market and ensuring that they will not ‘be 
subject to exploitation’ (DECC, 2010a: 37). 
A qualitative assessment as part of the consultation process specifically 
mentions cooperatives alongside top-down instigated community energy 
developments. Energy4All is hereby considered an exemplary not-for-profit 
cooperative that generally, though not exclusively, develops community projects 
at the 2MW scale. The company achieves this by working with landowners to 
find suitable sites for wind turbines and helping raise capital through share 
offers with the possibility of regular dividends being provided to the investors 
according to the financial results of the project. It is assumed that due to the 
absence of a profit incentive as a growth driver, cooperatives will be the way 
forward within this scale of generation, although this is highly dependent on 
political commitment (Pöyry Energy, 2009). 
Government’s commitment to new entrants and new ownership structures has 
been somewhat stunted by their rhetoric surrounding the FiT reviews. On 
August 1 2011 the results of the fast-track review were implemented in order to 
sustain growth, particularly ‘for the solar industry while protecting the money for 
householders, small businesses and communities’ (Barker, 2011). Up to that 
point, high tariff levels for solar PV had sparked a gold rush among commercial 
developers and as a consequence, new tariffs were introduced in a fast-track 
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process (Barker, 2011). The following introduction of greater flexibility regarding 
changes in tariff structures has created a sense of uncertainty that the FiT was 
originally supposed to reduce. 
In particular, many prospective generators that had already spent considerable 
amount of time and money planning and developing >50kW PV projects, which 
also included community and public sector schemes, failed to anticipate this 
review. It saw sharp cuts for >50kW PV, despite government’s concessions 
towards the wider impacts community energy projects have on ‘low carbon 
behaviour and [...] social inclusion’ (DECC, 2011c: 13). The government 
response, however, made clear that they ‘do not consider that support for large 
scale PV delivers the broader behavioural benefits of domestic and community 
scale developments’ (DECC, 2011c: 18). This is in line with some consultation 
respondents’ apparent position towards 50kW PV schemes as a fair upper limit 
for ‘genuine’ community schemes (DECC, 2011a: 16). 
Changes to the tariff structure put into question what scale government 
anticipates community energy to aim for. ‘Genuine’ appears to imply entirely 
community led, funded and owned and that such projects will not exceed 50kW, 
even though this interpretation restricts and limits community energy’s potential 
and its overall impact. In terms of generation and the requirements for 
decarbonisation, this scale is certainly negligible. Large up-front investment 
requirements and connection to the National Grid act as further barriers to 
community energy and new entrants in general (Jenkins, 2012; Smith, 2012), 
which reinforce the notion that <50kW projects might be considered the only 
viable option for communities. However, just picking out community energy and 
the political difficulties and unwillingness to seriously commit towards this form 
of generation and energy interaction does not pay justice to energy’s 
increasingly critical position transcending politics, economics, human wellbeing 
and the environment. 
 
3.4 Scales of energy policy determination and provision 
The evolution of UK energy policy, also in relation to community energy, is 
increasingly shaped by such considerations as well as international and 
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transnational agreements and decision-making bodies. For the UK as well as 
other European countries it is binding policy objectives and guidelines put 
forward by the EU, usually in the form of binding commitments such as the 
2009/28/EC Directive 'on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources’ (European Parliament, 2009), that determine national objectives and 
resulting energy policy strategies. 
The national level remains responsible for market creation and support (such as 
Ofgem’s RO), infrastructure provision, technology R&D, the regulatory 
framework and guidelines for planning and renewable energy. The National 
Planning Policy Framework (DCLG, 2012a) in combination with the National 
Policy Statement for Renewable Energy Infrastructure (DECC, 2012o) fill the 
gap left by the abolishment of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister’s Planning 
Policy Statement 22 (ODPM, 2011b). This level is dominated by the Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Ofgem and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG, formerly known as the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister, ODPM). The treasury is also increasingly pressuring 
the development of energy policy towards what appears to be minimal 
intervention approach (UK Parliament, 2012). Interestingly, communities are not 
mentioned in the National Policy Statement for Renewable Energy 
Infrastructure (DECC, 2012o). 
According to DECC (2012p), the planning reforms nevertheless ‘place 
communities at the heart of the planning system’ (DECC, 2012p: 12) but the 
position of energy in relation to communities is not specified. The National 
Planning Policy framework, on the other hand, contains several segments 
surrounding the interaction between communities and ‘renewable and low 
carbon energy’. It states that planning should ‘encourage the use of renewable 
resources (for example, by the development of renewable energy)’ (DCLG, 
2012a: 5). To increase use and supply of renewables, local planning authorities 
should have positive strategies to promote renewables and design policies 
accordingly. When determining planning applications, local planning authorities 
‘should not require applicants for energy development to demonstrate the 
overall need for renewable or low carbon energy and also recognise that even 
small-scale projects provide a valuable contribution to cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions’ (DCLG, 2012a: 23). They should also approve applications if 
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associated impacts are or can be made acceptable, unless ‘material 
considerations indicate otherwise’ (DCLG, 2012a: 23). This points toward an 
appreciation of the capacity of renewable energy technologies but community 
energy still remains shrouded in ambiguity. 
This lack of commitment towards the likes of communities interested in energy 
generation has been exacerbated further by the disbanding of Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs). RDAs were responsible for developing and 
delivering economic strategies aimed at increasing competitiveness, growth and 
employment (Smith, 2007) although some of these functions were passed on to 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) (RegenSW, 2011a). The primary objective 
of the new framework is to streamline the planning process but many 
proponents of community energy remain sceptical regarding the capacity of 
these changes to deliver intended outcomes, which is discussed in more detail 
in the analysis chapters. The main issues lie in the vagueness of the policy 
framework as well as individual policy statements as they strongly encourage 
but do not necessitate certain forms of development or the restriction thereof. 
 
3.5  The framework surrounding community energy development 
Energy policy, on the other hand, is not necessarily responsible for the delivery 
of policy objectives beyond the supply of energy and the tweaking of 
requirements in relation to political, social or environmental considerations 
according to the UK’s liberal market framework. Community energy, particularly 
in the UK policy context, therefore requires a specific set of support 
mechanisms as its uncompetitive nature is not compatible with the liberalised 
market, its regulatory framework nor available policy measures. 
 
3.5.1 Liberalisation and non-market based challenges 
Despite the shortfalls in enabling new scales and ownership structures to 
develop, the achievements of the UK’s competitive energy market are 
considered by many as the most brilliant policy success in the UK over the last 
25 years (Helm, 2004; Noel and Pollitt, 2010). Others are more critical of its 
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deficiencies and bemoan its failure to produce desired and desirable outcomes 
(Mitchell, 2008). One of the less desired outcomes is that the UK’s energy 
market remains characterised by path-dependency and lock-in as detailed in 
previous chapters, although this is not necessarily confined to the UK due to the 
long diffusion timescale for infrastructure systems (Grubler and Nakicenovic, 
1991). 
The ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s may appear to contradict these notions as it saw 
a rapid replacement of coal fired generation infrastructure with gas fired 
generation infrastructure (Pollitt, 2010). This development, however, was less of 
a transition towards a new generation infrastructure but rather the replacement 
of one fossil-fuel with another (House of Commons, 2011). A diverse approach 
to scale, on the other hand, might introduce more flexibility into investment 
patterns, which would reduce the inherent irreversibility of many energy system 
investments (Fielder, 1996). 
The UK, like so many other countries, now finds itself in the position where 
current decision-making in energy policy will determine the lock-in for the 
coming decades, particularly taking the legally binding 80% emissions 
reductions by 2050 on 1990 levels, as recommended by the Committee of 
Climate Change (CCC, 2011), into account. The Long Term Electricity Network 
Scenarios (Ofgem, 2007-2009) commissioned by Ofgem (Office of Gas and 
Electricity Markets) provide long-term options ranging from a centralised ‘big 
transmission and distribution’ scenario to a highly decentralised ‘micro-grids’ 
scenario (Ault et al., 2008). The current tendency, however, remains strongly 
biased towards a centralised scenario with a portfolio of centralised renewable 
energy options (primarily offshore windparks), nuclear power stations and fossil-
fuel with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCC, 2011). This is the result of lock-in 
associated with technological, institutional and social path-dependency 
(adapted from Ault et al., 2008; Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000) and points to a 
‘like-for-like’ replacement of infrastructure in terms of scale and ownership 
structures. 
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3.5.2 Abandoning the invisible hand – re-regulating renewable 
energy 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, however, there are tentative signals indicating that 
energy policy is undergoing a transformation by shifting responsibility towards 
business and society in the UK, as is the more general political framework 
launched by the Coalition Government (DCLG, 2012b). Combined with what 
might be interpreted as a bold move towards more regulation, this could 
ultimately point to a change in paradigm (Kern and Mitchell, 2010). These 
changes appear to be underway as a result of the liberalised energy market 
(regime) being put under increasing (landscape) pressure by EU requirements 
on pollutions standards such as 2001/80/EC (European Parliament, 2001b), the 
commitment to provide 15% of energy demand from renewable sources by 
2020 (House of Lords, 2008) and the emission reduction commitments (CCC, 
2011), which are proving increasingly difficult to achieve under liberalised 
market conditions. It is also questionable in how far a deregulated market can 
deal with macro-scale problems such as climate change and depleting fossil-
fuel reserves (Geels, 2002; Pollitt, 2008). 
The energy policy landscape is therefore likely to witness fundamental changes 
over the coming years but it remains to be seen whether regulation can deliver 
the rhetoric put forward by government concerning energy security, climate 
change and ‘green growth’ (Sharman, 2011). The combined challenges of a 
likely doubling of electricity consumption by 2050 (Huhne, 2011), the large 
investments required to prevent the ‘energy gap’ from happening (MacKay, 
2009), market trends favouring gas as the fuel of choice for the new generation 
of power stations (Helm, 2011) and the current decision-making regarding these 
issues proving decisive in determining the UK’s electricity generation trajectory 
and technological lock-in (House of Commons, 2011) favouring short-termism, 
also appear to reduce the willingness to take these concerns aboard. 
In particular, the current availability of cheap gas is considered an obvious 
incentive to focus on the expansion of gas generation as a transition technology 
before newer, cleaner and more efficient technologies take over (Helm, 2011). 
This implies that incremental technological change is considered sufficient to 
combat macro-scale challenges and the price of gas reaching an 11 year low in 
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May 2012 and the first LNG shipment from the US to the UK taking place in 40 
years (Dutton, 2012) have fuelled this debate. However, the UK’s obligation to 
generate 15% of energy from renewables by 2020 requires a different and more 
diverse approach and the decarbonisation necessary to limit the effects of 
climate change suggest more widespread and holistic changes throughout the 
economic production and consumption system and beyond, rather than just the 
marginal decarbonisation of electricity generation in an otherwise BAU 
economic development trajectory. 
At the upper end of the scale of RETs and ‘low-carbon generation technologies’ 
in general, encouraging mechanisms have already been implemented. This is 
evident from the successful diffusion of offshore wind technologies (DECC, 
2012c; Moore, 2011), while the sole purpose of the Green Investment Bank 
appears to be backing for new nuclear power developments (Mitchell, 2011). It 
therefore appears likely that gas, offshore wind and nuclear power (and coal 
with CCS, depending on the outcome of the Electricity Market Reform and 
technological advancements) will be the main building blocks of the UK’s 
energy system for decades to come as long as investment can be secured to 
get these large-scale centralised projects off the ground (CCC, 2011). 
The consultation document for the Electricity Market Reform (DECC, 2010e) 
and the Energy Act (DCLG, 2011b) are further steps in this direction towards 
more regulation but also towards a more centralised and coordinated approach. 
This shift and increase in regulation might be further proof of growing realisation 
that market forces alone are not capable of providing pathways and outcomes 
that are favourable for the achievement of overarching objectives such as 
energy security, affordability and the reduction of environmental impacts of 
energy generation. 
At the other end of the scale, energy policy is taking a similar trajectory towards 
increased regulation. The FiT and the new Microgeneration strategy (DECC, 
2012a) along with the Green Deal (DECC, 2010f) and the Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI) (DECC, 2012d) provide incentives to encourage consumers to 
engage in energy saving as well as the generation of electricity and heat from 
renewable sources. However, the lack of reliability and predictability of policy, 
especially concerning the diffusion of small-scale RETs, as seen with the fast-
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track review of the FiT for PV developments exceeding 50kWh (DECC, 2011c), 
places a big question mark over the ability and willingness of the UK 
government to provide a framework capable of developing new scales and 
ownership structures regarding decentralised energy generation in a way that 
might encourage people and communities to take climate change action and 
energy security into their own hands. 
More importantly, current energy policy deficiencies relate primarily to the lack 
of investment and development at the small utility scale, the upper end of the 
FiT scale and many other scales in between.  
Carbon reductions 
via 
Top-down Middle-out Bottom-up 
Low carbon society  Supply of low 
carbon facilities and 
low carbon 
alternatives  
Introduction of 
Norms; tailored 
supply of needs  
Introduction of 
norms and 
behaviour 
Low carbon homes Regulations Professionals and 
practices 
Demand from 
individuals 
Low carbon energy 
sources 
Utilities Community 
ownership 
Individual 
ownership 
Agent and agency Government Communities  Individuals, 
grassroots 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the area where UK energy policy is failing to promote the 
middle-out scale of development as detailed by Parag and Janda (2010). 
 
3.5.3 Regulation and the diffusion of decentralised renewable 
energy technologies 
Energy policy, however, is not solely responsible for the UK’s generation 
portfolio. The extent and speed of technological and social diffusion and the 
transition to a low-carbon economy, as anticipated by government, are also 
reflections of the capability of practices, planning laws and institutions to keep 
Figure 3.1: Approaches to energy and climate change policies (Parag and Janda, 
2010) 
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track with new regulation and legislation, which in turn is lagging behind the 
possibilities provided by technological innovation. As renewable energy policy 
lies at this intersection it can be divided either into demand side and supply side 
measures or price-based and quantity-based measures (Andor, 2010). 
Either way, energy and climate change policies are likely to incur transfers 
between different sectors of the population as some low income households 
might benefit from fully subsidised measures or lose out because higher income 
households might benefit from buying measures at subsidised prices which are 
likely to be funded through all energy consumers’ (increasing) energy bills 
(DECC, 2010e). This is analysed in further detail in the analysis chapters. 
The FiT, as one of the policies funded through all energy customers’ bills, 
arguably forms a strategically managed niche exempt from traditional market 
principles (Meyer, 2003). The market is no longer the key determinant of price 
signals relating to the choice of generation technology nor of the best way of 
managing price risk. Public authorities determine the price level, therefore the 
risk is transferred from the market to policy-makers. This provides policymakers 
with a considerable dilemma as a low price will lead to an undersupply and 
potentially the non-compliance with carbon reduction commitments while a high 
price risks inducing windfall profits, boom and bust cycles and a higher burden 
on consumers (Butler and Neuhoff, 2004; Platchkov et al., 2011). This is 
particularly relevant to technologies that cannot be considered mature or 
material (commercially viable), in which case the relative high level of support 
might require frequent reviews in line with technological diffusion and the 
associated falling prices (Meyer, 2003; Newbery, 2010). 
The success of the FiT hereby needs to be measured both by deployment 
figures of RETs and by the reduction in price per unit of generation over time. 
Germany and Spain are countries that fully embraced this policy and both 
managed to exceed their renewable energy targets faster than originally 
anticipated. Their strong and export oriented wind turbine industries, and to a 
certain extent (though increasingly less so) also their PV industries (Fuchs and 
Wassermann, 2009), have also been exclusively linked to the presence of FiTs 
as both countries adopted the policy early on. In Germany in particular, the FiT 
triggered strong growth in the small and medium size enterprise sector (SME) 
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and provided an impetus for research and development in industry, electrical 
engineering, mechanical engineering, biochemistry, the building industry and 
the agricultural sector (El Bassam and Maegaard, 2004). The success of FiTs 
can therefore be measured as much by the successful diffusion of new scales 
of generation facilities as by a country’s co-evolution of energy policy and a 
‘green economy’ within the framework of its regulatory state paradigm (adapted 
from Mitchell, 2008). 
As mentioned throughout this thesis, a further benefit associated with the FiT is 
more variable ownership structures that result from its simplicity. Ownership of 
renewable energy generation facilities is dominated by corporate players in 
Spain, Scotland, England and Wales while Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands have a high proportion of local and cooperative ownership (see 
Table 1.1). Cooperatives are defined as participative and locally based 
schemes or those not running for profit but providing returns on the basis of 
‘ethical investment’ (Toke et al., 2008; see also Chapter 1). Germany’s 
‘Mittelstand’ is of particular interest as cooperative models that permeate these 
SMEs are financed by public share offers. As indicated in previous sections of 
this chapter, much of Germany’s installed renewable energy capacity is also 
owned by individuals, such as farmers or ‘Buergerkraftwerke’ (citizen’s power 
stations), which are citizen-investor-owned schemes with strong local 
participation, often involving ethical investment principles. Local ownership 
increases the prospect for schemes being given planning consent and arguably 
also improve the general planning environment and political profile, particularly 
of wind power. The planning controversies in the UK, especially in England and 
Wales may plausibly be attributed to a lack of such involvement opportunities 
(Toke et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, FiTs have been criticised for the high costs they impose on 
consumers and the windfall profits they provide to suppliers (Monbiot, 2010a). It 
can also be argued that the potential for ‘green jobs’ has been overstated as 
much of the supply chain is increasingly moving towards emerging economies 
(Pollitt, 2010; Platchkov et al., 2011). However, drawing on the German 
example it is assumed that in 2008 alone the German FiT system cost energy 
consumers €4.5bn but avoided €2.7bn of fuel imports (Vaze and Tindale, 2011). 
Resulting economies of scale in the renewable sector contribute further to 
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falling overall costs over time, unlike comparable changes in the fossil-fuel 
sector that eventually lead to depleting reserves and thus rising costs 
(Schwaegerl, 2011). The difficulty with FiTs lies in establishing adequate tariff 
levels. If they are set too high, less cost effective technologies are chosen and 
competitive pressures from other energy sources will be discouraged, thereby 
also imposing unnecessarily high costs on consumers. Innovation activities may 
therefore become less attractive (Söderholm and Klaasen, 2007). If they are set 
too low, on the other hand, innovation activities may be entirely discouraged. 
 
3.5.4 The economics of supporting small-scale generation 
A purely economic analysis of the German FiT points to the expense of picking 
winners and the questionable carbon savings in light of the presence of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as the reduction of emission in the 
electricity sector enables obsolete ETS certificates to be sold to other industries. 
In theory, emissions are therefore shifted, rather than reduced (Frondel et al., 
2009). 
However, this narrow economic analysis ignores other knock-on effects of 
energy policy as long as it provides a reliable and predictable framework 
(Hanson, 2011; see also Porter and van der Linde, 1995). This particular issue 
with the ETS, after all, is not a problem relating to the FiT itself. A FiT is 
designed to provide a stable market for the period of investment cost recovery 
but this stability has been the source of much debate following FiT reviews in 
various European countries (Noble, 2011; Der SPIEGEL, 2011). Despite these 
uncertainties, the profitability of projects eligible for the FiT should be measured 
in monetary as well as non-monetary benefits, especially innovation potentials 
enabling the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
This requires the backing from political institutions willing to look beyond the 
short-term financial bottom line, especially bearing lock-in (Unruh, 2000) and 
path-dependent trajectories (Mahoney, 1982) in mind. Germany is very 
fortunate in that its Bank for Reconstruction and Development (KfW-Bank) 
provides loans at reduced rates for investment in renewables (Rydin, 2011a, 
see also Chapter 5 – Analysis Part 1). Special loan provision are by no means 
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restricted to community energy projects but many communities and community 
related public bodies have been the beneficiaries of loans not only for the 
installation of renewables but also for energy efficiency and other projects 
relating to environmental protection (Held et al., 2010; Vaze and Tindale, 2011; 
Rydin, 2011a). 
Energy policy and the surrounding framework can therefore be designed with a 
primary but not an exclusive focus on technological diffusion, which requires an 
understanding of barriers to investment as uncertainties about the monetary 
and non-monetary benefits are directly reflected by people’s investment 
decisions. Alternatively, it can be designed more along the lines of a regulatory 
framework within a liberalised market. This also determines what might be 
considered within the scope of energy policy as some benefits associated with 
the FiT, such as the promotion of social innovation by encouraging a wide range 
of previously passive electricity consumers to engage actively in the generation 
of electricity from decentralised renewable sources, may not be economically 
measureable. What is more important in this research context are therefore not 
bare economic figures but rather which ownership structures of RETs and 
scales of deployment result from policy incentives. 
Due to these varying if not contradicting views and economic models it is not 
surprising that the economic viability of more tightly regulated support systems 
such as FiTs is highly contested. Opposing opinions often reflect the ideological 
divided between a liberal market framework, such as the UK’s, and a more 
coordinated market framework, such as Germany’s. The latter assumes that 
government can and needs to act as principal facilitator while the former 
assumes that liberalisation, competition and deregulation will deliver the 
changes and change agents required for the continued provision of our 
(increasing) needs and the delivery of policy objectives (adapted from Jackson , 
2009). 
 
3.5.5 International community energy experiences 
In several EU countries more associated with coordinated market frameworks, 
such as Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Austria, community scale renewable 
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energy projects have proven very successful in breaching the growing 
producer/consumer divide (Droege, 2009). A study by DTI along with Co-
operatives UK analysed the factors determining the success of co-operative 
community energy projects in Denmark and Sweden and points towards the 
following success factors that allow this form of energy provision to thrive and 
associated change agents to deliver effectively what is required: 
 ‘Support to communities from technical advisors and practitioners to 
transfer know-how; 
 Commitment of government and local authorities to community 
involvement and ownership models and to a co-operative approach with 
many small units of delivery; 
 Education and information to promote public familiarity with the range of 
co-operative structures and energy services; 
 Multiple bottom line perspective to develop a public consensus that the 
price of energy should not be the only driver of energy policy’ (Conaty, 
2011: 9; DTI, 2004) 
The lack of top-down commitment towards these objectives in the UK also has 
knock-on effects on organisational structures capable of delivering these 
provisions. A narrow focus on consumer costs also conveniently ignores the 
underlying issue of growing income inequality. A more recent study by Co-
operatives UK (Conaty, 2011) concludes that the cooperative sector’s delivery 
of renewable energy measures had the following weaknesses: 
 ‘Lack of focus, cohesion and direction – fragmented effort by small 
organisations that is too slow to make a difference 
 Lack of co-ordination, forums for communication and back-office help 
 Lack of infrastructure to scale up, lack of common standards along with 
isolated good practice and poor replication 
 Lack of mechanisms to avoid unnecessary competition 
 Lack of joined-up systems for retrofit work 
 Lack of funding models for small co-operatives, for retrofit work and poor 
access to development finance. Lack of methods for raising construction 
finance 
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 Lack of awareness in the UK of the potential of co-operative and mutual 
models – low profile and poor image holding things back’ (Conaty, 2011: 
10) 
Community scale environmental projects, such as slow food and Transition 
Town movements can now be found in many communities throughout the UK 
(Church and Elster, 2002; Seyfang and Smith, 2007). A growing body of 
(popular) literature surrounding this topic is further proof of growing interest in 
community resilience, particularly food security. Breaching this divide in the 
energy sector, however, is a comparatively more difficult task. When it comes to 
the provision of electricity there is hardly any local nor historical expertise 
available that might enable a transition to a more holistic system of production 
and consumption. Skills in this area require development but it is unlikely, at 
least under current market conditions in the UK, that any meaningful up-skilling 
will happen in the near future without coordinated and consistent government 
intervention (Fudge and Peters, 2011). 
Examples of such intervention can be found in Denmark and Germany, where 
the diffusion process has also been stimulated by the alteration of planning 
regulation, usually by prioritising the development of RETs. Paragraph 35 of 
Germany’s BauGB (building code - Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2011) 
enables communities to determine specific areas for concentrated wind energy 
development. German regulation even goes one step beyond its federal 
building code by allowing wind energy developments under 20 wind turbines to 
go ahead without public hearing (Bundesverband WindEnergie e.V., 2005). This 
as well as the greater facilitatory capacity of local authorities highlighted in the 
previous chapter avoid the pitfall of structural discrimination against renewables 
and encourages the local exploitation of ‘low hanging fruit’ in terms of 
technological maturity and generation capacity in the renewable energy 
diffusion arena, although this approach tends to promote economies of scale 
favouring incumbent corporates and utilities in the absence of appropriate 
regulation (adapted from El Bassam and Maegaard, 2004). 
In the UK, until recently a more general approach to renewable energy and 
sustainable development was followed, primarily through Planning Policy 
Statement 7 and 22 which specified the need to accommodate and promote 
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renewable energy developments (ODPM, 2011c, 2011b). Recent changes to 
the planning system in the UK have, for the moment at least, increased 
uncertainty rather than reducing it and this is analysed in more depth in the 
analysis chapters. Another major barrier to medium-scale and middle-out 
developments in UK remains the allocation of planning decision-making for new 
<50MW developments to local planning councils. New energy developments 
exceeding 50MW, on the other hand, are subject to the granting of planning 
permission by the Secretary of State (Pollitt, 2010; DECC, 2012f). This allows 
for effective fast-tracking of large-scale developments rather than those within 
the scale of community energy. 
 
3.5.6 The transferability of success stories 
Germany’s success may be partly attributed to its holistic approach according to 
Stenzel and Frenzel’s (2008) argument that governments can significantly 
influence the trajectory of the diffusion of technological innovation, particularly of 
RETs, through governance, policy and regulation. By taking a holistic approach, 
it is possible for governments to challenge incumbent assumptions about the 
social embeddedness of technologies and to foster change that goes far 
beyond the mere choice of technology. The German concept of ‘Energiewende’, 
can be at least partly conceptualised as an intentional and concerted approach 
to change. Its origins can be traced back to at least 1988 when political 
legitimacy and support for renewables was established with the help of cross-
party support for a Parliamentary Resolution calling for more R&D in 
renewables (Scheer, 2001). Germany’s energy policy related decision-making 
has ever since necessitated changes and alterations in the planning system and 
areas of financial provision to accommodate this strategic long-term vision. 
More often than not, measures encouraging multi-scalar technological diffusion, 
such as the German example, have also been developed with domestic 
production and job generation potential in mind. Both German and Danish 
energy policy and regulatory measures implemented over the last 20 years 
affecting RETs have led to strong domestic growth in green energy 
technologies and associated services (Lehr, 2008; Vaze and Tindale, 2011; 
Sørensen, 2012). As previously indicated, however, cross-country comparisons 
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of market based energy policies have been criticised for failing to take 
differences including planning systems, the existence of established 
mechanisms favouring local ownership, financial resources for small-scale 
decentralised renewable energy developments and cultural differences in 
enthusiasm for grassroots activity into account (Butler and Neuhoff, 2004, Toke, 
2005a). 
It is nevertheless fair to state that strong development of community owned 
renewable energy can be linked to the FiT as market-based trading systems 
such as the RO, which are associated with perceived financial insecurity and 
the threat of market collapse, are less likely to attract new entrants (Toke, 
2005a). It can also be argued that the RO practically excludes communities or 
other small operators from entering the market as they cannot compete with 
central planning and development facilities of large companies nor their 
financial support, their development portfolios and the backing from energy 
suppliers and transmission infrastructure providers (adapted from El Bassam 
and Maegaard, 2004). 
Government interventions behind new scales and ownership models of 
renewable energy generation infrastructure show that a clear focus on 
technological and economic development in specific industrial sectors has led to 
a rapid diffusion of technological and social innovation. These innovations are 
primarily technological but in certain settings these innovations include up-
skilling as well as less economically tangible effects such as energy awareness 
and energy/carbon literacy, apart from increased energy security and the 
strengthening of the local economy (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008; Droege, 
2009). 
The social valuation process of regulation, legislation, planning and local energy 
developments includes culture specific influences and framework conditions in 
which individuals and developers are rooted (Toke, 2005b). Schweizer-Ries 
(2008) states that individuals’ acceptance of the deployment of local energy 
depends on their knowledge about ‘the spatial characteristics and 
environmental characteristics, and the affective component as an emotional 
connection to this spatial environment’ (Schweizer-Ries, 2008: 7). At the same 
time, local opposition might stand in contrast to apparent widespread support as 
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surveys conducted on behalf of government indicate (Haggett, 2009). If people 
have an idea of economic effects of local energy, however, they are more likely 
to be in favour of their deployment (Nielsen, 2002). Therefore, local economic 
evaluation is decisive for acceptance (Schweizer-Ries, 2008). This appears to 
be the case in Germany where energy policy has transformed local energy into 
an economic necessity and an essential element of its NEF, rather than a visual 
or aesthetic nuisance. 
 
3.5.7 Changing perceptions of renewable energy technologies 
This is not to say that German regulation has succeeded in eradicating negative 
public perceptions towards local and decentralised energy developments. If 
profits are perceived to benefit just a few community members, rather than the 
community as a whole, perception by the German public, as anywhere else, 
remains in opposition to these developments (Jobert et al., 2007). However, as 
regulation also provides incentives for microgeneration, such as solar PV, even 
those in opposition (with sufficient financial endowments) might be able to profit 
from investments in other, more affordable scales of technological diffusion. 
Strong opposition therefore rarely emerges as people find other ways of getting 
their share from regulatory incentive schemes (Jobert et al., 2007). 
Research from Denmark also suggests that the economic involvement of 
citizens in local energy projects leads to more positive attitudes. This is 
particularly the case when people own shares in wind turbines (Krohn and 
Damborg, 1999; Vaze and Tindale, 2011). Over time, people become familiar 
with their surrounding infrastructures (Parkhill et al., 2010), which apparently is 
already the case in Denmark, because ‘wind turbines are now seen as an 
integral part of the Danish cultural landscape [...], there would be a public outcry 
if they were removed’ (Nielsen, 2002: 130 adapted from Warren et al., 2005). 
According to Toke (2005b), it is the Danish model of local share ownership that 
helps increase local support for renewable energy development. He concludes 
that economic factors play an important role in shaping public perceptions 
towards landscapes. With the right incentives, pollution reduction values are 
given greater prominence in planning decisions than landscape values (Toke, 
2005b). 
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Unlike Germany and Denmark, opportunities for local ownership are still 
restricted in the UK. Local economic benefits from commercial renewable 
energy developments usually relied, and in many cases still do, on voluntary 
contributions from commercial developers (CSE, 2009). The introduction of the 
FiT has opened the door for local ownership but a more widespread rollout of 
new scales and ownership structures requires significant changes to planning 
practices and local taxation systems. Currently, the most common way for 
renewable energy developments to provide community benefits is for money to 
be paid into a fund for the use of the community like the Community Sustainable 
Energy Programme by the National Lottery (CSEP, 2012). This implies either 
annual payment per MW, lump sum payment or an amount linked to the 
revenue. The actual amount paid has to be derived from discussion and 
negotiation between the developer and representatives of the local community 
but actual benefits remain very low both compared to other countries and to 
projects developed by communities themselves (Munday et al., 2011). 
Renewable UK’s best-practice protocol indicates that communities hosting 
commercial developments struggle to receive local benefits exceeding 
£1,000/a/installed MW, although there are examples of local benefits exceeding 
£5,000/a/ installed MW. Examples from Germany entail local benefits exceeding 
€20,000/a/ installed MW through fixed annual business rates (Hammermann, 
2012). For entirely community owned projects in the UK, on the other hand, 
evidence points towards the possibility of generating £35,000/a/ installed MW, 
which is analysed in more detail in the analysis chapters. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Despite the lack of beneficial treatment of community energy in the UK, many 
community activists, change agents and communities have therefore chosen to 
develop community-led energy projects, often as a means of enhancing local 
climate action, increasing resilience and energy security and to create more 
meaningful engagement with RETs. Localising some of the financial benefits 
that energy generation entails is also playing an increasingly important role in 
local energy related decision-making. Scottish communities, particularly island 
communities, have been very successful in developing such projects, some of 
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which managed to secure investment from various sources to develop their own 
turbines with considerable energy security and financial benefits for the 
community (Munday et al., 2011). 
Beyond the natural island setting, Baywind (Baywind, 2011) and Westmill Wind 
Farm Co-operative Ltd. with its 2,374 members (Westmill Co-op, 2012) are 
probably the most prominent examples of community based renewable energy 
initiative and many others have followed suit, such as West Oxford Community 
Renewables, Brighton Energy Co-op, Bath Energy Co-op and Wadebridge 
Renewable Energy Network (WREN), just to mention a few. However, the scale 
and pace at which community energy projects are developing in the UK is 
sluggish compared to many continental neighbours and success stories are few 
and far between. This is reflected by the fact that only a fraction of renewable 
energy developments are community energy schemes (around 0.5% of 
generation, see Chapter 1 for more details) while in Denmark and Germany the 
share of community energy projects is significantly higher. 
Examples from the UK nevertheless show that the development of community 
energy projects is possible in the UK as long as a dedicated and skilled team 
can provide the necessary input to keep the project going despite regulatory 
and planning uncertainty at various stages during the development process. 
The introduction of the FiT has triggered a boom in communities actively 
engaging in the prospect of local community owned energy generation but the 
continuous reviews and the uncertainty about the future of the FiT as such have 
significantly slowed the momentum of the movement. The development of FiT 
related community energy is also more in line with the developments in Brighton 
(kWs of solar PV) than Westmill (MWs of wind) due to the scalar restrictions of 
the tariff structure. 
However, official government support for community energy does not end with 
the introduction of the FiT. DECC envisages that the development of community 
energy schemes will be commissioned by local authorities, developers and 
housing associations, community groups, scheme developers and 
commissioners as principal agents of change (Allcorn, 2010b). Despite this 
commitment to various scales and ownership structures, fundamental changes 
to energy policy as envisaged in the Electricity Market Reform (HMG, 2012) 
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have yet to include provisions to protect, enhance and develop the community 
energy niche. 
Analysing energy policy through this community energy niche is the subject 
matter of the second half of this thesis. Starting with Chapter 4, the following 
chapters set out to determine which actors and which networks or coalitions of 
interaction shape the niche of community energy within a governance 
framework of liberalised market principles, an incumbent NEF and macro-scale 
landscape challenges. Both community energy’s capacity to diffuse 
technological innovations and its capacity to allow a wide range of actors to 
engage in innovative social practices through collective energy generation are 
evaluated by establishing which barriers remain and which opportunities arise in 
the development of new scales and ownership structures of decentralised 
energy provision. Community energy hereby provides a tangible yet dynamic 
lens through which the resulting threshold, where the development of new 
scales and ownership structures of decentralised RETs feed back and 
challenge path-dependencies and lock-ins, can be analysed.  
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
4 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology used for primary and secondary 
research which forms the basis for this particular analysis of the governance of 
energy policy, technological diffusion and social innovation in the following 
chapters. By introducing the empirical element of this study, this chapter 
illuminates how the aims and objectives outlined in the introduction were 
approached within this thesis. The first section provides an overview of previous 
studies relevant to this piece of research. This is followed by a justification of 
the study area, the introduction to strengths and weaknesses of methodologies 
applicable to this area of research and the actual methodologies used in this 
thesis. Particular focus lies on the change agents and their categorisation as 
they play an essential role in the diffusion/adoption process. The last sections 
introduce the sampling strategy, data analysis and presentation as well as 
positionality and ethics. 
Building on Mitchell’s (2008:2) critique of the tendency of government policy 
decisions to rely heavily on narrow quantitative economic analyses, rather than 
a combination of economic, technology and innovation theories and qualitative 
social science, this thesis sets out to marry these theoretical and 
methodological approaches. The community setting was chosen as a 
geographical area of analysis because of its nature as the smallest unit of 
collective action capable of generating a critical mass to move from idea to 
implementation. It also represents an incubation room where technological 
diffusion and social innovation combine to foster new generation and 
engagement practices and where the momentum for various forms of 
sustainable development and climate change action appear largest. The 
universality of communities and their increasing recognition in energy policy 
provides ample space for the analysis of interactions. Various actors 
representing both communities and energy policy as well as the various 
interactive networks in between were interviewed for this purpose. Based on the 
literature reviewed and the theories expanded on in previous chapters, 
particularly the diffusion of innovations, transition theories, niche innovation 
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theories and the surrounding governance of NEFs, primary data was collected 
principally using in-depth interviews with energy activists representing the niche  
of community scale developments, change agents at the intermediary level 
linking community interest with policy regimes, and decision-makers and 
facilitators at the national scale whose frameworks for action are determined by 
landscape challenges, restrictions and requirements. 
 
4.1 The study area 
Geographically this thesis spans a wide range of scales and political 
dimensions. The primary focus is on the UK but where appropriate, European 
dimensions and aspects of energy policy are also analysed to place national 
particularities in an international context, also in light of increasing market 
integration. As a result of previous research conducted in the area of 
sustainable development and energy policy in Germany as part of a Masters in 
2007-2008, Germany features particularly strongly in this analysis. This thesis’ 
emphasis on economic and policy development trajectories also stems from this 
interest in the (un-)sustainability of energy systems. The empirical chapters 
focus more specifically on the UK, particularly England. Once again, however, 
comparisons with other countries, particularly Germany, feature regularly due to 
both the longstanding research interest in this area of research as well as the 
need for comparisons regarding geographically and historically determined 
policy landscapes and development trajectories necessary to interpret UK 
particularities. This reflects the MLP of targets, governance approaches, energy 
policy and scale of generation ranging from the landscape level to the niches 
embedded within various regimes, particularly community energy’s niche 
existence within the UK generation and energy policy regime. The interviews 
were all conducted in the UK with one exception in Germany. 
As specified in Chapter 2, the interviewees represent intermediaries, 
encouraging, actively fostering and/or facilitating specific developments as a 
precondition for the diffusion process (Eveland, 1986; Rogers, 1995) in line with 
their own financial, ideological and/or altruistic interests. In most cases, their 
spheres of interest and action are also locally and regionally confined although 
some benefit from knowledge and experience transfer from other regions or 
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even other countries, particularly Germany and Denmark. For the sake of this 
piece of research and in line with the MLP on energy policy, these actors’ views 
and agendas are considered embedded within the overarching frameworks 
determined by negotiations at the transnational scale of climate change and 
energy security representing the landscape level, the liberal market framework 
and financial constraints relating to the ongoing economic crisis at the regime 
level, and various policies, regulations and perceptions within the community 
energy niche, as indicated in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Analysing the interviewee’s position within the framework of innovation diffusion 
according to Geels (2002) involved the specific analysis of the change agents’ 
and agencies’ approach to renewable energy development and deployment. In 
particular, this allowed the distinction of non-geographical barriers and 
complexities as well as the geographical opportunities that the FiT and the 
surrounding regulatory framework provides to both adopters and change agents 
to diffuse RETs and how this feeds back to facilitators at a higher level. 
Particular geographical opportunities arise in the Southwest as the insolation 
rates, which are among the best in the country, allow for greater returns than 
average for solar PV. This has prompted many community groups to look 
towards developing solar PV community energy projects with the launch of the 
FiT. Most of the interviewees are based in the Southwest due to practical 
considerations such as approachability and travel constraints but the 
geographical advantages also provided an interesting insight into the ‘gold rush’ 
associated with initial phase of the FiT. 
Landscape                   
Climate change and 
energy security 
concerns  
Regime                    
Liberal market 
framework, financial 
constraints 
Niche                              
Policies,                 
Regulation,                 
Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Overarching framework in which the interviewees are considered 
embedded for the sake of this research (adapted from Geels, 2002)  
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By also taking Johnson and Jacobsson’s (2001) notion that the innovation and 
diffusion process is both an individual and a collective act into account, change 
agencies with a more specific focus on community and decentralised energy 
development can be defined as consultation networks who influence clients’ 
innovation-decision in a direction according to their (in case it is a business) or 
society’s (in case it is a cooperative) objectives or based on more idealistic 
views on environmentalism and equity. Geographical particularities, particularly 
with the insolation rates in the Southwest, also determine the scope and 
capacities of both change agents and communities. They form a recurring 
theme throughout the analysis chapters in that solar PV features strongly as a 
technology of choice rather than hydro or wind. Figure 4.2 indicates policy 
dependency, scale and priorities of various approaches to community energy. 
 
 
Offgrid and CBOs are highly geographically bound while NGOs in the energy 
sector such as charities and co-operatives tend to operate within a specific 
region. Energy agencies fulfil a similar function but they tend to operate either 
on a more commercial basis or on behalf of government across a broader 
geographical area. Consultancies may be active throughout the UK and the 
same holds true for commercial developers and utilities. Public private 
partnerships and local authorities, on the other hand, are once again highly 
geographically bound but their positions as the most decentralised links of 
government power/enterprise imply they can be classified as national within this 
Figure 4.2: Categorisation of community energy projects (compiled by the author) 
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framework. Priorities of community involvement depend on the type of bottom 
line these organisations are following and Figure 4.3 indicates areas where 
clashes that are analysed in more detail in the following chapters may arise, 
such as the likely incompatibility of commercial ambitions and social innovation 
through the embedding of skills at a local level. 
 
4.2 Previous Studies 
For the development of an appropriate methodological approach for the 
analysis of both the geographical particularities and the change agents’ position 
within the NEF a range of previous studies covering the areas of community 
energy, FiTs and community energy, transition theories, energy policy and the 
diffusion of innovations, diffusion niches, diffusion niches relating to community 
energy and other relevant studies were analysed. A table providing an overview 
of methods used in selected previous studies can be found in Appendix 1. 
The table indicates that theoretical studies and papers in the areas of transition 
theories and diffusion niches rely heavily on documentary analyses (Hielscher 
et al., 2011; Kern and Mitchell, 2010; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith and 
Stirling, 2008) or a combination of documentary and historical analyses 
(Ornetzeder and Rohracher, 2006; Smith, 2006). Studies approaching energy 
policy from the diffusion of innovations perspective (either explicitly or implicitly) 
take similar methodological approaches (Foxon and Pearson, 2007; Jacobsson 
and Johnson, 2000; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Pollitt, 2010; Woodman and 
Baker, 2008) although there are two notable exceptions. 
Toke’s (2005a) study compares market-based and fixed-price arrangements 
relating to wind turbine deployment and ownership structures in several 
European countries. Drawing on documentary analysis, interviews and 
qualitative analysis, the paper specifies regulatory particularities that allow 
certain ownership structures of onshore wind to thrive in different economic and 
social frameworks. Similarly, Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) approach the 
international study of how technological change is regulated using interviews, 
case studies and documentary analysis. These comparative studies attempt to 
assess the potential of different policy strategies in encouraging diversity of 
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scale and ownership. A comparative study commissioned by the now disbanded 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry), on the other hand, uses case studies, 
and questionnaires as well as an extensive document analysis for the study of 
support systems and development practices of wind energy associated with 
community benefits in the UK and several other countries. 
Further comparative international studies that do not feature as a separate 
section in this table include those in the area of technological diffusion and the 
evolution of policy support systems and how they in turn enable various scales 
of technological embedding by allowing varying investment patterns to develop 
(see Breukers and Wolsink, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2006) and comparisons of 
national governance particularities in terms of decentralised and local climate 
change responses (Bulkeley and Betsil, 2005). A range of studies also aim to 
provide an understanding of the complexity and contextual factors that 
determine NEFs by covering the broader context of country-specific political, 
economic, technological and institutional developments (see Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000; Johnson and Jacobsson, 2003; Toke et al., 2008). In general, 
these papers rely on documentary analysis although many are based on large-
scale studies involving multi-method approaches. 
Studies with a less theoretical focus tend to rely more heavily on quantitative 
and especially qualitative data gathering and analysis. The analysis of public 
perceptions (see Rogers et al., 2008; Schweizer-Ries, 2008; Walker et al., 
2010; West et al., 2010) tends to require a combination of interviews with 
questionnaires or focus groups. Methodological approaches used for assessing 
drivers, barriers and solutions including motivations, funding opportunities and 
public support vary between in-depth case studies with interviews and 
qualitative analysis (Allen et al., 2012) as well as documentary analysis (Walker, 
2008) to combinations of documentary analysis and case studies (Adams and 
Berry, 2008; Hoggett, 2008). A study focussing on the definition of community 
energy in relation to process and outcome also combines interviews with case 
studies (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008), similar to a study assessing 
economic knock-on effects (Munday et al., 2011). 
More specific foci on FiTs and community energy, either in an attempt to 
establish where community energy fits into the FiT framework (Philips, 2010) or 
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their potential for alleviating fuel poverty (Saunders et al., 2012) make extensive 
use of interviews and qualitative analysis. Studies attempting to marry the 
diffusion of innovations theory with community energy by assessing the 
embedding of socio-technical innovations and the development of community 
innovation potentials, on the other hand, take a variety of approaches. Some 
researchers combine documentary and historical analyses to form theoretical 
papers (Verbong et al., 2006; Seyfang and Smith, 2007a), while others also 
include interviews and qualitative assessments (O’Brien and Hope, 2010; 
Walker and Devine-Wright, 2006) or all these approaches combined with 
questionnaires and quantitative analysis (Walker et al., 2010). 
 
4.3 Rationale for the methodological approach 
The strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies vary according to the 
research specifications. As the previous section and the preceding chapters 
indicate, the literature reviewed for this piece of research covers a range of 
topics and theoretical concepts as well as the dynamic policy landscape 
surrounding the governance of energy policy. As a result, the empirical element 
of this research is required to fit around both an evolving theoretical framework 
and a constantly changing policy framework. The following two sections provide 
an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of common methodological 
approaches in this subject area derived from the overview of methods used in 
selected studies (see Appendix 1) in the previous section in relation to the 
methodological requirements for this analysis. 
 
4.3.1 Strengths of methodological approach 
The empirical element of this thesis is based on a qualitative approach due to 
its capacity to capture the dynamic nature of policy landscapes both in terms of 
policy development and the underlying reasons, interpretations and practical 
outcomes of policy implementation. The rationale for choosing a combination of 
documentary analysis, interviews and qualitative analysis for this thesis stem 
from the tried and tested nature of this approach as much as from practical 
concerns. 
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Qualitative research and data analysis has been advocated by Ritchie and 
Spencer (1994) as a means of studying the area of applied policy. It is 
considered particularly helpful in providing insights and explanations necessary 
to gain an understanding of theories of social behaviour and social action 
experienced by practitioners and others affected by policy and policy related 
decision-making (Walker, 1985: 19; Ritchie and Spencer, 1994: 173). A 
qualitative approach to data collection also enables the researcher to look 
beyond decision-making towards the evaluation and analysis of resulting and 
actionable outcomes, i.e. technological diffusion and social innovations. 
Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) Framework Analysis differs between contextual 
(primarily directed at what is shaping the circumstances and the setting of the 
event), diagnostic (precisely determining and characterising why an event or 
circumstance is taking place), evaluative (examining and appraising how the 
circumstances arose and was enabled to take place) and strategic questions 
that need to be addressed in the context of applied policy research. 
In this thesis, contextual questions dealt with the underlying form and nature of 
energy systems and NEFs, which pointed to lock-in and path-dependency. 
Diagnostic questions addressed the reasons for, or causes of what exists, 
thereby indicating that system incumbency and overarching economic 
paradigms play an important role in determining country specific lock-ins and 
path-dependencies. Evaluative questions dealing with the appraisal of the 
effectiveness of what is already in place highlighted issues surrounding policy 
innovation and the difficulty of multi-scalar approaches and new ownership 
models within the NEF. Strategic questions shaped the identification of new 
theories and actions that arose from the evaluation of the contextual, diagnostic 
and evaluative analysis. 
A more conventional approach to this framework analysis, whereby a literature 
review is conducted in the early stages of the thesis and updated in the writing 
up stage, would have ignored the complexity of energy policy development. In 
particular, fundamental shifts in risk perceptions following the FiT reviews at the 
niche scale and the Fukushima Daiichi incident at the landscape scale, which 
sent ruptures through decision-making structures even outside the realms of 
energy policy, required ongoing reframings and reassessments of the 
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theoretical and policy frameworks. This dynamism consequently fed results 
from strategic questions back to the evaluative, diagnostic and contextual 
framework. 
Historical analysis played an important role in determining the contextual 
framework, especially for the assessment of how specific path-dependencies 
and lock-ins have come about. This approach also proved useful in identifying 
how policy innovations are derived from underlying economic trends and 
considerations, also regarding the evaluation of shifting priorities and growing 
uncertainties. In relation to community energy however, the small number of 
relevant examples in the UK reduced their individual as well as their combined 
significance in explaining policy developments. With respect to technological 
diffusion and social innovation, the relative novelty of the FiT played an 
important role in limiting the value of this approach for this research beyond the 
framing of policy related decision-making relating to infrastructural path-
dependencies. 
The main element of this thesis’ methodological approach is data gathering 
through interviews. They are fundamental for backing up and strategically 
exploring ideas derived from the historical analysis and ongoing literature 
review. The fairly close-knit nature of community energy in the UK also allowed 
the incorporation of updated views on particular developments by the 
interviewees, in some cases even more than once during the research process, 
thereby enabling some aspects of this policy analysis to take on characteristics 
of longitudinal surveys. 
The tried and tested nature of interviews (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) in the area 
of energy policy in combination with extensive literature reviews allowed both 
first hand and second hand data collection to be weighted equally in terms of 
intellectual and practical value (Hart, 2005). This approach, according to Tesch 
(1990), is akin to that of theory building as it seeks to identify connections 
between phenomena. Interviews enable the examination of experiences, 
feelings or opinions regarding policy developments, while structured yet open-
ended questions ensured comparability of responses without compromising the 
space for reflection and the expression of the interviewee’s own thinking by 
reducing the interviewer effect through free conversation. Following this 
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approach by the book, however, would have removed the opportunity to tailor 
interviews to particular circumstances and strategic contexts and limited the 
naturalness and relevance of questions and answers, also regarding the 
changing policy landscape throughout the interview period (July 2010 – October 
2011 with updates until October 2012). The interview approach used in this 
thesis therefore resembles an interview guide approach as it allowed for 
variances in the wording of questions and more freedom to explore specific 
areas of enquiry (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). 
 
4.3.2 Weaknesses of methodological approaches 
A quantitative assessment of renewable energy adopters for a small energy 
agency in the Southwest had also been conducted in the early stages of this 
research. However, this approach was deemed impractical following a pilot 
exercise due to the relative novelty of policy measures encouraging multi-scalar 
and multi-actor engagement in electricity generation, especially the FiT. 
Planning issues that non-permitted developments face also proved a hindrance 
in assessing enablers and barriers regarding policy, technological diffusion and 
social innovation. 
This quantitative assessment involved both questionnaires and telephone 
surveys but it restricted the naturalness and relevance of answers as questions 
were limited around specific topics to avoid answers shifting the focus of the 
conversation (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). It did not prove particularly helpful in 
clarifying trends or theories following their descriptions derived from the ongoing 
literature review and how policy developments and practical outcomes 
interconnected beyond a linear interpretation of policy innovation outcomes 
(adapted from Dey, 1993). 
A focus on individual case studies, both for a potential quantitative and/or a 
qualitative methodological approach features strongly in the literature relevant 
to this thesis and references to individual case studies feature throughout to 
explain particularities. However, too narrow a focus would have limited the 
validity of research findings and also inhibited the exploration of new 
developments resulting from the dynamic community energy niche and its 
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surrounding NEF. Recurring patterns would have been more difficult to identify 
and the establishment of why particular relationships exist, rather than testing 
whether they exist in the first place would have been more difficult to achieve. 
Another problem with case studies in a fairly new area of research in terms of 
FiT policy related developments are the planning delays and the general 
difficulties of moving from idea to implementation, which is explored further in 
the analysis chapters. 
 
4.3.3 The methodological approach 
As a result of the strengths and weaknesses of particular methodologies within 
the area of community energy research and related subject areas, this 
methodological approach combines elements of historical analysis and to a 
limited extent also case study research, particularly in the literature review 
which spans Chapter 2 and 3, with semi-structured interviews for the analysis of 
events relating to the FiT, energy policy, technological diffusion and social 
innovation in line with Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) Framework Analysis 
outlined above. The interview approach is analysed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs to provide an insight into the empirical process of 
information gathering and analysis. 
The importance of change agents and intermediaries (see Chapter 2) within the 
niche of community energy derives from its novelty, its complexity and the 
incapacity and unwillingness of UK governments to provide adequate support 
structures for the up-scaling and institutionalisation of community energy, which 
is in line with its minimal-intervention approach to energy policy and regulation 
in general. Within the community energy niche as well as the regime of policy 
and regulation, people fostering and encouraging community energy within 
communities, associated organisations and institutions as well as policy and 
regulation are considered change agents. According to Rogers (1995): 
The diffusion process relies on change agents that drive the uptake of 
innovations. A client may come to the change agent with a problem, and the 
innovation is recommended as the possible solution to this problem. This 
interaction cycle between the change agent and the client may continue through 
several cycles as a process of information exchange. The newness of a 
diffusion means that some degree of uncertainty is involved. In this case 
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uncertainty implies a lack of predictability, structure and information. 
Technological innovations embody information and therefore tend to reduce 
uncertainty about cause-effect relationships in problem solving so the adoption 
of renewable energy technologies might help reduce uncertainty about future 
increases in electricity prices. (Rogers, 1995: 6) 
For the general analysis of technological diffusion and social innovation, the 
term ‘change agent’ is used to describe the entire interviewee sample but in 
relation to community energy for this particular analysis, this term specifies 
intermediaries at the middle-out level between bottom-up action and top-down 
regulation. The intermediaries’ capacities to engage with the deployment of 
decentralised RETs can be distinguished according to the following categories. 
 Energy activists - Engagement or the wish to actively engage in 
collective energy generation within a community. This also includes the 
wish to engage in/receive benefits from the development of decentralised 
RETs by external companies. 
 Change agents - Engagement in implementation bodies specialising in 
the deployment of decentralised RETs associated with community 
benefits both in terms of ownership and/or benefits. These organisations 
facilitate and manage cooperation, coordination and knowledge transfer 
among the agents of the implementation process. 
 Facilitators - Engagement in the long-term decision-making strategies by 
investors, individuals, business or communities. This level of decision-
making influences the capacities of both energy activists and 
implementation bodies to engage and gain profit from the deployment of 
decentralised RETs in the long term. 
Insights into individual action as well as decision-making influencing the scope 
of action, particularly of change agents at a ‘lower level’ were gained both by 
analysing actions taken by change agents and by querying choices and 
perceptions using semi-structured interviews with energy activists, change 
agents and facilitators. This also enabled the assessment of interactions and 
processes of cooperation, coordination and knowledge transfer, which enabled 
the classification of interviewees according to this categorisation of requiring, 
providing and facilitating processes. Energy policy was analysed in relation to 
various positions within this particular framework of policy and technology 
interaction. Feeding changes in practices, often as a result of the changing 
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policy landscape, into an experimental framework created a methodological and 
theoretical focus on, and reflection of, actions and their consequences (adapted 
from Sørensen et al., 2010; Sørensen and Mattsson, 2008). 
 
4.3.4 Evidence and contribution to knowledge 
This methodological approach provides in-depth evidence for policy-makers and 
researchers interested in the UK NEF’s lock-ins and path-dependencies 
surrounding community energy. It helps contextualise surveys and more 
quantitative research outputs that are blind to such phenomena. This analysis 
also allows unquantifiable benefits and knock-on effects from (energy) policy, 
particularly in those surrounding social diffusion and the breaching of 
producer/consumer divides to be evaluated and appreciated empirically. 
Analysing interviews enables the researcher to evaluate and inform both theory 
and practice of the diffusion of innovations and transformation processes that 
are otherwise barely captured as numbers and often put into context by 
comparing them to other figures derived from similar methodologies. 
The identification of barriers and facilitators in the community energy 
development niche provides important points of inquiry for further investigation 
in the subject area as well as critical evaluations of assumptions surrounding 
more quantitative findings. Open-ended questions prove critical in evaluating 
individual and locally specific development processes and how the reality of 
one-size-fits-all policies pans out at the grassroots implementation level. It also 
engages the researcher and the reader through this analysis in the overall 
fuzziness and volatility of innovation diffusion arenas, especially below the point 
where economies of scales apply. What appears as anecdotal evidence when 
taken out of context provides conceptual understanding and evidence when 
compared with and contrasted with further data, both qualitative and 
quantitative, in the field of inquiry. This enables the NEF’s mechanisms 
associated with the FiT to be understood beyond the expense and difficulty 
associated with its maintaining as a scale-specific technological niche. In 
particular, the unsuccessful development of the community energy niche 
becomes evident as an unintended outcome of policy uncertainty and niche 
vulnerability. The interview format also provides a longitudinal element and 
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ongoing analysis throughout the evidence-gathering phase which enables the 
volatility of the FiT’s niche to be appreciated when viewed from a bottom-up CE 
development perspective. 
Energy policy tends to be about technological fixes to what is essentially a 
societal problem of energy demand and policies generally arise out of numerical 
analysis of demand and technological solution capacities with a lack of 
appreciation of local knowledge bases, energy demand and generation 
transformation desires and the capacity and willingness to change and embody 
low-carbon transitions at the crucial point where electricity generation and 
consumption blur and interlace. Successful and adequate technological 
implementation requires appropriate policies based on the integration of and 
negotiation with those shaping what may appear as an inflexible yet steadily 
growing consumption mass contently unaware of its BAU trajectory’s knock-on 
effects. 
The following sections provide details of the interviewee sample, further details 
on the interviewee categorisation and the sampling strategy as well as the study 
area. 
 
4.4 Interviewee categorisation 
According to the MLP shown in Figure 4.2, some interviewees might be 
motivated by landscape issues such as energy insecurity and climate change, 
but find their actions limited to the FiT niche because of regime constraints. 
Other change agents might be motivated primarily by the financial incentives 
provided at the niche level and consider environmental benefits and the 
diffusion of environmental innovations as a welcome by-product. The following 
interviewee classification is loosely based on the MLP of energy provision by 
Parag and Janda (2010). 
 Energy activists and grassroots community energy 
The first of these two examples already describes one of the main 
determinants of grassroots community energy development. Some projects, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2, develop below the ‘radar’ of governance in 
experimental niches, often driven by ‘deep green’ self-sufficiency desires, 
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such as alternative technology movements of the 1970s (Smith, 2006). 
Some interesting projects have arisen at this level of development but the 
focus of this thesis is more on the scales of technological diffusion and 
social innovation associated with particular regulatory interventions. For the 
sake of this analysis, community energy projects motivated or enabled 
through policy, particularly the FiT, are categorised as bottom-up 
developments while grassroots developments relate to more experimental 
projects. Actors driving and promoting the bottom-up community-led agenda 
are considered energy activists. 
 Bottom-up community energy 
Change agents diffusing proven concepts or ideas at the grassroots level 
are considered bottom-up change agents within this analytical framework. 
Developments at this level relate primarily to the policies that regulate the 
implementation of RETs within or close to the microgeneration scale (<45kW 
for heat and <50kW for electricity), particularly the FiT. Bottom-up 
community energy projects usually only comprise one technology, such as 
solar PV or micro-hydro and the legal framework is commonly based on 
constituted community groups or community-based organisations (CBOs), 
such as co-operatives. Many of the bottom-up change agents and agencies 
diffusing community energy at this scale also abide by co-operative 
principles. 
 Middle-out community energy 
Medium to large-scale community projects exceeding 100kW but within the 
FiT ‘community scale’ (100kW-2MW for hydro and 500kW-1.5MW for wind, 
see Chapter 3 for more details) of development are generally more 
structured than bottom-up projects. They also tend to require a greater 
range of external expertise. Many of the middle-out change agents operating 
at this scale also tend to work according to co-operative principles. These 
organisations can be constituted using a variety of legal and organisational 
structures, such as Industrial and Provident Societies or Community Interest 
Companies. 
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On the same scale we also find the smallest commercial approaches to 
community energy such as limited companies with the intention of 
professionalising what might have started as a grassroots movement into a 
business or an energy supply company (ESCo). They can either be driven 
within a specific location, or at the next higher level, within a broader 
geographical area or among communities of interest and the focus is usually 
on one specific technology. Their business models do not necessarily 
include community share issues and the middle-out change agents 
operating according to these objectives are often professional consultants 
with considerable experience in planning and finance. 
 Large-scale community energy 
There are few examples of large-scale community energy projects in the UK, 
the most famous and successful of which are Scottish island communities 
which have attained this scale thanks to generous grant funding (Munday et 
al., 2011, more information in Chapter 3). Communities at this scale of 
development are highly dependent on external change agents with 
considerable experience in attracting investment and more general 
governmental facilitation. This is also the scale where commercial investors 
start playing a crucial role, due to the lack of at-risk finance available for 
community-owned developments (Hoggett, 2010b). Depending on their input 
it is difficult to determine an exact threshold for ‘true’ community energy but 
they are included in this analysis as some of the engagement models 
provide considerable community benefits and allow scales of technological 
diffusion which are considered necessary for the achievements of carbon 
reduction commitments (more details in Chapter 3 and the analysis 
chapters). 
 Top-down community energy 
The largest scale of community energy is usually linked to top-down 
commercial developers through hybrid organisational structures where the 
community either ‘owns’ a wind turbine or a certain percentage of the total 
installed capacity (Watson and Devine-Wright, 2010). Community buy-in is 
secured either through a public share issue or a set amount is paid into a 
community fund on an annual basis, partly to compensate for the visual 
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intrusion and partly to enable the local community to engage actively in 
energy provision and to take pride in local generation of renewable energy. It 
is important to note that top-down development or hybrid organisational 
forms might also apply to smaller scales and that projects within either of 
these scales might be facilitated or initiated by local authorities. Change 
agents at this level of interaction act primarily as intermediaries between 
communities and commercial developers, ensuring that communities receive 
the best possible terms within their professional capacities. 
 Other relevant actors 
Apart from the change agents categorised above, several other actors also 
play a role in facilitating the development of community energy. In particular, 
these include installers of various community-scale technologies, lobbyists 
for this scale of technological diffusion (both from a business and from an 
environmental NGO perspective) and people involved in socially embedding 
technological diffusion, either through policies and planning or more 
fundamentally though inclusion in learning curricula. Those embedding 
technological diffusion are categorised as top-down change agents due to 
their overriding capacity to determine community specific frameworks for the 
diffusion of community energy while the others can be grouped together as 
facilitators. Government and policy-makers as principal determinants of 
general support frameworks are also considered able to take on facilitatory 
roles. 
 
4.4.1 Details of the interviewee sample 
In total, 40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with energy activists, 
change agents and facilitators including installers, planners and lobbyists as 
well as a utility representative and one person involved in integrating the 
renewables in learning curricula. Table 4.1 on the following page shows which 
interviewees fall into which categorisation. 
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Activists Change Agents Facilitators 
         Energy 
Activist 
Bottom-
up 
Middle-
out 
Top-
down 
Installer Planner Lobbyist Education Utility 
  
        EA1 BU1 MO1 Pla1/TD1 Edu1/Ins1 Pla1/TD1 Lob1 Edu1/Ins1 Uti1 
EA2 BU2 MO2 TD2 Ins2 Pla2/TD5 Lob2 
 
  
EA3 BU3 MO3 TD3 Ins3 Pla3/TD6 
  
  
EA4 BU4 MO4 TD4 Ins4 
   
  
EA5 BU5 MO5 Pla2/TD5 Ins5 
   
  
  BU6 MO6 Pla3/TD6 
    
  
  BU7 MO7   
    
  
  BU8 MO8   
    
  
  BU9 MO9   
    
  
  
 
MO10   
    
  
    MO11             
 
 
Some interviewees show up in several categories in Table 4.1 as the dynamism 
of this diffusion arena encourages involvement in several aspects of 
community-scale energy-technological deployment. Some of the change agents 
classified as top-down change agents in Table 4.1 also feature among the 
facilitators due to their dual capacities. Some of the change agents identified as 
bottom-up change agents work for co-operatives with a financial bottom-line yet 
remain committed to energy transitions through co-operative ownership while 
others work for energy agencies fostering this scale of development through 
various communication channels. Middle-out change agents also vary between 
community energy development specialists and energy agencies aiming for a 
wide variety of community energy approaches to more commercially ambitioned 
community energy projects. Top-down change agents range from government 
representatives, either involved in policy-making, in relation to FiTs, 
decentralised and community energy, to planning representatives. For this 
research purpose it is also helpful to conceptualise the individual spheres of 
action within diffusion arenas as follows in Figure 4.3 on the following page. 
 
Table 4.1: Interviewee categorisation 
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The interviewees represent either the centralised or the decentralised diffusion 
system. Figure 4.3 indicates the division between the centralised governmental 
diffusion arena and the decentralised non-governmental diffusion arena. 
Professional advice companies and consultancies working between the bottom-
up and the top-down level at the lower half of Figure 4.1 provide services to 
communities and businesses interested in developing local generation and also 
conduct feasibility studies on issues relating to legal, financial and planning 
barriers, policy development and the regulatory framework. Some are also 
actively engaging in lobbying on behalf of communities they represent. Utilities 
and commercial developers represent the outer ‘ring’ in the decentralised 
diffusion arena as they pull more weight in terms of influence on policy and well 
as in terms of achieving planning consent. These actors, as well as installers, 
lobbyists and the energy activists themselves represent the decentralised 
diffusion system.  
Government represents the centralised diffusion system at the top half of Figure 
4.3. Locally, government is represented by parish/district councils or local 
Centralised diffusion system 
Decentralised diffusion system 
Figure 4.3: Centralised/decentralised diffusion system divide (compiled by the author) 
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authorities and nationally the most relevant government department is DECC in 
relation to energy policy and DCLG in relation to planning. At the local level, 
government’s centralised diffusion system is most strongly represented by the 
planning system. At the national level, government is decisive for policy 
measures and regulation and responsible for the backing that certain 
development scales can expect to receive in line with the objectives of the 
current power balance. It is also indirectly responsible for the availability of 
finance for energy provision. This is where government can actively engage in 
the creation and management of niches where technologies and social learning 
can mature beyond the liberalised market framework (Verbong and Geels, 
2010). The outer landscape shapes energy related government action 
according to the MLP in Figure 2.1 and 4.1. 
There are many interactions between the centralised and the decentralised 
diffusion systems and in the case of projects facilitated by local authority it can 
be difficult to define a boundary. On the other hand, these hybrid approaches 
might have the capacity to combine the benefits of both the centralised and 
decentralised diffusion systems. What appears as a barrier in the middle of 
Figure 4.3 represents the core areas of interactions between the centralised 
and the decentralised diffusion system of community energy in terms of 
restricting and enabling factors provided by the centralised system. 
 
4.4.2 Sampling strategy 
As change within this system ‘can only come about when individuals [...] can 
see the point in changing’ (Rivzi, 1989: 227), it is necessary to interview a wide 
range of actors encouraging, promoting and facilitating change and interaction 
between the two diffusion systems. 
Within the UK, interviewee sampling followed the snowballing technique. 
Following the quantitative scope study of renewable energy uptake by the public 
at an energy agency in the Southwest, several contacts were identified, which in 
turn recommended or even contacted other relevant actors within the network of 
community, decentralised and cooperative energy development as well as 
relevant planning and development bodies. By attending a range of 
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conferences, further key actors were identified and consequently interviewed, 
including policy-makers, planners and relevant researchers. Some key actors 
were not available due to time constraints but more often than not, adequate 
alternatives in terms of experience, capacity and influence within the community 
energy framework were recommended by unavailable potential interviewees 
themselves. 
 
4.5 The framework for analysis 
In relation to the change agent categorisation framework and the geographical 
scope of both community energy projects and change agents, questions in the 
semi-structured interviews followed Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) Framework 
Analysis outlined above. They were directly related to the Aims and Objectives 
of this thesis, which are reiterated below, but varied according to the 
interviewees’ position and influence within this categorisation. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the NEF surrounding the UK FiT 
influences the diffusion of decentralised RETs in community settings and the 
role of change agencies in the technological and social innovation process. 
The thesis fulfils this aim by addressing the following objectives: 
 To identify how energy policy, specifically the FiT and the surrounding 
NEF, influence the diffusion of community energy; 
 To critically examine the role of change agents in developing the niche 
for technological and social innovation associated with the diffusion of 
community energy within a changing energy policy landscape embedded 
in a liberalised energy market; 
 To evaluate the capacity of community energy within the wider NEF in 
relation to the diffusion of decentralised RETs. 
Energy activists and bottom-up interviewees were asked questions weighted 
more heavily towards Objective 1, change agents in general and installers were 
asked questions more in line with Objective 2 while top-down change agents, 
planners and lobbyists were primarily confronted with questions relating to 
Objective 3. More often than not, however, the dynamism of the interviews 
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allowed a certain amount of flexibility so the interview guide described here was 
by no means rigid. 
This flexibility also allowed knowledge transfer to feature in these interviews as 
both interviewer and interviewees were interested in their respective sources of 
knowledge/ channels of communication and how expertise was passed on 
between the different scales of community energy diffusion. Rather than being 
as neutral or passive an actor as possible according to more traditional 
interpretations of interviewer-interviewee relationship, the interviewees were 
considered conversational partners (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). This approach 
discouraged unidirectional data production and recording in favour of an 
appreciation that both parties are necessarily and unavoidably active in the 
interviewing process (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). 
As both parties viewed each other as knowledge brokers within the energy 
policy framework, the methodology also incorporated elements of action 
research. This is primarily the result of this study of technological diffusion and 
social innovations not only limiting itself to the description of diffusion but in 
some cases actively engaging and disseminating knowledge through channels 
of communication relating to the diffusion of innovations itself. This approach is 
based on the assumption that the innovation-decision process, which is 
appraised in the analysis chapters, is essentially an information seeking and 
information-processing activity in which the individual is motivated to reduce 
uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages of the innovation (adapted 
from Rogers, 1995 and Engel, 1997). 
Specifically, the interviewees, change agents in particular, were analysed 
according to the following framework based on Rogers’ five adopter categories 
(1995, adapted from Tambach et al., 2008): 
 the degree to which the decentralisation of electricity generation based 
on the FiT and related policies is embedded in their policy, organisation 
and practice; 
 their cooperation-intensity with other actors; 
 their experience in the development of decentralised renewable energy 
generation; 
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 their willingness and financial capability to participate and engage in the 
decentralisation process for new scales and ownership models; 
 the extent of business/community participation in the plan; 
 the extent to which decentralised renewable energy diffusion is linked to 
the transition to a low carbon economy. 
Interviewing actors according to this framework provided insights necessary for 
the analysis of the innovation-decision process, patterns of adoption and the 
diffusion of technological and social innovations. By investigating the adoption 
processes, accounts of diffusion from the respondents’ viewpoint conveyed their 
perception of innovations, the change agency and the underlying regulation that 
enables this process in the first place. Change agents in particular are 
continuously involved in many of the abovementioned actions while others, 
particularly energy activists, might only engage once in one category. If the 
diffusion and adaptation process is exemplary, however, they might engage in 
the dissemination process through the likes of public lectures, which goes back 
to the point that the boundaries between the interviewee categorisations are 
often blurred. 
Structural indicators of the change agent or agency’s innovativeness may relate 
to the organisation’s size, maturity, specialisation, resources base and decision-
making structures as well as their interconnectivity within the community energy 
network. The nature and the quality of their links to intended adopters will 
directly influence the likelihood of adoption and the success of implementation. 
Change agencies need to possess the necessary capacity, commitment, 
technical capability, communication skills and project management skills to 
provide operational aspects of diffusion. This is of particular importance to 
innovations with a major technical element, which increases with the planned 
scale of renewable energy deployment (adapted from Greenhalgh et al., 2004 
and Grubb et al., 2008). Necessary skills also relate to government’s long-term 
commitment including indirectly connected areas such as the educational 
sector, where the development of appropriate courses fostering particularly 
skills prove crucial in creating reinforcing cycles capable of challenging lock-ins 
and path-dependencies. 
 
125 
 
4.6 Constraints 
In light of the complexity of analysing community energy through the MLP of 
energy policy along with theories about technological diffusion and social 
innovation, decisions relating to the quantity of data gathered and assessed for 
this analysis have been a pragmatic matter and are not necessarily justifiable in 
abstract terms (adapted from Greenwood and Levin, 1998). They have been 
dependent as much on the willingness of community energy actors to be 
interviewed as on pragmatic compromises on interview time. It also required 
chains of assumptions and definitions anticipating that data and hypotheses 
about the deployment of renewables are capable of providing a foundation for 
others to assume that the ‘reasoning and research process gone through is 
sensible and, therefore, that the results are acceptable’ (Greenwood and Levin, 
1998: 62). 
As indicated in the section on the rationale for the methodological approach, a 
qualitative approach including documentary analysis and interviews provides a 
less comparable set of data than a quantitative analysis of innovation diffusion. 
It is difficult to replicate the findings, nor do they represent a representative 
sample which can be tested and reproduced to enhance its validity. On the 
other hand, the opinions voiced by the interviewees do in many cases show 
considerable overlap and metrics for the quantitative analysis of social 
innovations have yet to be developed.  
An inductive approach allows these passages to be viewed and analysed as 
confirming instances, thereby enabling them to contribute to a more objective 
and reproductive view (adapted from Williams, 2003 and Murrall, 2009) by 
providing explanations and illuminations that numbers alone can not. Qualitative 
research therefore meets different objectives from quantitative research and 
primary qualitative research has been combined in this thesis with (secondary) 
statistical research to provide more detailed explanations (see Bryman and 
Burgess, 1994). The qualitative research focus is dedicated to viewing events, 
action, norms and values from the perspective of the research subjects, which 
is essential for establishing how changes in policy and regulation influence 
individual capacities for action (Bryman, 1988; Bryman and Burgess, 1994). 
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The theory is therefore tested by analysing its capacity to resolve problems in 
real-life situations. The inquiry set out to establish whether change agents and 
energy activists cogenerate knowledge through collaborative communicative 
processes encouraged by the framework of energy policy and regulation (and 
by the facilitators themselves), which is represented and partly developed by 
the facilitators. The meanings constructed in the inquiry developed and 
constructed new meanings, which in turn allowed more specified inquiries and 
analyses according to Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) Framework Analysis. This 
implies that the results of the research process, however, are not necessarily 
tangible but may provide deeper understanding of the initial problem. These 
findings might therefore not be in line with what energy activists or the change 
agencies stand for nor what government had in mind when the FiT was 
implemented (adapted from Greenwood and Levin, 1998). 
A problem with technological innovations in general is that what might be 
perceived as a clear, unambiguous advantage in terms of long-term benefits 
relating to GHG emissions and cost-effectiveness in terms of long-term payoff 
of high upfront costs, which will be easily adopted and implemented (strong 
direct evidence) in the eyes of policy-makers, might be perceived completely 
differently by both change agencies and potential adopters. In the absence of 
emergency powers, diffusion therefore only takes place once the advantage is 
recognised and acknowledged by all key players. If the relative advantage is not 
obvious to potential adopters, it will probably not be considered further. Even 
though renewables might be considered ‘evidence-based’ innovations, they 
need to go through a lengthy period of negotiations among potential adopters. 
This process is exacerbated by an unfavourable regulatory framework, which 
can either increase or decrease the perceived relative advantage of the 
innovation (adapted from Greenhalgh et al., 2004). Energy activists play a key 
role within the grassroots diffusion process as their perseverance might be 
interpreted as a process of providing evidence and confirming instances locally. 
 
4.7 Data analysis and presentation 
Bearing in mind these constraints, the analysis of this diffusion-facilitating and 
innovation-enabling process involved a variable set of questions dealing with 
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the appraisal of policy and how governmental and international objectives for 
both renewable energy generation and decarbonisation feed back into the 
national policy arena and affect the technological diffusion and resulting social 
innovation at the community level. For the conclusion and throughout the 
analysis, research findings were interlinked with the contextual and diagnostic 
research performed by other people to develop a strategic outlook and 
recommendation towards the way policy and regulation might encourage 
change in the form that has been identified in this analysis as being lacking in 
the UK energy generation and provision landscape. 
Within the context of this thesis’ focus on the appraisal of policy and the 
necessity for a more strategic approach to community and decentralised energy 
generation, the next step is to provide an overview of data analysis and 
presentation. This forms the backbone for the range of policy interactions 
encountered in the interviews, and enhances the abovementioned 
categorisation and typology of the interviewees as some have a more vested 
interest in policy related development than others. 
Finding associations with experiences, opinions and attitudes consequently 
shapes the explanation for the research findings and the development of new 
ideas, theories, policies, plans, strategies and actions. The underlying 
framework was formed by a systematic approach to the qualitative data in that 
there are several points of inquiry that form a recurring theme in the interviews. 
They are grouped as extracts from the transcriptions (where applicable) 
according to their reference. This process often involved abstraction and 
synthesis (Bryman and Burgess, 1994) as ‘each passage of text, which has 
been annotated with a particular reference, is studied and a distilled summary of 
the respondent’s views’ (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994: 184) or an entire quote by 
itself were placed into an analytical context. 
‘Piecing together the overall picture’, however, ‘is not simply a question of 
aggregating patterns, but of weighing up the salience and dynamics of issues, 
and searching for a structure rather than a multiplicity of evidence’ (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994: 186). Structures and associations, in other words, can only be 
found by systematically checking for associations between attitudes, behaviours 
and motivations which are either derived from explicit responses or from implicit 
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connections. Strategies for change may hereby emerge directly from the 
qualitative data as a result of the identification of underlying motivations, 
patterns and explanations (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). This approach 
provided the basis for identifying the barriers to widespread engagement with 
energy through community energy developments as well as an overview of 
possible strategies capable of reducing the risk associated with these types of 
developments. 
Most of the interviews were transcribed although some were recorded just using 
notes, either because of objections from participants about being recorded, 
noise or because the batteries ran out. Either way, the important passages were 
analysed using the coding scheme (see Appendix 2), which changed and 
evolved as the analysis progressed in line with changing policy and regulation. 
The list in Appendix 2 displays the subject headings and categories of the guide 
that were used to code the interviews. The colours relate to each of the three 
research objectives, although the actual analyses did not follow this coding 
strategy as rigidly as it might appear. 
For the development of the theoretical narrative, relevant text passages 
according to the research objectives as indicated by the coding structure were 
grouped together in coherent categories and themes. The development of more 
abstract concepts from these findings was achieved by quoting and rephrasing 
the participant’s story in terms of the theoretical constructs (adapted from 
Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). 
Coding involved the selection of recurring themes and repeating ideas, either by 
highlighting them directly in the text, by adding comment boxes or by extracting 
the passages with references both in a statistical and a word-processing table. 
These themes were identified by their relation and relevance to the Aims and 
Objectives, their value in explaining people’s responses and the clarification of 
statements as well as the simple notion that they might be of importance 
(adapted from Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003). This was combined with a 
description of the themes that have been identified, the reasons behind 
choosing them and how they are related according to the research diary. 
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4.8 Positionality and ethics 
For ethical and confidentiality reasons, the interviewees are anonymised, 
although in some cases the names of relevant organisations are provided. At 
the beginning of each interview the interviewee(s) was provided with a consent 
form stating the aims and objectives of the thesis, the areas of inquiry, the 
anonymisation process, data storage and analysis procedures and a brief on 
their rights as interviewees which included the possibility to stop and cancel the 
recordings (if relevant) at any time during the interview and to request the 
transcripts for review and alteration if necessary. 
It was nevertheless important to appreciate the process of knowledge exchange 
not entirely as a monodirectional process. In particular, knowledge of German 
energy policy and sustainable development throughout previous studies as well 
as this thesis were often of equal interest and importance to the interviewee as 
the interviewee’s knowledge to this piece of research. Consequently, 
positionality was constantly shifting throughout the interview process. 
Experiences of the interviews were also recorded in a diary both during and 
following the interviews and it shows how both parties benefited from the 
process as invitations to public talks, disseminations and further discussions 
surrounding community energy demonstrate. 
However, special care was taken not to push conversations towards specific 
outcomes and passages in the transcripts representing monologues by the 
interviewees bear testimony to their freedom of expression throughout the 
interviews. The involvement of both interviewee and interviewer in energy 
related research and practice nevertheless limited the possibilities of detaching 
oneself from opinions of NEFs and diffusion processes as suggested by 
Douglas (2003). By embracing this inevitability the research process feeds back 
to the point made above about this research incorporating elements of action 
research. 
The following analysis chapters are based around this analysis of interviews 
according to this coding system and the interweaving of relevant documentary 
analysis. Most of the information analysed in Chapter 5 – Analysis Part 1 deals 
with the role of energy policy, specifically the FiT and the surrounding regulatory 
framework in influencing the diffusion of community energy. It starts with 
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community-led developments providing insights into the scope for energy 
activist engagement and then moves on to larger scales of RET diffusion in 
community settings introducing change agents and intermediaries between the 
niche of community energy and the regime and landscape. It is interwoven with 
aspects detailing technological diffusion and social innovation potentials relating 
to community energy. Chapter 6 deals with the facilitation of new scales and 
ownership structures of decentralised RETs within the wider NEF. 
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Chapter 5 – Community energy, change agents and the UK NEF 
 
5 Introduction 
This chapter analyses how the diffusion of RETs in community settings comes 
about in the UK. The FiT is hereby considered the key enabler for community-
led renewable energy projects and its capacity is put into context by assessing 
the UK’s NEF relating to community energy. This involves the evaluation of 
changing energy policy and regulatory landscapes surrounding the FiT and the 
assessment of what barriers are in place that prevent the mainstreaming of 
various scales and ownership models which are considered within the scope of 
community energy according to this thesis’ analytical framework. Change 
agents are essential for establishing various community energy pathways and 
their role is analysed throughout as intermediaries shaping the diffusion of 
technological and social innovation associated with community energy. 
 
5.1 Bottom-up community energy within the UK’s National Energy 
Framework 
The first section of this chapter introduces the concept of bottom-up community 
energy and analyses its position in relation to the UK’s NEF and its resulting 
energy system. As the previous chapters indicate, community energy and 
decentralised energy generation in general experience less political and 
economic recognition in the UK than in other countries, such as Germany and 
Denmark. Establishing a niche particularly for community-led projects is further 
hampered by considerable structural as well as economic constraints 
associated with the UK’s liberal approach to energy market regulation. The 
introduction of the FiT marks an important step in assuming political recognition 
for new forms and scales of energy generation and engagement. The following 
section explains the importance of predictable and consistent support for 
electricity generation where economies of scale do not (yet) apply among 
various change agents ranging from energy activists and bottom-up change 
agents fostering community-led developments to commercial community energy 
developers and installers 
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5.1.1 Community energy and energy policy 
Prior to the introduction of the FiT, grants were one of the few means of 
community access to energy generation. The nature of grants in the UK’s 
competitive energy market framework implied that few communities were able 
to benefit and successfully develop projects. Replication of success stories 
were unlikely and grant dependency has been put forward by many of the 
interviewees as one of the main limiting factors hindering the widespread 
uptake and acceptance of decentralised renewable energy generation. Some 
change agents, on the other hand, favour the certainty that grants provide to 
communities lucky enough to benefit from them due to the uncertainties 
surrounding the FiT and energy policy in general. The following quote from an 
energy agency representative highlights the benefits for grant support. 
You’ve got a grant and you can do something, so [the introduction of the FiT], I 
think, has affected community schemes, even though the FiT has now attracted 
more of them. A grant would help them more probably than the FiT because of 
that access to finance issue. (MO2) 
This stands in contrast to many who see the FiT as a liberator from grant 
dependency (see Fudge et al., 2011) as grants limited the entire support to 
winning communities, which is reinforced by the following statement from 
another energy agency representative. 
Lots of the community projects that are up and running at the moment were 
grant funded so the question is how do we mainstream this, how do we make 
them available, how do we make projects work in the future when the grants 
aren’t available. (MO9) 
Most change agents driving the community energy agenda therefore favour the 
FiT for the development of community energy and decentralised energy in 
general. It allows a greater range of individuals and organisations to tap into 
electricity generation, as even the interviewee with favourable view on grant 
support admits. 
[The FiT] enables and it encourages greater investment in renewable electricity 
[and] the number of [interested] communities is definitely growing because 
people are thinking about it because of the money. (MO2) 
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This statement also introduces the crucial factor separating grant from 
structured policy support: regular income. Grants provide a one-off supply of 
funding while support mechanisms such as the FiT enable continuous income 
streams for the duration of technologically and economically viable generation 
(Mendoca, 2007). 
From an energy activists’ perspective, the introduction of the FiT represents a 
more fundamental change in the way energy is perceived, rather than the mere 
creation of a protected niche market by securing income streams, as the 
following quote indicates. 
The key policy change which has allowed this is of course the FiT, whose 
purpose was to facilitate the rapid take-up of renewable technology and our 
coop and this population has absolutely no dedicated resources and capital [...] 
so without the FiT this would be an interesting discussion but could have no 
material impact upon the local economy. […] I would say it’s flawed, like all 
policies but the key issue is demand response and how you engage with energy 
and any way that gets people actually involved with energy will solve a lot of the 
problems we have. (EA1) 
A representative from a cooperative specialising on the development of 
community energy projects that was established without a primary focus on the 
FiT takes a similar position in relation to its potential for both technological and 
social learning.  
They were saying in [the Microgeneration Strategy] that they want to try push 
for more community renewables and put the power back in the hands of the 
people. [With the help of the FiT] we can now develop other technologies [such 
as] hydro and wind because solar PV has allowed us to do that because the 
FiTs have built an awareness of renewable energy more than anything. (BU7) 
These favourable views of the FiT’s technological and social diffusion/learning 
potential reflect its impact beyond the implementation of technology. It is evident 
that new scales and ownership models have the potential to change the way the 
public engages with energy and alter the understanding of energy by people 
both already involved and those who are looking to get involved in community 
energy. Introducing the FiT has therefore opened up possibilities for energy 
activists and change agents alike by dramatically increasing the options for 
community energy development and engagement by making the process of 
development at this scale ‘easier because you can make a clearer business 
model and know exactly how much income you would get per system’ (Ins4). 
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This approach, particularly from a bottom-up change agent perspective, is 
radically different from the tedious one-off application procedures associated 
with grant applications. For some established change agents working as 
community energy consultants based on commercial SME business models, 
rather than cooperative business models associated with bottom-up energy 
related change agencies, the FiT is also considered the key enabler for 
community energy development, as the following quote indicates. 
The FiT provides opportunities for community developments [...] but in order to 
take advantage of those opportunities you are competing directly with 
commercial companies, in terms of the offers that you can make. (MO4) 
Within this more commercial context it is interesting to note that competition is 
considered the primary driver for different ownership models and scales of 
community energy developments and accompanying technological choice. 
These enterprises and associated change agents therefore take a slightly less 
unambiguously favourable view of the FiT’s potential but its introduction is 
nevertheless considered a favourable policy development. 
Some installers of FiT eligible RETs echo many of the views laid out above, 
even though it is primarily considered a business opportunity.  
[The feed-in tariff] was intended to uplift the green sector and the economy as a 
whole. [...] Always in the background was “Look guys, the feed-in tariff’s here, it 
is going to stimulate demand.” [...] We know that the RHI is sitting there, […] we 
know that there’s potentially some carbon cap and trade kind of activities 
coming our way, we know the utility prices are only going to go up because of 
gas and all the rest of it, we know the Code for Sustainable Homes is going to 
kick in, we got all sorts of Building Regs part L that are having an influence on 
the way things are designed and built, we have an aspiration for carbon free 
construction – it’s the perfect storm, really. (Edu1/Ins1) 
In line with this point of view, another installer considers the FiT ‘some kind of 
balanced view as a portfolio across the different [...] ways of reducing carbon’ 
(Ins5). In relation to community energy, however, this installer criticises the FiT 
as ‘a very unambitious toolkit’ (Ins5) due to the lack of a structured supportive 
framework for scales and ownership models between individual household 
scale installations and commercial developments. 
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5.1.2 The community energy investment landscape 
As highlighted throughout this thesis, this lack of a supportive framework for 
community energy is primarily a result of the systemic bias towards large scale 
and utility owned developments in the UK’s energy related technological 
diffusion system (DTI, 2005; Walker et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2008). One of the 
effects of this incumbency is that the scale of community-led energy 
developments is effectively capped by the lack of available at-risk finance due 
the financial market’s unfamiliarity with community energy and its market bias 
towards developments led by established utilities (see Chapter 1). According to 
a community wind developer, communities are therefore struggling to raise 
sufficient finance for developments exceeding the implementation of small-scale 
solar PV, often no larger than five to ten times the generation capacity of 
individual household installations and usually of symbolic character. 
The key missing bits I think are a genuine form of finance, not these tiny pots of 
competition money, a little government grant. [...] It needs billions of pounds of 
finance to, for the UK to establish a kind of genuine community energy 
community economy but the […] existing finance market for renewable energy 
is focused on bigger scale projects so how do you steer that into community 
energy? (MO5) 
A major issue is that the introduction of the FiT in the UK was not accompanied 
by changes to the way finance is supplied to associated developments, 
particularly collective community-led energy generation schemes based on 
cooperative principles. The unfamiliarity of such FiT projects implies that 
guarantees provided by the FiT alone do not have the capacity to attract third 
party finance (Timms and Hume, 2009; Hoggett, 2010a, b). 
[The FiT] doesn’t in itself transform everything. It doesn’t address the key risk; 
the key barrier to smaller stuff [...] is the risky bit at the beginning, which is risk 
money. [...] The FiT doesn’t provide that risk money, all it does is provide a 
viable income. (MO5) 
There has most definitely been an increase [in interest] but the barrier to 
development has nothing to do with the FiT. The barrier to development is the 
risk of spending up to £50,000 for an application and getting a ‘No’ at the end of 
it. When it comes to a community, its ability to raise risk capital to put towards 
making an application, only for that application to fail is not easy to do. […] 
Quite often, a community project does not get to planning because the grid 
costs are too high. (Ins2) 
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Both interviewees point towards the same problem of lacking financial 
availability but the last point of the second quote raises another fundamental 
issue in relation to community energy. Grid connection costs currently represent 
one of the main barriers for community energy (Willis and Willis, 2012). 
Particularly for remote rural projects, the costs associated with grid connection 
vary considerably and in many cases determine the feasibility of entire projects 
(BU1). According to a National Grid representative, the only scale in the UK is 
the national grid and they try to avoid generation that cannot be centrally 
controlled. Decentralised developments below 5-10MW are therefore generally 
not connected due to the costs (Jenkins, 2012). The FiT is therefore an 
essential step towards enabling economic viability of bottom-up community 
scale renewable energy generation projects but this form of social and 
technological organisation can only thrive if it is accompanied by more 
fundamental changes to the UK’s NEF though institutional learning and a more 
holistic approach towards niche creation for community energy and an 
appreciation of smaller scales of development. 
One attempt at overcoming the access to finance issue is the launching of a 
community share issue (Co-operatives UK, 2012). This can be a viable way of 
raising capital within a community but the total volume that can be raised locally 
tends to be fairly low. To increase the attractiveness, some cooperative projects 
allow for share transfer but this implies that they need to deal with the Financial 
Service Authority. On the other hand, the possibility of withdrawing share capital 
also implies that shares can be traded on ‘second hand’ markets without 
affecting the business (BC). The nature of geographical communities as 
opposed to communities of interest, however, implies that the willingness and 
capacity to invest will inevitably be limited as this energy activist points out. 
If we could do solar allotment, I’m sure there would be local investment [...] We 
are looking at between 10 and 12MW capacity so we’re looking at 30 million 
quid’s worth of stuff so scratching around raising £40,000 or something, it’s just 
pissing in the wind. So we need the right vehicle to invest in, to encourage 
investment locally. (EA1) 
The difficulty of raising capital can be put down to both the general lack of 
capital availability as a result of general financial uncertainties and the 
increasing weariness of banks in terms of required financial security to backup 
loans. Larger developments, particularly those in excess of £1m, have a larger 
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range of available funding possibilities as the Co-operative Bank and Triodos 
Bank are venturing into this form of niche finance (Uti1). As a general rule, 
however, according to one of my interviewees, ‘nobody gets out of bed for less 
than £25m for project finance so you’re starting at 21MW before you can 
seriously think about project finance’ (BU9), thereby limiting economically more 
attractive developments to established utilities. 
Government backed banks and the Green Investment Bank in particular are 
often mentioned as vehicles capable of providing the financial backing that is 
currently lacking for community energy but their focus appears to be on large-
scale projects (RegenSW, 2011b). The following two quotes from bottom-up 
change agents indicate the desire for more structured financial support with the 
help of government backed banks or loan schemes as a means of encouraging 
further technological and social learning at the bottom-up decentralised and 
community energy scale of development. 
How you create the vehicle for risk capital so that communities can not only do 
the simple things of tapping into existing schemes but start thinking about 4MW 
wind development which need a couple of hundred grand, at risk, would require 
a rather small fund [and government] could go quite a long way with that. (BU9) 
If there was a green energy bank that knew what the returns were and were 
handing out loans in order to allow people to install systems that can be paid 
back, I’m sure there would be renewable systems all over the country [as] 
people don’t want to pool their financial resources until something is there to 
see that they can have something tangible to put their money into. (BU7) 
Another approach to institutionalising smaller developments would be the 
introduction of Small Firm Loan Guarantees to provide incentives for low carbon 
investments (Lob1) but the absence of government backed banks is considered 
the main barrier for community energy in the UK. German regional state-owned 
banks, known as Landesbanken, ‘play an important role in providing loans for 
community-scale renewable energy developments’ (Lob1) in Germany and 
several interviewees point towards Germany’s financial provision system as a 
good example of coordinated and institutionalised support for various scales 
and ownership models of RETs. 
[Germany has] policies where they instruct the banks and the banks are 
instructed because they are owned and controlled by the Laender and so if they 
say you must lend at 3%, you must lend. (EA4) 
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The Landesbanken and the KfW Bank are considered the most important 
financial institutions regarding decentralised and community energy 
development in Germany. The latter has the capacity to provide subsidised 
interest rates as long as there is no competition from commercial banks. The 
proximity of policy and financial availability has also provided the bank with a 
credit rating which allows it to borrow and lend 38 times its paid up capital. This 
system of financial provision is considered by many as a good example of a 
parallel development of technological and social learning through policy with the 
help of financial institutionalisation and devolved lending power (Rydin, 2011a; 
Vaze and Tindale, 2011). However, as many interviewees pointed out, this is 
not necessarily a replicable model as it has at least partly evolved as a result of 
both Germany’s federal political structure and its coordinated market economy, 
as opposed to the UK’s liberal market economy. 
In the same way that in Germany the banking system is developed around 
what’s called Mittelstand in terms of the size of enterprises, SMEs, so you have 
a banking system very used to providing debt and equity and project finance for 
those kind of sizes and unsurprisingly [...] you then develop a renewable energy 
support mechanism that encourages exactly the same sort of scale to come 
forward so the banks are all set up to do it. (BU9) 
In line with this energy agent representative’s argument it appears as though 
community energy in the UK is being rolled out from an entirely opposite angle. 
It is less of a co-evolution between economic development, policy, technological 
and institutional learning and lending practices that facilitate community 
renewable energy developments but rather development of community energy 
taking place in spite of unfavourable institutional arrangements. 
 
5.2 Planning and energy policy interaction 
This is also evident from the UK’s planning system. The lack of a supportive 
planning framework is increasing the challenges that energy activists and 
change agents driving the bottom-up community energy agenda face. Low 
success rate for onshore wind farm planning procedures in comparison to other 
countries (BWEA, 2008; Pollitt, 2010) also point towards a more fundamental 
issue with the position of renewables within the UK’s planning framework but 
community energy is confronted with its particular set of barriers. If local 
planning councillors object to proposed developments, even if it is supported by 
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a large share of a community, it is very unlikely that planning permission will be 
granted (Toke, 2005b). The following example of the structure of local planning 
councils provided by one of the interviewees working for a bottom-up energy 
agency indicates the difficulty of encouraging renewable energy development 
(or any form of unfamiliar development), particularly in rural areas. 
The problem with local planning councils is that at a parish council level they 
rarely consist entirely of elected members due to the lack of interest in these 
positions. More often than not, people remain on the council for years without 
elections due to the lack of opposition but their views do not necessarily reflect 
that of the majority within the constituency. Wind farm developers are primarily 
opposed because they are seen as the main beneficiaries of renewable energy 
installations no matter what sort of shareholder scheme they have on offer. 
Parish councils also have to respond to the feedback they receive from the 
public and as people are more likely to write to the council to complain [about a 
planned wind farm development], than to state their preference for a planned 
project, they are always more likely to be biased towards the negative 
responses. (BU2) 
The general unease with renewable energy developments imply that community 
energy often faces similar challenges even when they are instigated by local 
energy activists or action groups and a greater share of the benefits can be 
retained locally compared to entirely commercially driven developments. 
Particularly if community energy is to provide more than just symbolic 
engagement with electricity generation, it needs to be recognised as more than 
just the implementation of generating technologies, as the following quote by a 
community wind developer indicates. 
Supposedly there’s a preference for community projects and supposedly they’re 
easier but reality is that we’re not experiencing great ease and I think it’s just a 
consequence of everything that’s going on at that level in the planning 
department of local authorities. (Ins2) 
Commercial installers, such the one quoted above, are therefore struggling to 
develop FiT eligible community projects beyond the relatively insignificant 
<50kW scale as it is down to the local planning authority to decide what 
constitutes a representative group in a community (King, 2011). Government 
itself also appears to be discouraging significantly larger community energy 
developments, starting with DECCs (2010a) specific ‘community’ FiT banding 
(see Chapter 3), which foresees wind developments exceeding 1.5MW to be 
commercially driven. This stands in stark contrast to the largest onshore 
turbines currently available on the market with an installed capacity of 7.5MW 
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(Enercon, 2013). Even if communities were to work on a resource base capable 
of breaching this 1.5MW threshold, however, the upper limit of 5MW under the 
FiT implies that eligible developments need to remain well below the scale of 
innovative commercial technologies and the benefits of economies of scale. The 
alternative is engagement with the RO but the intricacies of its competitive 
nature put most communities and community energy developers at a 
disadvantage. The biggest issue for communities in relation to wind power, 
however, is not the lack of recognition in relation to scalar development 
potentials but that the planning requirements for both small-scale (community) 
FiT and large-scale (commercial) RO developments are nearly identical. 
[Planners] want me to produce a specialised report now on the impact between 
that turbine and bats in that area. No one can do it. That is a condition of my 
planning application now. Ice fall, shadow flicker, distance, everything you deal 
with with a wind farm, I have to put into an application for a 20kW turbine. (BU1) 
The issue is that we have tried to put up a single wind turbine we are almost 
faced with the same rate, well it is not quite the same but it is comparable to 
developing a full wind farm and that is unfair, particularly as this is actually the 
people themselves wanting it. […] We have a planning system that is designed 
to stop large organisations effectively destroying a local community. [...] That’s 
all quite proper and probably does not go far enough but when you have a 
community saying we want this wind turbine that is very different to E.On saying 
we want a wind turbine from which you will derive little benefit. (MO6) 
As these two statements from bottom-up community energy developers 
indicate, the efforts required for the development of small-scale wind stand in no 
relation to the actual generation capacity. This also goes back to the scalar 
dilemma as even if planning is streamlined for community energy within the FiT, 
its scalar restriction implies that the combined capacity of all FiT eligible 
technologies is unlikely to have a major impact on the UK’s overall renewable 
energy generation capacity. This once again points towards the situation where 
FiT related decentralised and community energy projects in the UK represent a 
niche within the niche of renewable energy. 
 
5.2.1 Reforms to the planning system – The Localism Act 
As the UK government recognises the complexities and uncertainties that the 
planning system is adding to energy policy uncertainties, several reforms are 
underway. The drive towards localism with the Localism Bill, which gained 
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Royal Assent on 15 November 2011 (DCLG, 2011b), and the alteration of the 
National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) might provide opportunities for 
greater public engagement with renewable energy and encourage technological 
and social learning. 
According to some of the change agents interviewed, the devolution of 
responsibility as originally envisaged in the Localism Bill may enable 
‘communities and potentially local authorities [to] become very strong drivers in 
terms of planning’ (MO10). As it is still unclear how exactly the changes to the 
planning system will affect community energy, however, a large share of the 
interviewees take a more cynical approach to the willingness of government to 
contribute towards the social embedding of technology and development by 
introducing localism through the planning reform and the planning process in 
general. 
Just chaos will be back to everyone not knowing if you need planning or not. So 
no, more Tory rubbish. I’m sorry but that’s it. I don’t see any benefit to anyone 
from it because Localism Bill? Who’s in charge of the local thing? The local 
council? They’re a bunch of tossers anyway. Excuse my language. Self-serving 
bastards. Give the power to them? No thanks. Am I going to get a say in it? 
Forget it, it’s laughable. (Ins5) 
This encapsulates some of the anger that many interviewees felt but did not 
express quite as openly. Change agents’ unease with the planning reforms 
relate to the danger of lacking predictability and consistency associated with 
energy policy transcending the planning system as it increases the institutional 
bias towards large-scale developers with balanced portfolios and sufficient 
resources to spread their risk. 
At the moment there’s a perception that community ownership gives you a 
better chance of planning consent and that’s what we are taking advantage of 
but if we don’t take advantage of it it’s going to happen anyway and it will all be 
corporate owned. [The Localism Act] could offer an opportunity for a community 
ownership venture [and] the idea that communities have got to take charge [...] 
has political resonance so it helps to that extent but the detail of the legislation 
is not structured to confer an advantage on a community owned company. 
(MO4) 
As this quote indicates, there is also uncertainty regarding the development of 
formal structures for engaging with energy and benefiting communities. Change 
agents working at this intersection are struggling to develop community energy 
development packages accordingly. Scepticism surrounding the Localism Act’s 
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usefulness is even more evident from the following statement from a planning 
expert. 
Localism provides opportunities for on-shore wind by developing formal 
structures for engaging with and benefiting communities [and] the abolition of 
Regional Spatial Strategies has led to a loss of translation of targets to a local 
level. […] The Localism Bill is seen by many as the golden bullet for community 
scale development but it is naive to believe that it will solve our problems nor 
that it will provide enough generation to meet any of the national targets 
concerning renewable energy or carbon reduction by 2050. (Pla2/TD5) 
This sceptical stance towards the planning reforms in relation to the Localism 
Act is also echoed by many interviewees in relation to Permitted Development 
Rights.  
 
5.2.2 Reforms to the planning system – Permitted Development Rights 
Expanding the energy related Permitted Development Rights legislation to 
include a range community energy related RETs is an issue many energy 
activists and change agents would like to see addressed in the near future but 
even under current legislation various exemptions and specifications put their 
use into question. As an example, solar PV panels can be installed without the 
need for planning consent if they are considered Permitted Developments 
(Planning Portal, 2012a) both under the previous and the current planning 
framework. Exemptions apply such as the need for them to be invisible from 
highways in case they are sited in conservation areas or World Heritage Sites 
but for all other forms of solar PV development, including roof or wall mounted 
as well as free standing panels, no planning restrictions apply (Town and 
Country Planning, 2011). For some areas of the country, however, even these 
limited restrictions pose a serious limitation to development possibilities as this 
bottom-up community energy developer indicates. 
Financially they’ve set [the FiT] up to try to favour small developments, that’s 
why you have increasing levels for smaller technologies but that’s assuming 
planning risks are different while in fact they’re not. [Solar]  PV on a roof […] 
may have Permitted Development but that isn’t even given in Cornwall. It 
doesn’t exist if you are in some sort of conservation area and that takes out 30-
40% of the county. (BU1) 
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The problem is that once any form of renewable energy is to be scaled up, 
interactions with the planning system become more frequent, particularly once 
the focus shifts to wind energy. The planning requirements for wind farms are 
very extensive but they also apply to the microgeneration level as only turbines 
that do not exceed 11.1m are Permitted Developments despite all of the 9 MCS 
(Microgeneration Certificate Scheme) accredited turbines exceeding this height 
limit (Hunt, 2011). These Permitted Development Rights, according to a DECC 
representative, should nevertheless be playing an important role in the new 
planning application process for community-scale developments, although 
government admits huge uncertainty regarding the outcome of the planning 
reforms.  
I think that we should be able to squeeze some of that time [average of 4 years 
to develop a wind farm] and the Permitted Development Rights debate and 
Localism may well either speed that up or slow it down even further, depending 
on what neighbourhood plans say for renewable energy but there is the 
opportunity there for there to be an agreement in principle that renewable 
energy can be developed in certain sites as long as it is a feasible project and 
that would speed up the development process. (TD4) 
Recent comments on the Localism Act (October 2012) actually point towards a 
slowing down of the planning process as many renewable energy 
developments, even community led developments are increasingly denied 
planning consent by neighbourhood planning committees (MO5). Rather than 
simplifying the community energy planning process, ongoing reforms to the 
planning system therefore appear to be complicating if not hindering the 
development especially of community-led energy developments in the UK. 
 
5.3 Change agent interaction and community energy 
As a result of these barriers, the development of a community energy niche 
within the UK’s NEF is haphazard. The uncoordinated nature of organisational 
structures at the bottom-up scale of change and innovation also struggles to 
push for more widespread recognition of community energy in light of concerted 
and well managed efforts associated with top-down development structures 
(Parag and Janda, 2010). The scope for individual or collective action and 
overall impact is often more dependent on local circumstances and support 
provided by change agents driving the community energy development process, 
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which once again points to the lack of an adequate policy support framework 
(Martiskainen and Watson, 2009). Change agents, as indicated in Chapter 2 
and 4 and throughout the previous section, therefore play a crucial role in 
converting top-down facilitation (or obstruction) into bottom-up action. 
 
5.3.1 Change agents and bottom-up community-led developments 
The planning and energy policy uncertainties analysed in the previous sections 
imply that the diffusion of RETs beyond a household level but below 
commercially attractive scales is particularly dependent on the skills and 
capacities of both energy activists within communities as well as external 
change agents and intermediaries. Successful community initiatives have been 
able to rely on energy activists driving the entire agenda and some examples 
are provided in Chapter 3. These enabling circumstances where specific 
citizens take action and drive the community energy agenda at the bottom-up 
level have been dubbed ‘the retired engineer factor’ (Church, 2010). 
It’s often down to one or two key individuals in the community group that have 
the drive and knowledge and understanding to push it through and sometimes 
that might not meet with support from everybody in the group. They take a 
pioneering role and it happens. I think if you look at the track record of projects 
that have worked it’s very much down to personalities and few key individuals 
that have pushed it through and sweet talked a few people to come up with the 
cash. (Ins2) 
The problem is that very few communities are fortunate enough to have a local 
human resource base capable and willing to persevere and commit in light of 
challenging institutional circumstances. The specific factors enabling the 
‘transition from issue to exploration into delivery and development of projects’, 
however, ‘is a huge gulf which [has not] been particularly well recognised by the 
literature’ (BU9). Change agents play a decisive role in driving this agenda, 
especially where the capacities of energy activists are not sufficient to move 
from idea to implementation. 
A large project takes a lot of professional skills that you wouldn’t necessarily 
have in your community group and the ones that have been successful tend to 
be the ones where it just happens that a wind developer lives in their village or 
there’s a consultant who lives in that village. (MO2) 
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As this energy agent employee points out, the process of community-change 
agent interaction is crucial in determining the scale and ownership structure of 
likely developments. The lack of governmental facilitation beyond the provision 
of the FiT and the vague commitment to Localism in relation to planning is also 
pushing interested communities towards change agents and knowledge 
networks, even corporates and utilities. Consequently, their dependency on 
external expertise and negotiation skills increases. 
[As] people naturally distrust big companies, there is a role for an intermediary 
there to broker the arrangements between local communities and big 
companies, although [...] if you are going for scale, big companies need to be 
involved but you need to control the way that they are involved. (MO5) 
With large projects it’s no problem finding the finance but for small projects [this 
is not the case]. It’s government coming up with ideas, but not detail. [This 
necessitates] somebody [who] stands in the middle [to] have the vision in the 
bigger picture. That’s what we’re trying to do. (MO1) 
As these change agents pushing for community-led renewable energy 
developments indicate, the only way interested communities can effectively tap 
into and benefit from the energy generation system is through engagement with 
intermediary experts, particularly if larger scale developments are being 
considered. Most bottom-up change agents work on the basis that public 
engagement with energy ‘and the practical processes that can produce that’ 
(EA1), particularly if they are combined with ‘funding streams [that] remain 
there’ (EA1), are also more widely acceptable than externally driven 
technocratic approaches to community energy (Walker and Devine-Wright, 
2008). A major difficulty that change agents face, however, lies in convincing 
developers of the benefits of rewarding communities and local energy action 
adequately for their efforts and some are struggling as much as energy activists 
themselves to ensure that communities receive the types of benefits they might 
be expecting from RET deployment. 
We’re saying we want 10% of the revenue of this system to go to the local 
community. That’s the whole ethos as a company we wanted to happen. [...] 
We found local suppliers and manufactures of everything. The steel racking 
was being made at a plant in South Wales at Newport, we are using local 
grounds workers, we are using local electricians and then the funders came in, 
saying right, we’re signing cheques, we’re not having any of this stuff, we’re 
using our own people from Germany and you’re having 2000 free solar panels 
to the community. (BU7) 
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The problem herein lies in balancing vested financial interests with social and 
environmental considerations (Vaze and Tindale, 2011). As one interviewee 
points out, this is not necessarily a contradiction as their community energy 
social enterprise aims at ‘making profits and making profit for a purpose [as] a 
developer, a social entrepreneur and social equity investor’ (BU5). However, the 
difficulty of marrying these ambitions when confronted with potential enablers of 
change in terms of purely technological diffusion with greater financial leverage 
and the ability and willingness to exercise pressure is common among the less 
profit orientated external change agents (Smith, 2006). The result is that many 
of the change agents at this level of community engagement see their role as 
enhancers of local skill sets for the development of community-led projects. 
We work with the core group in the community to increase their skills. This is 
benefits in terms of understanding what’s actually happening and talking to 
people in the local areas, and when we get to bigger consultations it’s not just 
me there having to talk about it as there’s other people understanding what 
we’re doing and the benefits it brings. (BU1) 
This feeds back to the concept of ending the ‘passivity of which people 
experience something so mundane as energy’ (EA1), which is very much down 
to the internal process of social innovation (Bergman et al., 2010). From the 
views expressed in this section it is evident that change agent interaction does 
not guarantee successful community-led energy development but depending on 
experience and expertise, change agents can foster greater engagement with 
practices of energy consumption and the diffusion of RETs. 
 
5.3.2 Scaling-up community energy 
When it comes to greater scales of technological diffusion, opinions vary among 
energy activists and change agents alike concerning the favoured approach that 
communities should take. In general, issues surround the balancing of local 
empowerment and the need for large-scale RET deployment. Several 
interviewees, particularly energy activists and bottom-up change agents would 
rather see the community energy development process balanced towards 
communities and community-led developments, as the following quote 
indicates. 
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At the very least the people who received the advice [should] have some control 
over the people that provide the advice, otherwise the advice providers are 
gatekeepers and have too much power in the system. (MO6) 
This change agents points towards situations where communities are 
dependent on external expertise but also addresses the need for more 
democratic consultation processes. If information was not just passed on in a 
linear top-down manner, the community engagement process could help 
collectively drive empowerment as communities would be provided with more 
than just advice on a single aspect of the technological diffusion process. This 
would strengthen their position towards incumbent gatekeepers of resources 
and improve market access through the pooling and concentration of resources 
locally. This idea is in line with the ideal development trajectory favoured by 
many change agents advocating community-led technological diffusion as it 
would see the growth of community energy as one of many technological and 
social innovation transitions on the way to a low-carbon economy/society (see 
Hielscher et al., 2011). It is also seen by many as a means of increasing 
democratic accountability in the sector of energy provision (Julian and Dobson, 
2012). This is precisely what some of the interviewees, even at the more 
commercial scale of development, are aiming for. The dilemma lies in balancing 
democratic accountability with potentials for up-scaling.  
Our whole principle here is broad and shallow. Lots of, in industry terms, small 
generators, not in individual terms, spread over a large area, all with relatively 
low environmental impact. Combined they have no environmental impact. 
That’s the whole crux of what we’re trying to do. (MO1) 
This approach, at least to a certain extent, bypasses vested political, financial 
and economic interests but it is obviously restricted in the actual scale of 
individual generation plants. Ironically, the limiting factor for up-scaling is once 
again the FiT, despite its potential for opening up energy generation to a variety 
of potential generators, as argued below by an energy activist and a commercial 
community energy developer aiming for the development of large-scale 
community energy projects. 
A community which actually wishes to generate energy at [post-feed-in tariff] 
scale has to be allowed to have the feed in tariff up to that scale. If a community 
scheme is just symbolic in educational and just restricted to one kilowatt on a 
scout hut roof or the equivalent of a child’s windmill driving up a torch, all well 
and good but that has no relevance to the issues we’re trying to deal with so if a 
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community scheme wishes to generate up to scale it has to be allowed to do so. 
(EA1) 
[The feed-in tariff] may create opportunities for community organisations, but it 
doesn’t do, it doesn’t confer any advantage to the communities. [...] And it is lip 
service. There is no legislation in place that I can see that gives us a 
competitive advantage with a big business when it comes to doing renewable 
energy development. (MO4) 
The fragility of the FiT niche therefore tends to encourage communities and 
change agents alike to look towards commercial developers if larger scales of 
generation are to be achieved. From a government perspective, greater scales 
of RET diffusion is the favoured (community) energy development trajectory and 
this necessarily implies community buy-in rather than community-led 
development although government is still struggling to balance the need for 
scale with bottom-up development ambitions. 
Most commercial companies who will partner [communities] will want at least a 
51% stake because it’s their capital. When it comes down to it, it’s their risk and 
therefore they want to be able to override the community. That’s quite a difficult 
policy issue for us at the moment. We haven’t had to deal with it because at the 
moment most community schemes are smaller and 100% community owned. 
(TD4) 
This approach would see communities bypassing change agents by dealing 
directly with commercial companies. However, the unlikelihood that sufficient 
negotiation expertise can be sourced locally is once again likely to put 
communities at a disadvantage. Pragmatic change agents favour an in-between 
pathway by modelling their business plans on portfolios of various community-
scale and similar decentralised developments to strengthen the position of their 
organisations and the communities they represent in relation to potential 
investors, as this energy agency representative indicates. 
If there’s a portfolio of projects we can bring together then we can say to 
investors that we are spreading risk across 5 or 6 projects so they’re more likely 
to see that as a balance to investment and we’ll obviously be able to provide 
some return on the investment. (MO9) 
These development approaches also have the benefit of being less dependent 
on one particular piece of regulation, such as the FiT, which is explored in the 
following statement by a community wind developer taking a more top-down 
approach to community energy. 
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In order to develop a sustainable business, you have to do it at scale in order to 
get the finance but also to draw in the expertise necessary to deliver the project 
and to generate the profile necessary to actually interest people and inspire 
people because that is what ultimately the community projects are about. (EA3) 
By encouraging outside investment from financers with broad portfolios, more 
sustainable development models can be developed and consequently, policy 
related uncertainties are reduced. The business aspect of community energy 
may be strengthened if quantifiable local economic knock-on effects can be 
proven to co-evolve with technological diffusion (Toke, 2005a; Munday et al., 
2011). Change agents and their organisations already represent a growing 
economic niche and by employing members of the communities, the green 
growth aspect of community energy may be further enhanced as potential 
opportunities for local regeneration as well as the management of leasing 
partnerships and revenue cycling from the renewable energy projects evolve 
and become established. However, there is still widespread concern about the 
legitimacy and accountability of many stakeholders in the process, which 
include investors, shareholders, the local community itself and tax payers 
(Fudge et al., 2011). 
 
5.4 Decentralised energy and alternative ownership structures and scales 
With these difficulties in mind, many change agents and community energy 
activists are seeking alternative forms of community energy engagement to 
enhance their legitimacy particularly in relation to the political and economic 
framework. A potentially more widely applicable and replicable way of allowing 
communities access to renewable energy generation and the benefits of low 
carbon electricity and security of supply without the need for communities to 
(part-) finance and develop renewable energy projects by themselves may be 
the hybrid or public-private partnership business models (Watson and Devine-
Wright, 2010). These approaches usually involve tapping into larger-scale 
projects led by commercial investors or getting the local authority with on board 
rather than the arduous path of community-led development. They are included 
in this thesis under the community energy umbrella as their capacity for up-
scaling is much greater than for community-led projects and because new 
engagement forms may see new forms of community participation develop, not 
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least because of the considerable financial benefits such developments can 
entail. 
 
5.4.1 Hybrid and public-private approaches to community energy 
Change agents favouring hybrid and public-private partnerships as a means of 
expanding and institutionalising the community energy niche foresee 
organisations such as energy agencies and commercial developers playing a 
more important role in disseminating information and organising partnerships. 
With the right organisational set-up it is assumed that both commercial 
developers and communities can take a more concerted effort by combining 
their interests. In many cases it down to the change agents and their energy 
agencies to develop links between the public and the private sector based on 
policy dissemination as top-down institutionalisation of this approach has yet to 
develop. 
We take government policy, read it, try and pick the bits that they are trying to 
hide and make, translate it for people, so that’s one thing that we do. So 
facilitation is kind of our role so we’ll know that local authority x is trying to do a 
heat project and a company wants to do a heat project, we’ll know that and we 
can get them together, whereas a private company wouldn’t necessarily know. 
(MO2) 
The receptiveness of either parties to such change agent advice, however, 
depends very much on their capacity and resources to act. The problem with 
local authorities is that their capacity in relation to RET deployment is similarly 
dependent on one or more individuals acting as top-down agents of change as 
for more bottom-up community energy projects (Fudge et al., 2011). Due to 
planning uncertainties and the FiT’s experimental and uncertain nature, 
resulting activities and processes constantly need to adapt. Consequently, 
many external change agents find themselves ‘bridging the gap’ between policy 
and their community (MO1), as this energy agency representative elaborates 
on. 
We’ve developed a business plan, we’ve put in lots of funding applications, 
we’re going to get INTERREG funding for the project, which will give us money 
to work with communities in the SW so we’ll be looking for local authorities to 
come in and partner with us and match fund some of those activities to support 
the communities, to bring forward projects in your local area. The whole project 
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is run a total open book process and I think this is another message for industry 
working with the public sector. If a community wants to be involved and they 
want to take the project forward they want to know what they are getting out of 
it. They appreciate they can’t have everything as somebody else is taking the 
risk, then there’s got to be some reward there, the local authority are providing 
the land, for example, then there’s got to be a benefit for the local authority for 
providing that land. (MO9) 
The focus of change agents with this scale of development in mind is less likely 
to cover the establishment of bottom-up business models of communities. On 
the other hand, developing a community energy portfolio allows communities to 
bypass regulatory uncertainties. This implies that certain trade-offs are likely to 
be made regarding ownership as larger scales are more likely to be achieved 
with greater shares of commercial ownership. Public-private partnerships may 
even go a step further by combining public guarantees and private expertise 
and investment. According to one of the interviewees, this would enable a more 
balanced approach to various community energy pathways currently being 
explored. 
The community power town model that we have been trying to get going [is] like 
has happened in Germany. […] The profitable bigger projects can cross-
subsidise and support the smaller and more dispersed projects and you can 
have an economically viable model for a low carbon town. (MO5) 
At the same time, this approach also maintains a community biased position in 
face of large developers by proposing different investment models based on 
community co-ownership rather than bottom-up FiT driven development or top-
down buy-out. Some change agents call for even greater flexibility of the 
community energy concept as long as the community benefits reflect the scale 
at which projects are being developed. 
We’re looking to do large scale renewable electricity projects, essentially [...] a 
minimum of two large turbines, 5MW and with the aim that our company [...]  
puts up the money for the pre-planning and then goes to the market to get the 
construction finance, so the community doesn’t have to own the turbines. [The 
community] can if it wants, have a share issue and buy shares in it but our 
definition of community energy is not that it has to be owned by the community, 
it has to be supported by the community, so we’d only go with projects where 
over 50% of the local community geographically are in support and it has to 
have significant benefits for the community [...] between £20,000 and 
£30,000/installed MW/a. (MO2) 
This level of return would be similar to what communities in other European 
countries can expect for similar business arrangements, particularly German 
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communities through business taxation (Seydewitz, 2010, see also Chapter 3). 
Community investment and development models such as these do not 
necessarily meet the requirements of what many would consider genuine 
community-led renewable energy development but the scale and speed of 
development, as long as they are coupled with substantial community benefits, 
points towards a greater RET diffusion potential while still maintaining 
engagement and social innovation opportunities. 
 
5.4.2 Local authorities and community energy 
What both advocates of the community-led and the commercial buy-out route 
indicate in the previous sections is that either processes would be greatly 
simplified if local authorities, semi-governmental organisation and QUANGOs 
had a greater involvement in the community energy development process. The 
desire to get local authorities in particular with on board is encapsulated by the 
following quotes, the first by a commercial community energy developer and the 
other by a DECC representative. 
Local authorities are key to just about every project. They have some kind of 
involvement, whether it is planning consent, whether it is working in partnership 
with them, they are hugely important. [However] the local authorities just do not 
have the resources to take this forwards themselves now. They don’t have 
offices with time on their hands to do this. (MO4) 
I think local authorities are a key and we’re working closely with local 
government groups. […] We firmly believe that the best community energy 
projects will be ones where the local authority play an active role but the 
community also plays an active role so it’s not the local authority doing it to its 
community but doing it with their community. Unfortunately, we don’t have a 
huge number of examples of that. (TD4) 
Both quotes also highlight lack of resources available to develop energy 
projects and hint at the impacts that fiscal austerity is having on public services. 
Whatever intervention local authorities or councils have been able to exert is 
coming under increasing duress, which the following quote by another bottom-
up community energy developer helps put into context.  
I was talking to a London based authority and the guy was almost in tears 
literally that the size of his team of seven had just got made redundant, and he 
would have loved to be able to do something but it just wasn’t the kind of, you 
know, person hours there to do it.  So I think we need to recognise the 
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difficulties that local authorities can be working under and make it very, as easy 
as we can for them. (BU5) 
Even before the cuts in local government, authority and council funding, 
however, their involvement in energy related activities was rarely unified or 
coordinated and the result is that the approaches to public engagement vary 
accordingly. Another critical issue in relation to local authorities, the subjectivity 
of RETs throughout various governmental departments, can act as a further 
barrier despite the facilitatory role assumed of local authorities. 
Planning authorities are initially quite supportive of all renewable technologies 
[...] but their final support of that tends to come down to visual impact and that 
tends to be quite subjective. (BU2) 
Yet another problem with local authorities in the UK is that they have 
traditionally had a different function within the framework of service provision 
than local authorities in other countries (see Chapter 2). The lack of trust in their 
ability is also reflected by the ongoing process of shifting services from public to 
private sectors (Butler, 2011). 
In general, local authorities, local government in Britain has an odd history, in 
that it’s seen as to some extent self-serving and obstructive, rather than 
facilitatory, so it is blamed for things for which it is not responsible. [They] could 
achieve more than they do but they themselves are being destabilised at the 
moment and so it’s difficult to expect very much of local authorities that are 
being actively undermined, which is the current policy of central government, is 
undermine them. (EA1) 
Along with this development, the centralised grip on local authorities has 
recently also been making way for a more decentralised and enabling function 
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006). The changes In relation to energy and electricity in 
particular mark a radical change from previous legislation. The 1976 Local 
Government Act which prevented councils from selling renewable electricity, 
even though the sale of heat and electricity from CHP sources was still allowed, 
was overturned on 18 August 2010 (DECC, 2010g). The result is that local 
authority owned renewable energy generation capacity currently amounts to 
0.01% of electricity generated in England, compared to a figure roughly 100 
times higher in Germany (DECC, 2010g), not to mention the share owned by 
municipal utilities (see Chapter 3). The scope for local authority action in the UK 
is therefore likely to remain very different from that in other European countries 
in terms of facilitatory capacities, although their capacity as enablers is 
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nevertheless considerable as long as their potential is recognised and exploited 
accordingly, as this bottom-up change agent indicates. 
I guess local government supporting community energy in the UK will potentially 
look very different than it would do in say Denmark or Sweden, but there’s a 
whole range of different ways that, you know, right through from making sure 
that their local elected representatives are really clued up about renewable 
energy from a very kind of objective scientific perspective rather than an 
ideological one and that local authorities can do things like look at the 
landscape in the area and look at what they’ve got, what natural resources 
they’ve got, look at what the landscape is like and talk to local people and say 
‘OK, so what can we do collectively in this area to build up a renewable energy 
infrastructure?’ So very much working in partnership with communities right 
from the very early planning stage. (BU6) 
Despite the resource constraints, however, ongoing changes in relation to 
energy provision are actually encouraging local authorities and county councils 
to consider the development of renewable energy infrastructure, particularly 
since the introduction of the FiT. Various attempts by government to increase 
bureaucratic efficiency are nevertheless putting this enabling capacity (Bulkeley 
and Kern, 2006) into question. 
Where local authorities still retain sufficient capacities for meaningful 
engagement in energy related issues, on the other hand, there is great potential 
for a more top-down approach to community energy. If these administrative 
bodies cover large geographical areas, as the following quote by a local 
authority representative indicates, the potential for holistic approaches to 
decentralised and community energy are considerable. 
[Our authority] is a major unitary authority now. It’s a single council covering a 
large geographical area and it’s able to make some very good strategic, long 
term decisions about where it sees itself in the future. (Pla1/TD1) 
Particularly for rural areas, community energy or decentralised energy in 
general is often considered an economic redevelopment opportunity (Munday et 
al., 2011) and some authorities have been quick to recognise this regeneration 
opportunity. Where resources are available, the potential of local authority 
involvement is also likely to expand into other areas of energy provision and 
services as their responsibility increases regarding technological aspects of 
energy infrastructure as well as their leading by example in the area of demand-
side management (Roberts, 2010). Despite the good intentions, however, a 
major problem most local authorities face is the lack of ‘drive, expertise and 
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money’ (Pla2/TD5) to provide the services community energy advocates are 
expecting. 
Every authority should have a renewable energy planning unit, but they don’t. 
You will find generalist planners doing it in most authorities. There is one 
planner [here] with the experience. If he were to leave, [the] experience would 
walk out the door with him. (Pla3/TD6) 
This planner points to the fickle position of community energy and renewable 
energy in general within local authorities. Large, unitary authorities appear to 
have the capacities to dedicate considerable resources to energy generation 
and saving while other, less well-endowed authorities are in danger of losing 
their entire expertise in terms and planning and potential engagement 
resources. In light of these difficulties, the capacity of widespread local authority 
commitment towards the accommodation of new coalitions of energy generation 
is unlikely to emerge any time soon. 
 
5.4.3 Commercial renewable energy developments and communities 
Without sufficient local resources to sustain community-led energy generation 
plans and local authorities lacking the capacities and will to support bottom-up 
decentralised energy engagement as well as change agents lacking capacities 
to foster the development of hybrid organisational forms or public-private 
partnerships, the engagement with commercial developments is often the only 
opportunity for communities to benefit from renewable energy. Their interest in 
onshore RET diffusion is evident from growing figures of onshore renewable 
energy generation capacity (Pollitt, 2010) but community engagement rarely 
features high on their agendas and varying approaches to community 
engagement are indicated by the following statement. 
There is obviously the established pattern of electricity providers leasing or 
giving or whatever part of their output to the local community. At its most cynical 
you could say it’s a sweetener, at the other end of the scale you could say it is a 
contribution to and a recognition of the impact on that community. (Pla3/TD6) 
This energy planner indicates the diverging perceptions of the benefits that 
commercial renewable energy developments can provide for communities. 
From a commercial community energy perspective there is no problem in 
encouraging widespread commercially driven renewable energy generation as it 
156 
 
will make ‘on-shore wind happen more easily’ (MO4). Similarly, some 
community energy activists also take a pragmatic approach to commercially 
driven renewable energy. 
There is no reason why developers cannot have very substantial financial 
benefit and give some genuine engagement to the locality which actually has to 
host it in terms of its presence. (EA1) 
In the past, however, many of these commercial approaches have failed to 
provide adequate compensation for communities affected by large-scale 
developments and the consultation processes have often failed to take 
community consideration and requirements into account. Granting planning 
permission for these developments, as long as they do not exceed 50MW, 
which is the point at which the decision-making is down to the secretary of state 
(Pollitt, 2010; DECC, 2012f), is still down to the local planning authority and this 
intersection is considered one of the key areas of consultation and negotiation 
of benefits by many of the change agents. 
The commercial development model in the UK has relied on commercial 
developers [going] to local planning committees as a matter of course but they 
expect to get turned down, 50% get turned down at local planning and plenty 
more don’t get that far because they get beaten off before they are submitted 
and then of those 50% that get turned down at local planning, 50% of those are 
then successful at appeal but the appeal, getting them through an appeal is 
reliant on being able to appeal against national level policy, the PPS 22, the 
targets for renewable energy. Now that’s been taken away and the planning 
system’s been turned on its head and now local winds rather than top winds 
and so if there isn’t positive planning policy for renewable energy the 
[commercial] developers have kind of lost some of that stick that they had. 
(MO5) 
As this community wind developer points out, the lack of planning certainty may 
actually have the potential for increasing the negotiation power of communities 
when confronted with commercial developers by making ‘it more difficult where 
you as a developer aren’t offering significant benefits to the community’ (EA1). 
According to an energy agency representative, this may even ‘change the way 
that people are thinking about planning decisions, so it will mean that 
community buy-in is more important than it has been in the past’ (MO2). On the 
other hand, wind energy developers are effectively been ‘driven offshore’ (EA1) 
by this increasingly inconsistent planning framework and increasing community 
demands. Some energy agency representatives with a wide range of potential 
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communities in mind are nevertheless arguing for a more flexible definition of 
community energy in this context, as this following statement indicates. 
We’re also trying to say to government [...] is that community energy does not 
have to be community owned, because many communities don’t have the funds 
to do that. It enables certain people within the community to invest who have 
that money and other people it gives them no tangible benefit because they 
don’t have the capital sitting around and so it doesn’t create that level of trust 
and buy in that something that’s not community owned or could be community 
owned but is creating that financial benefit for them. (MO2) 
This position towards community energy might partly reflect an acceptance of 
the dominance of incumbent structures within the UK’s overarching energy 
policy framework. For wind farm developers this notion is of particular relevance 
(see Jacobsson et al., 2009) as they tend to rely on the more competitive RO 
framework, rather than the constrained FiT. System incumbency, as indicated in 
Chapters 1,2 and 3, encourages competition in the energy sector and the RO’s 
structure benefits economies of scale to the detriment of less commercial 
approaches, as another energy agency representative points out. 
In the UK we have always had that view that it is going to be market driven and 
governments [...] were completely blind to the kind of sociology of the industrial 
landscape that they were creating. [...] They didn’t have any view about whether 
that would have an effect on long term support and they just thought we need 
kit in the ground, very technocratic, and if the big boys say they’ll do it that’s 
fine. (BU9) 
According to this interpretation of the UK’s NEF, it does not matter to 
government whether ownership or control lies in the hands of communities or 
an outside installer, generally a utility, or international shareholders. The hybrid 
approach allows communities to potentially tap into the more competitive 
technological and social learning system through the ownership of shares, a 
particular wind turbine or a set number of solar PV arrays. Guaranteed returns 
on (share) investment are generated as a result without having to deal with the 
financially uncertain at-risk stage (Co-operatives UK, 2012). Those calling for a 
more commercial approach to community energy take a similarly favourable 
view towards hybrid approaches. 
Just because we’re talking about community renewable energy it doesn’t need 
to be small and in terms of ownership, ownership is quite an important issues 
when it comes to finance, so I think we shouldn’t be too descriptive about what 
the true meaning of community ownership is, simply because sometimes, you 
need to raise the money from somewhere else. (MO9) 
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If it is well managed by both sides, this approach can terminate in a win-win 
situation but there are few examples where this form of joint ownership has 
been successfully managed. According to a local authority representative there 
were solar PV installers during the pre-fast-track review stage ‘proposing to give 
£7,000 per MW/a to a local benefit trust [while] many of the other solar farms 
are only offering £5,000 per MW/a [but] that’s still £625,000, index linked, over 
the life of the facility’ (Pla1/TD1). Sadly, policy uncertainty has proven 
detrimental for such projects as they were devised on the back of a tariff 
structure which failed to gain political resonance. 
 
5.4.4 Community engagement 
These pragmatic views on what community energy means and implies generally 
point towards a recognition that ‘the market has been driven by the private 
sector’ (MO10) and always will be. A major problem with community-led bottom-
up developments within the UK’s current NEF is that their scale and generation 
capacity is likely to remain small and more or less insignificant within the bigger 
picture of the technological diffusion required for the transition to a low carbon 
economy. As a DECC representative put it by contrasting commercially driven 
community energy projects with grassroots community projects: 
It’s a shame for communities to miss that opportunity while commercials are 
exploiting those community’s local resources. [...] We need to look at how we 
exploit the full resources when we are doing development and part of the issue 
with community energy is the other side to that, where communities have lower 
ambition, they only put in one turbine because that’s the only thing they can 
afford, they just want to do something and the resource is much bigger. (TD4) 
With the bigger picture in mind, many top-down change agents and facilitators 
consider commercial interest in these forms of business and engagement 
models a logical consequence of policy and planning uncertainties. According to 
this view, the lack of at-risk finance available to up-scale grassroots 
developments is not necessarily a negative feature. 
Centralised and hybrid organisational forms tend to be favoured more by 
resource constrained communities, commercial community energy change 
agents as well as some policy makers as there is a convincing economical 
argument that compensating local communities for renewable energy, 
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particularly wind farm development, would still be cheaper than developing 
offshore renewables, such as wind. In the long term, these arrangements 
provide overall savings for society (Moore, 2011; TD4). However, a holistic 
approach to various scales of community energy has yet to develop in the UK, 
as the following quote by a community wind developer points towards. 
[There is also] this huge missed opportunity that these projects cost a lot of 
money and they make a lot of money but they are not delivering rural 
regeneration, they are not delivering local economic benefit from the wind 
projects. […] If you put it all together, there is enough money to make it work 
whereas if commercial developers cherry pick the best ones and the rest end 
up stranded and communities are left trying to do crap heap projects that don’t 
make money so therefore they can’t raise any investment for them. (MO5) 
Rather than commercial developers developing projects ‘with a community feel’ 
(BU9), communities therefore need to step up to the challenge by becoming 
‘essentially pretty business-like about things […] if they want to make money in 
community energy […] because there is not devolution of central funding’ 
(MO10). This intersection between business and community ambition is 
precisely the area which most of the interviewees seek to develop in order to 
foster greater community buy-in and more ambitious community-led RET 
deployment. 
 
5.4.5 Energy Supply Companies and new business models 
Some councils, local authorities and developers are thinking ahead in terms of 
energy provision and services by working on developing Energy Supply 
Companies (ESCos). Woking Borough Council (DECC, 2010g) is the most 
prominent example of this recent revival and this development has led many 
change agents to engage more with the possibilities of not only getting the local 
authorities with on board but actually forming community energy development 
coalitions.  
I think a lot of the local authorities are keen not just to sort of develop with 
generation on its own they want to sort of become, for want of a better word, an 
electricity supplier in their own right, […] so I think the local authorities are 
seeing this as an opportunity to increase their revenues particularly at, where 
the economy is at, at the moment and the local authorities don’t have a lot of 
money. (TD3) 
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Despite partially contradicting signals from government regarding the 
deconstruction of top-down support through the Big Society principle, yet 
encouraging the development of ESCos through the Green Deal, it appears as 
though this concept is gaining popularity, particularly among change agents not 
exclusively focussing on the financial award from renewable energy 
developments, as the following example indicates. 
I’m a fan of forgotten municipal enterprises which doesn’t work in the mix of 
previous or current government thinking. There’s been a complete failure of 
confidence in the public sector to deliver anything in the belief that only the 
private sector can deliver and only the market can deliver and in fact, that’s a bit 
perverse because a whole lot of our infrastructure would never have been built 
if it had been left to private capital. (EA4) 
This idea of public sector involvement strikes a chord with certain change 
agents and local authorities but the general unfamiliarity with the concept might 
prove critical in developing organisational vehicles that have the actual 
capacities of ESCos. The confusion is evident from the following statement by 
an energy agency representative. 
Local authorities are all very excited by the word ESCo in general, but the main 
thing that we’ve been saying to them is first of all work out what you’re going to 
do, what you want to do, what you want to achieve and then work out the best 
model for managing that, for owning it, and that may be an ESCo or some 
other, kind of, special purchase vehicle, or it might be something else. [...] I 
think it is, kind of a short hand for what local authorities want to do. (MO2) 
Excitement in this organisational form might therefore be temporary. For many 
of the interviewees, signals sent out by government remain private sector 
orientated although there is some evidence that the rhetoric surrounding hybrid 
organisational ESCos and local authority involvement in community energy 
might indicate a new approach. This is most evident in Scotland where a certain 
transition towards community engagement appears to already be underway. 
Scotland is a good example of good policy. They said “We’re going to go for it”, 
whether that’s their targets or just the way at local authority level, whether it’s 
planning policy, planning guidance or whatever, they’re not necessarily 
welcoming it with open arms but they are encouraging. (Ins2) 
The reasons behind Scotland’s commitment may partly relate to the fact that 
many communities do not have access to the gas grid due to their geographical 
remoteness and the relative lack of economic prospects as well as local 
sources of revenues. 
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Scotland has it because Scotland has very clear [...] funding for community 
development and management of community energy services. Without that sort 
of political will I can’t see effective role out of community energy because it will 
only happen where the perfect storm is possible, where the site, the 
opportunity, the expertise, the energy all come together. (Pla3/TD6) 
Despite the volatile regulatory framework surrounding community energy and 
support for renewables in general, however, it is therefore evident that 
government is increasingly concerned about the support that (English) 
communities are receiving. One example is that certain aspects of government 
rhetoric, as reflected by ongoing FiT consultations (DECC, 2012k), point 
towards the possibility of granting social housing, community projects and 
distributed energy schemes an exemption from proposed FiT changes. In 
particular, community energy is to be excluded from the proposed ‘multi-
installation tariff’ which will see only  90% of the tariff level being granted to 
‘individuals or organisations already receiving FiTs for 25 or fewer solar PV 
installations to reflect the benefits of economies of scale’ (DECC, 2012h). On 
the whole, however, the barriers identified in this analysis point to a lack of 
government ambition in relation to energy policy, high uncertainties regarding 
planning and auxiliary costs such as grid connection and the unfavourable 
investment landscape which is partly the result of these uncertainties. 
 
5.4.6 Utilities and enhancing replicability 
The next step up from ESCOs and local authority involvement is for 
communities to partner with utilities. Their involvement greatly reduces policy 
related uncertainties thanks to their broad portfolios, their expertise and their 
investment potential. This provides great development opportunities but there is 
a danger of communities and community energy concepts being used as buy-
ins for what are effectively entirely commercial developments. According to a 
bottom-up change agent working for a charitable energy agency, government is 
content with leaving ‘it to the largest of the developers to give a bit of money to 
a community and see that as somehow engagement’ (BU9), rather than 
committing energy politically to communities. As it stands, community 
dependence on the volatile FiT is actually increasing their dependency and 
reliance on poorly balanced negotiations with large utilities. Arguably, this 
162 
 
dependency decreases local knowledge contextualisation and flexibility more 
likely to develop sustainability benefits (Burgess et al., 2003).  
The upside of cooperating with utilities, on the other hand, is the replicability of 
business models. The community does not require the expertise, finance and 
patience to pay for community energy itself while the utility will benefit in the 
long term by developing replicable yet inflexible community engagement in 
laborious development processes in the short term. Standardisation may be a 
viable option through community-utility public-private partnership in the absence 
of a governance framework that energy activists and change agents could rely 
on and due to the relative novelty of and unfamiliarity with community energy in 
general (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008). Getting utilities with on board would 
certainly encourage the alignment of advice and support with real outcome in 
terms of technological infrastructure but this approach makes it ‘very difficult to 
ensure that the advice is of a high quality because the people who run the 
service don’t know what the people who are using the advice think of it’ (MO6). 
Some change agencies such as the Centre for Sustainable Energy with its 
PlanLoCal resource packs and Local United with their diffusion packs, are 
aiming for greater replicability in the early stages of development through 
structured independent advice enhanced by feedback loops. Utilities, on the 
other hand, have greater leverage when it comes to offering packages and this 
does not necessarily exclude the integration of community-led business 
models.. 
[We] make sure that social enterprises can now take ownership of the 
energy sector to create a new energy movement. The FiT and the RHI 
[…] encourage ownership of electricity generation and heat generation in 
the community. It’s moving at a slow pace but what we’re about is to 
make that happen much more rapidly. (MO7) 
Among the Big Six serious interest in community energy has yet to develop but 
Co-operative Energy might already be one step ahead in that they aim to 
systematically stimulate ‘community owned energy projects from which [they] 
want to buy power’ (Uti1). This step from a big player within the decentralised 
innovation system might prove very useful for the development of a viable 
market for community power generation. 
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We want to be the organisation that matches demand from the public 
with new supply in the community energy sector. We’re working with 
affiliate organisations and we are rewarding those affiliates with for 
promoting cooperative energy to their members. Members then sign up 
to us and the affiliates can use their reward in whatever way they wish, 
which could be a community owned community energy venture.(Uti1) 
In other areas of community related energy developments, utility involvement, 
either directly or through subsidiary companies has encouraged the rolling out 
of solar PV rent-a-roof schemes (DCC, 2011). Some schemes aim at installing 
solar PV along with smart metering on the roofs of social housing, whereby the 
installer retains the FiT and the householder receives free electricity (London 
Rebuilding Society, 2011). In practice, however, free electricity has often only 
been linked to water boilers and the windfall profits that the providers of these 
schemes receive have resulted in many critical voices questioning the FiT as 
such. 
Utility involvement clearly has its benefits in terms of replicability but this goes 
hand in hand with reduced flexibility. Vulnerable communities are also in danger 
of being used as vehicles for the widening of corporate profit margins. Baring 
this in mind, streamlining the NEF towards communities at small scales of 
development might enable community-led energy projects to become quicker 
and cheaper but any changes ‘will be of no avail as long as industry does not 
take into account concerns at community levels and benefit distribution issues 
relating to utility driven policies’ (Lob1). 
 
 
5.5 Multiple pathways for community energy 
The result of the community energy niche volatility is that a wide variety of 
community energy approaches are being developed although some are being 
crowded out by a long list of uncertainties. Where communities are lacking 
access to appropriate external change agent support there is a danger that 
there are constant ‘re-inventions of the wheel’ (BC) occurring as separate 
community groups are working to negotiate individual solutions to problems 
commonly encountered in the development process. This stands in stark 
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contrast to commercial renewable energy developers, according to this DECC 
official. 
What we haven’t managed to do effectively to date as a government or as a 
community is to provide that support to enable that adaptation to happen at the 
speed that it does in the commercial world. Therefore commercial always gets 
to the low hanging fruit first. Commercial will adapt quicker [than government 
support] and what we need to do is support communities in that adaptation, 
whatever comes out. Even if you are doing a project, if it’s the right size and 
you’re selling the electricity on and you’re reducing the electricity bills locally, 
there is still a business case for that with minimal FiT. (TD4) 
Government therefore appears to be willing to protect more community-based 
bottom-up developments in light of commercial competition while retaining the 
benefits of a competitive market. The following quote from an expert on policy 
and regulation reinforces this notion. 
The government is very conscious that it hasn’t got a good track record, which 
is true of any government really, of picking winners. So how does it sort of 
enable some of the benefits of markets to deliver least cost options but also to 
push the market for want of a better word, to direct the markets towards where 
it needs to be. So we are going through a bit of a significant change right at the 
moment really to maintain this competitive element but also direct it towards 
what we want. (TD3) 
Opinions on how this may be achieved are as diverse as the approaches to 
community energy that are currently being developed. Similarly, the position of 
government and semi-governmental organisations is either viewed 
unfavourably, in the sense that there is not much scope for local government 
intervention, or favourably, in that their role as facilitators may be expanded 
considerably. The two following quotes indicate this dichotomy as the first 
represents an unfavourable the second a favourable position. 
I can’t see local authorities overall taking a huge role in leading the community 
stuff. I think there would be some pockets. [...] If they focus on just getting the 
planning stuff right then that would really help, that’s what they need to be doing 
and making sure that Localism doesn’t mean parochialism but a kind of 
meaningful process which has got the right support so people find a way of 
expressing their sense of global responsibility within a local plan. (BU9) 
[Local carbon budgets] would focus their minds if they had [them] alongside 
their financial budgets and if maybe the two are connected in some way, then it 
would really focus minds. (Ins4) 
Ultimately, both interviewers are nevertheless calling for a greater acceptance 
of community energy’s potential within various tiers of government so that 
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communities avoid ‘putting 50kW turbines at the end where we could have put 
1MW turbines because that’s all we needed’ (BU9). Approaches to community 
energy and sustainable energy in general should not need to vary according to 
the communities’ and the facilitating agency’s position within the top-down 
policy framework (Smith, 2009). Appropriate backing from change agent and 
facilitatory networks could lead to a situation where this self-serving purpose of 
community energy could be replaced with an appreciation of wider implications 
of the low-carbon transition, as this bottom-up change agent indicates. 
I think we need to leap frog that and get to that kind of situation in Germany 
where people see it as an income generating asset that is making the full use of 
resources available and has a kind of structure of ownership that means that 
people gain from having it in their back yard. (BU9) 
If this potential is recognised, the problem of change agent outreach and lacking 
community ambition may be overcome as dispersed structures and poor 
organisation, which are a much a product of the lack of top-down facilitation as 
of the lack of understanding what community energy should comprise and 
imply, could be streamlined. Change agencies by themselves, however, do not 
tend to have budgets that allow for serious marketing and haphazard network 
structures rarely allow economies of scale to apply. The following statement by 
an installer encapsulates many feelings of those involved in more practical 
aspects of community energy. 
All these organisations are fantastic but I get to see the end users on a day-to-
day basis and none of them know about these organisations. [Some 
organisations are] too commercially orientated […] and not practically oriented. 
If you go to [them] they will give you the information about, you know, 
exhibitions and legislation and things like that but they won’t tell you the 
practicalities of having a system installed, whether it be your community school 
or whether it’s your own house or so and so forth. (Ins3) 
Stronger links to government and public authorities through hybrid 
organisational forms and public private partnerships therefore have a greater 
capacity to drive community energy towards a serious option in terms of 
generation and engagement. This is also recognised by government. 
At the moment, a lot of these energy companies are self selected, the board of 
directors are self selecting, they’re getting a large amount of income, potentially, 
from their renewable energy projects and they decide where it’s spent with no 
clear mandate from the community other than from the shareholders who buy 
into the cooperative or CIC. How do you maintain community support and 
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cohesion around it when there is no wider picture, there is no clear use of the 
funds? (TD4) 
As this quote from a DECC representative indicates, some form of 
governmental involvement is also important when it comes to the balancing of 
community interests and commercial options as well the embedding of energy 
generation and saving within the bigger picture, possibly even in processes not 
necessarily directly related to energy. 
 
5.6 Where next for community energy? 
This chapter has provided an overview of how the UK’s NEF and community 
energy interact and how various approaches to ownership and scales of RET 
diffusion in community settings come about through the interaction of energy 
activists, change agents and facilitators. It points towards the need to recognise 
the concept and solidify the position of community energy and other forms of 
decentralised energy generation within the system of energy provision that is 
likely to stay in place for the foreseeable future, as the following quote by an 
expert on policy and regulation indicates 
There needs to be checks and balances, safety and ensuring that companies 
are viable and credit worthy and so on and so forth, given that the government’s 
policy objective, the wider policy objective to do with low carbon and 
renewables. […] The only way to do that is to simplify the regime so that it 
recognises that these are going to be relatively small scale compared to the 
larger centralised system that will always exist, or certainly will exist for the 
foreseeable future, and enable them to strive and operate in a bit of a niche so 
the two markets if you like can separate the big centralised system from the 
decentralised system so they can mesh up. (TD3) 
The next chapter analyses the possibility of positioning community energy as a 
separate niche linking bottom-up ambitions with market incentives for RET 
diffusion spanning FiTs, planning and investment to form a new space of 
meaningful embedding, engagement and interaction with energy. 
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Chapter 6 – Embedding community energy innovation 
 
6 Introduction 
The previous analysis chapter illustrates both the possibilities and the barriers 
associated with energy policy and the surrounding regulatory framework 
facilitating community buy-in relating to the diffusion of innovations of RETs at a 
highly decentralised scale of development. In particular, the position of change 
agents influencing and determining scale and ownership structures by 
advancing technological deployment within the changing system of energy 
provision was investigated in order to provide a qualitative evaluation of the 
struggle both communities and intermediaries are facing in their attempt to 
develop various community scales of renewable energy in the UK. 
This analysis chapter establishes which specific regulatory measures influence 
the diffusion of community scale renewable energy generation infrastructure 
and associated benefits and how local economic regeneration, energy security 
and climate change action is valued within the NEF. It also depicts what 
changes in energy governance might be envisaged to alter the community 
energy innovation trajectory by encouraging the uptake of various scales and 
ownership structures within the framework of the transition to a low carbon 
economy. 
 
6.1 The diffusion of technological innovation 
This chapter starts with an analysis of how technological innovations are 
diffused within the UK’s energy policy governance framework. The capacity for 
various scales of development are analysed with regard to applicable support 
measures. By comparing the UK’s with other European countries, notably 
Germany, an indication is provided on how co-evolutionary developments 
shape, determine and lock-in national energy policy governance frameworks 
along with scales and ownership structures. This is followed by an analysis of 
how policy innovations are diffused and what scope there is for regulatory 
measures to determine the scale of decentralised energy provision and what 
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benefits are derived from the availability of specific niches for community energy 
development. The final section depicts the possibilities for new governance 
approaches to community energy development within the UK’s NEF along with 
envisaged changes capable of exploiting the dynamism associated with the 
niche of community energy. 
Technological diffusion in the UK energy sector, as is evident from Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 is characterised by scalar and ownership lock-in. Community 
energy is not a novel concept within the NEF but due to the structure of the UK 
energy market and the comparatively long standing tradition of large non-
municipal utilities providing electricity and heating (Pearson and Watson, 2012), 
it is not entirely obvious what benefits new scales of energy generation might 
entail. The scale of community energy development is very much dependent on 
the ownership structures of generation assets, which in turn often depend on 
the benefits and project aims associated with the deployment of renewables. 
According to Haggett (2008), increasing stakeholder involvement in the 
decision-making process relating to energy infrastructure was found to be the 
most important aspect of the transition to a renewable energy system. The 
introduction of the FiT has encouraged a ‘more embedded and multidimensional 
conceptualisation of the roles, engagements and potentiality of ‘the public’ 
within the energy system’ (Walker and Cass, 2007: 1) by enabling localised 
stakeholder involvement and opening up greater opportunities for ownership or 
part-ownership of renewable energy generating assets as indicated in the 
previous chapter. 
 
6.2 Scales of renewable energy provision and regulatory interaction 
However, according to one interviewee, ‘we certainly can’t say that community 
renewables are mainstream at this stage’ (MO9) due to the comparatively late 
introduction of support measures. Appropriate scales and ownership structures 
have yet to be negotiated within the niche of community energy innovation and 
the governance thereof. At this stage it is evident both from the scalar ambitions 
and the interviewee’s opinions that the development of community energy is a 
two-tier system. One tier proposes community ownership of generation assets, 
which generally restricts scale to the limits of the FiT although greater scales 
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and innovative ownership structures may emerge where communities are 
fortunate enough to possess or secure adequate financial backing. The other 
proposes part ownership of generation assets, thereby enabling greater 
diffusion of RET accompanied by ever decreasing community ownership with 
increasing scale, at the upper end of which ‘bribes’ are proposed in order to 
drive the diffusion of onshore wind energy (Yeo, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 6.1 indicates the ownership vs. scale dilemma of community energy. 
Greater ownership is likely to restrict the scale of development in the absence of 
adequate at-risk finance and general funding possibilities. Either of these 
pathways, however, are lacking adequate governmental support structures 
which would encourage replicability (Smith, 2006) and enable greater public 
engagement with energy generation. 
 
6.2.1 Ownership over scale 
The pathway prioritising ownership over scale is analysed in this section and 
starts with the following example from a change agent representing a farmer’s 
cooperative’s energy agency. His view reflects sentiments in relation to 
ownership found throughout the highly decentralised energy diffusion arena 
which prioritises ownership over scale. 
Figure 6.1: The UK community energy innovation system (compiled by the author) 
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There are obviously wind farms but there tends to [be] a company set up to 
fund them and the farmer is paid a rent on the land although the farmer may 
have some equity within that company. [...] I’d rather have the farmers have 
control over their own destiny and owned or owned a reasonable proportion of 
whatever technology or generator they’ve got rather than just receiving a rent, 
in which case it is always going to be a much smaller percentage of the 
possible profits. (MO1) 
In this context, one can easily replace the word ‘farmer’ with ‘community’, 
thereby reflecting the main divide between advocates of either scale or 
ownership. However, this interviewee sees great ‘medium and [...] long-term 
potential for the agricultural and rural economy to be involved in the country’s 
energy needs. The farmer’s power station is in effect that. The first stage will be 
via brokering but in the future it could become its own utility’ (MO1). The exact 
details for such a setup have yet to be developed, particularly if ownership of 
energy generating assets is to remain entirely in the hands of the farmers. This 
change agent takes the position that the cooperative’s scale allows them to 
purchase at scale and eventually operate privately owned electricity generation 
facilities at scale without the need to up-scale individual projects, which would 
imply moving towards hybrid ownership models. 
[It provides] the farmers the opportunities the same as the large operators on 
price but put in at a scale they can afford, [which builds] a safety net into 
agriculture [...] because agricultural products are very volatile in price. (MO1) 
This farmer’s cooperative’s approach to decentralised energy provision aims at 
diversifying incomes by contributing to the diversification of infrastructural asset 
bases. Similar to change agents in the community energy sector, this agency 
takes ‘a step back [to] have a big view, which is something that [their] size and 
number of members’ (MO1) allows them to do in order to distinguish long-term 
needs from short-term gains. 
We’ve had preliminary talks with some of the councils. If they end up with goals 
of renewable energy generation within their area, certainly we can approach 
them and say ‘OK, what’s your goal?’ and this is a way that our members could 
achieve it within your area, or a percentage of it within your area and it can be 
joined up, clear thinking, all to the same standards, again rather than the 
hodgepodge individual applications as they come.[...] The advantage of having 
devolved generation and taking some of the strain off the grid, again, could do 
with more joined up thinking. (MO1) 
The scalar restrictions of this broad and shallow approach in terms of electricity 
generation and community buy-in are nevertheless obvious as this organisation 
171 
 
restricts the packages for its members to what is assumed to be affordable and 
financially viable in relation to the FiT’s tariff structure. Their favoured 50kW 
solar PV system ‘would be about 50% of [a member’s] electricity usage through 
a year’ (MO1) and also provides the best returns. However, this prioritisation of 
individual ownership implies that further community benefits (or buy-ins) are not 
a realistic possibility. The benefits of this approach, on the other hand, are its 
simplicity and replicability, which in themselves are very important to move the 
diffusion of innovations towards implementation (Rogers, 1995). This diffusion 
advantage of solar PV within the FiT framework is widely accepted among 
community change agents, as the following example highlights. 
[Solar PV] is a high cost technology for the return you get in terms of energy 
and it’s one of the easiest ones to install, in regards to the feed-in tariff. You can 
get a PV project off the ground and done within a year whereas with wind you’re 
looking at 4-5 years, same for hydro. (BU4) 
The simplicity of solar PV, both in terms of the straightforward installation, 
operation and usage as well the reduced uncertainty about its advantages 
thanks to the FiT (adapted from Eveland, 1986 and Rogers, 1995), imply that its 
implementation/diffusion therefore represents the path of least resistance. The 
diffusion of more complex technological innovations such as wind, on the other 
hand, requires more ‘observability’ and ‘trialability’ (Rogers, 1995: 16) before 
investments are considered. 
People want to invest once there’s a safe revenue stream [but] what a lot of 
people have said to us, even the key activists, is that only once the turbine is up 
[are they] willing to invest. [...] If our financing [before implementation] was 
totally reliant on the immediate geography we would be able to buy dynamos for 
pushbikes, basically. (BU3) 
This restriction therefore implies that a diversification of technological diffusion 
in terms of scale or ownership structure is currently difficult to pursue as the 
limited privately held funds available for highly decentralised developments are 
being locked into the ‘simple’ solar PV (adapted from Unruh, 2000), rather than 
being invested as a share in more complex technology. This also implies that 
the current governance approach towards other RETs such as wind is failing to 
reduce uncertainty at the community-scale. 
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6.2.2  Scale over ownership 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the upper end of the community energy 
scale sees change agents advocating large scale commercial developments 
with a community stake, rather than a majority share. ‘We’ll see so much more 
installations going if they don’t have to be community owned’ (MO2), thereby 
breaching the increasing scalar lock-in which defines higher shares of 
community ownership. Up-scaling, however, currently represents a major 
challenge in community energy innovation, even when a hybrid organisational 
approach to decentralised energy is taken into account and ‘a significant 
amount should be owned locally’ (Ins2), rather than the entire system as 
advocated in the previous examples. 
Community type organisations, particularly, without the basic funding and 
finance, don’t always take very kindly to somebody else coming in from outside 
and actually taking the majority of the benefits themselves. They would like to 
be able to do it themselves, if they were going to do it at all, which is one of the 
reasons you get opposition to the local wind farms and small wind arrays. (BU2) 
This dilemma of ownership is also something government is aiming to resolve 
although it may take a long time to clarify the exact details, as is evident from 
the vagueness of policy documents regarding community energy (see Chapter 
3). Scale, however, is necessary to achieve renewable energy targets and the 
recommendation by the CCC (DECC, 2011b) but it is also necessary to protect 
communities from unfavourable deals that might put them at a disadvantage in 
the long run. Negotiations thus need to put communities at an advantage in 
order to prevent commercial exploitation. 
A commercial entity will have no fear of a 5-10MW onshore wind farm. A 
community will start with a 1.2MW wind farm, if you’re lucky. That’s the 
magnitude of their ambition, to get one big turbine or many small turbines in 
place whereas the commercial are looking at how do we get 5 or 6 bigger 
turbines in place. I think that is partly because they know how to do it and 
communities don’t and communities are scared, part of it is access to capital, 
part of it is just ambition. The community’s ambition is not to make shitloads of 
money, the community’s ambition is to become greener, more self-sufficient to 
play its part, and therefore relevant to its size and scale. (TD4) 
This statement by a government representative appears to call for a balance 
between the need to achieve scale through the installation of commercially 
funded onshore renewables for the sake of climate change and renewable 
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energy targets and overcoming limited community ambitions in relation to scale, 
all under the assumption of minimal government intervention. It reflects the 
overall objective of the free market approach to energy and the ownership of 
assets and reinforces the notion of governance as opposed to government (see 
Chapter 2). As a result, an increasing amount of responsibility is being passed 
down from central government to utilities, commercial enterprises, communities 
and individuals alike (Porritt, 2005). 
According to this logic, rural communities with the natural and spatial resources 
to facilitate renewable energy generation in particular are to take on the shared 
responsibility of low-carbon energy generation and transmission. The FiT is 
designed to target ‘money at the best winds, not just the social impact but the 
energy impact has got to be a priority’ (TD4). The underlying energy policy 
paradigm also in relation to the UK’s small scale FiT, despite the rhetoric 
surrounding social inclusion, has ‘just been about megawatts’ (BU9), rather than 
changes in ownership structures. Incumbents are strengthened by whatever 
organisational drive (Fuchs, 2012) still exists in UK energy policy, which implies 
that scale, rather than social aspects of localising energy generation, 
transcends the regulatory state paradigm in relation to energy. However, this 
underlying principle is not necessarily at odds with the interests of change 
agents encouraging community energy development, as the following example 
indicates. 
Community groups, especially with wind, need to wake up a bit and think 
‘actually, if they’re going to stick 10 2-3MW wind turbines there maybe we can 
get one turbine’, get them to stomp up all the costs for the turbine, you know it 
costs £1m on its own, and then get the benefit from it and pay it off as a 
mortgage on the turbine. That’s how I would see the wind industry going for 
community groups. There needs to be more cooperation between communities 
and developers. I think the developers are keen, it’s getting the communities on 
board. (BU4) 
This energy agency representative’s underlying argument for this approach is 
that exclusive community ownership of generation assets restricts ‘the 
opportunity for [renewable resources] to be exploited [to communities] that 
already have a lot of money’ (BU4). Crucially, at this scale of generation it is not 
only necessary to increase or retain the local stake in decentralised yet 
commercial energy provision but also to get the ownership structures to reflect 
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the power balance, which is also an issue government is aware of as the 
following statement indicates. 
I would rather [communities] own 10% of the wind farm because then they get 
10% of the profit no matter which wind turbine is working or not working. [...] It 
just doesn’t make sense to me that you would build 10 wind turbines and own a 
specific one rather than own 10% of all of them. We know that when the wind 
blows different ways, different ones work better. It’s all about that utilisation and 
everything else, maintenance. You don’t have control over those so owning a 
stake in a company and getting a profit from the whole wind farm has got to be 
a safer option for a community. (TD4) 
Government as well as change agents are therefore struggling to provide a 
framework that does not put communities at a disadvantage in these 
negotiations. The following section indicates how diffusion potentials and local 
stakes in generation capacity can be married within the UK NEF’s governance 
approach. 
 
6.2.3  Which regulation for which scale and ownership structure? 
Despite the obvious scalar advantages that community stakes in commercial 
developments entail, the FiT scale nevertheless provides greater potential 
beyond the exclusive technological diffusion of innovations. Through the 
aforementioned trialability and observability (Rogers, 1995) of FiT scale 
technologies, consumers are moved from passivity to activity. Once this pattern 
has been established, and assuming that initial investment in technological 
diffusion has not absorbed the entire geographical investment base, community 
groups and change agents with agendas that stretch beyond the grassroots 
implementation of community energy can potentially move away from specific 
technological and potentially tariff-bound foci. By diversifying away from the ‘low 
hanging fruits’, particularly in relation to solar PV, communities can escape the 
restrictions of technological lock-in, despite this initial step providing the 
common economic basis for many community energy projects (BC). 
According to some installers, however, this argument is undermined by this 
exact restriction of scale as well as the lack of available finance as regulation 
and planning turn a blind eye to ownership structures. Hence, it does not matter 
if a 50kW installation is privately co-owned by community members or if 
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individual 4kW installations are put onto the respective co-owner’s roofs (Ins5). 
However, the FiT’s neutrality towards ownership reflects its purpose within the 
liberal market framework of energy policy. 
[The feed-in tariff] is necessary to build a market as a new technology. Once 
you have a market there you can then take away the subsidies and then the 
prices have come down because the technology is reduced in price. It’s the 
opposite of a finite resource where the more people buy the more expense it 
gets because it’s becoming a scarce commodity when the more people get it 
the lower the cost and it becomes more available to people. (BU7) 
People investing in technology supported by the FiT take a similar technocratic 
approach to technological deployment. Simplicity, not only terms of the 
technology itself but also regarding ownership structures, are prioritised in 
favour of collective action or a more concerted approach in general. This is an 
issue that particularly installers are well aware of. 
They want it done so each one as an individual installation and it’s individually 
funded and you know there’s no collectivisation because people don’t want 
collectives [as] there is no incentive over individual action. (Ins5) 
Within this scale of renewable energy development, people are therefore more 
inclined to invest at the individual household, rather than the community scale. 
The profile of potential community investors who are more likely to install 
individually, according to the same installer quoted above, reads as follows. 
Domestic customer typical profile is 50+, empty nest, money in the bank, doing 
nothing, earning 2% so they’d rather put it on their roof because they’re not 
moving, they’re going to get the savings that the feed-in tariff offer. (Ins5) 
This appears to fit government’s rhetoric surrounding the FiT, which appears to 
have been ‘moving away from just energy production to social inclusion, social 
inclusion seems to be that you have it on your own domestic building’ (MO1). 
People interested in climate change action are therefore effectively encouraged 
to focus on household scales of renewable energy development, which 
obviously benefits some more than others. 
With those particular customers it’s about their own roof. You would find it 
difficult to encourage them to install into community projects because their level 
of commitment to green technology isn’t that far advanced. It’s how it affects 
them. You get the other customer who’s financially orientated who would invest 
in a community project for the financial side but then the other customer who’s 
green orientated and would be committed to investing in a community project 
for both financial and the community benefits and reasons. (Ins3) 
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Despite the obvious interest in community energy by certain customers, these 
statements clearly indicate that it is easier to follow the individual rather than the 
collective path. The incentive in terms of FiTs appears to be pointing in the right 
direction but the benefits of pursuing common objectives through collective 
action remain intangible. This can once again be put down to the lack of 
observable and trialable (Rogers, 1995) examples as well as the lack of 
incentives to move projects in this direction. 
 
6.2.4  Which scale and ownership structure for which regulation? 
Despite the lack of incentives for consumers with funds and capacities to 
consider community scale developments, the FiT can at least be credited for 
benefitting the end-user with sufficient capacities, in terms of long-term returns, 
to invest in eligible RETs. However, this stands in contrast to the rhetoric 
surrounding decentralised and particularly community energy evident in Chapter 
3. 
The relative burden on smaller scales of generation by way of planning 
procedures is exacerbated by the delicate balancing act community energy 
groups face in light of missing public mandates. It is therefore necessary to 
expand the focus of energy policy beyond targets and technologies to include 
institutions, behaviours and incentives. To a certain extent, the gradual return to 
targets and plans in the last decade represents a move away from liberalisation. 
There is evidence that this is likely to continue as the increasing imposition of 
societal objectives, such as climate change, energy security, resilience and 
affordability requires the difficult task of retaining the benefits of competitive 
markets while centrally directed approaches increasingly dictate implementation 
(Pearson and Watson, 2012). This realisation, however, is not necessarily 
reflected by government. 
This government is not opposed to [regulation] but is desperately trying to 
ensure that regulation is only used where it is necessary rather than to address 
market failure. The reality is that you would imagine that that lends itself more to 
the commercial than the community... (TD4) 
The lack of consistency between different government departments, different 
sectors within government departments and between policy objectives 
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themselves that appear to be shifting with every new press release amounts to 
conflicting information (adapted from Rogers, 1995), which also transcends 
planning policies and decision-making. 
There are a number of completely conflicting policies being put into place and 
so, and these are actually absolutely explicitly set on in head on collision, and 
so on the one hand there is an assertion that we are to approach 50% 
renewables by 2027, 80% by 2050. All well and good but on the other hand 
there’s talk about delegating planning decisions to each locality (Localism Act). 
(EA1) 
What government and most interviewees agree is missing in the decentralised 
sector is a guideline or framework that change agents, communities (both 
willing to invest or about to have renewables ‘imposed’ upon them), investors, 
utilities and policy-makers, can abide by. Without such a roadmap it is likely that 
the diffusion of renewables in the UK below the scope and scale of large utilities 
will remain haphazard and time consuming for all parties involved. 
 
6.3 The diffusion of community energy innovations 
Even the FiT, which according to the previous chapter’s arguments constitutes 
a managed niche aimed at providing continuity within a changeable and volatile 
market such as the energy market, has failed to provide the consistency to 
attract sufficient investment to allow progressive technological diffusion. Its 
restriction to 5MW as a small-scale incentive to run alongside the RO, which is 
aimed at larger developments, may actually reduce its niche development 
attributes as the following statement by an expert in renewable energy finance 
indicates. 
The ‘small’ UK FiT is a unique device encouraging the uptake of 
microgeneration and no other country has implemented a similar tariff structure. 
[It] provides greater certainty but it is not a driver for innovation. (Lob1) 
Niche attributes, which according to Kemp et al. (1998) help build constituency 
behind a new technology, in relation to the FiT might not be strongly enough 
defined to allow for a continuous reduction of uncertainty. The applicable scale 
also calls into question any interactive learning processes and institutional 
adaptations necessary to overcome the barriers and (mis-)conceptions 
regarding the properties of renewables beyond the implementation of 
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microgeneration, such as small-scale solar PV. In light of the FiT’s restrictive 
properties, government’s doubtful commitment to multi-scalar approaches of 
renewable energy deployment therefore appear to increase uncertainty. This is 
backed up by the notion that ‘the tail is wagging the dog all the time on policy. 
One gets this sense that whoever calls the shots it’s not government’ (EA4). 
[Government] is in the pocket of the generators, they listen far too much to 
them, they’re funded by them in the sense of, you know, they have to work 
hand in glove with them to the exclusion of the renewable sector, which is just 
as sort of a joke really by the power companies. (Ins5) 
To a certain extent, government admits that this is not entirely exaggerated and 
the comments by the National Grid representative in the previous chapter 
reinforce this notion. As a government representative pointed out, large 
generator’s ‘huge head start in a number of ways [requires communities] to be 
brought up to speed’ (TD4) although ‘if the commercial is taking all the cost and 
all of the risk then they are entitled to a significant proportion of the reward’ 
(TD4). However, it would be unfair to reduce government’s commitment to 
community energy and renewable energy in general to lip service as the 
following statement by the same government representative indicates. 
We need to make sure that we have templates and structures and support in 
place so that communities are not disadvantaged in those negotiations but 
we’re not going to say as a Government it should be 40% or it should be 20% 
because it will all depend on the circumstances, the capacity, the costs for 
developing. [...] It will vary from place to place I think, which makes it much 
harder to regulate and to replicate. (TD4) 
This statement appears to indicate that the niches supporting community 
energy provided by the FiT (and the RHI) are therefore incentives aimed at 
pushing developments towards commercialisation, rather than protecting a 
specific type of development from market pressures. These niches might 
thereby be confined (locked-in) to specific scales and ownership structure. In 
fact, the statement also indicates that it is once more left to the market to decide 
what level of co-ownership and community buy-in is appropriate and the 
unwillingness of government to commit to specific regulation, despite the quote 
in 6.2.4 by the same interviewee claiming the opposite. 
Despite these limitations of the FiT, however, some interviewees are 
nevertheless dependent on the benefits that it provides at the microgeneration 
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scale. Under these diffusion circumstances, the FiT’s innovation attributes apply 
in particular to the potentially socially sustainable uptake of decentralised RETs 
in the niche of community settings, rather than the scalar rollout of renewables 
in general. In light of this capacity, the FiT is considered the single most 
important policy innovation in a governance regime dominated by the liberal 
market framework, which is evident from previous chapters. 
This government is just so private sector oriented. Everything that it does it just 
relies on the private sector. How many incentives can you come across in the 
last 5 years that have come straight from the government that have actually 
benefitted the end user [apart from the feed-in tariff]? (Ins3) 
This potentially beneficial outcome is achieved by encouraging a more 
geographically dispersed uptake of renewables by individuals, households or 
communities previously not engaged in energy provision (HMG, 2009a; DECC, 
2010a). For this aspect of innovation diffusion, the FiT might yet prove useful. 
There might even be certain benefits beyond the socially sustainable uptake of 
renewables as this process necessitates a certain niche diffusion of technology, 
as this following example from a community wind developer indicates. 
Once you get to say a single wind turbine, a 500kW wind turbine or 1.5MW 
wind turbine the feed-in tariff has made that economically viable on more sites 
than it used to be under the ROC system. (MO5) 
Driving the diffusion of proven technologies rather than stimulating technological 
innovation is the key attribute of the UK’s small scale FiT, even though it has 
only remained partially successful to date, as this analysis indicates. This is also 
a point raised by an interviewee propagating inclusive energy generating 
systems based on the diffusion of affordable solar PV. 
I think on the scale of technical PV development, you know it’s a massive 
worldwide industry and I wouldn’t say we’ll be a driver. We are certainly a 
recipient, we’re watching very closely the new thin film and other technologies 
to make sure that we get the best technology in there, but that’s very much as a 
recipient, but [...] we don’t think there were areas where we can drive 
innovation, particularly in relation to smart technologies. (BU5) 
The lack of innovative potential linked to support systems affecting the 
community and microgeneration scale stands in contrast to the ambitious 
learning potentials government is burdening and projecting onto the RO’s 
renewable technology innovation and diffusion scale. With the help of the 
planning system’s bias for large scale development (Pollitt, 2010), the RO is 
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effectively ringfencing renewables beyond the FiT capacity exclusively within 
the realms of utilities financially speaking and increasingly offshore 
geographically speaking (see Chapter 1). In light of the UK’s comparative 
advantage in attracting investors for offshore developments (The Crown Estate, 
2012), this bias potentially represents a consistent commitment to ‘picking 
winners’. This goes back to the aforementioned point that UK renewable energy 
policy represents a two-tier system. However, UK energy policy in general is 
also struggling with competing if not conflicting interests and scales, as this 
interviewee who is an advisor on energy market regulation highlights. 
Trying to unwind these and make the two markets work in parallel and work in 
parallel efficiently, is a bit of a holy grail, really. How can you have nuclear 
power and off shore winds compete on an equal footing with small scale 
decentralised electricity, very difficult basically [as you need to] ensure that 
there’s consumer protection, still ensure that any trading of electricity is viable 
and companies aren’t upsetting the market in way that, you know, would cause 
credit defaults or companies to fail or put unfair burdens on other participants in 
the market so it’s a quite complex balancing act to try to allow these two kinds 
of different approaches to operate in parallel. (TD3) 
The institutional bias towards scale and centralised ownership structures once 
again points towards the FiT representing a (poorly) governed niche within the 
UK’s NEF that is not primarily intended to allow innovations to diffuse beyond its 
limits. The arguments for denying special treatment to, or even political 
acknowledgement of, certain innovation diffusion trajectories and infrastructure 
ownership models where economies of scale do not necessarily apply reflect 
the general organisational bias towards market incumbency and lock-in of 
generation assets, scales and markets (adapted from Fuchs, 2012; Unruh, 
2000). 
 
6.4 Governing diffusion 
As the diffusion of innovations theory within this analysis explains diffusion rates 
through characteristics of the innovation and the surrounding social system 
(Wolfe, 1994), the capacity of UK energy governance in encouraging or 
discouraging technological and social innovation is once again put into context 
in the following sections by comparing it to energy governance structures in 
other social systems. Despite the difficulties associated with international 
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comparisons (as highlighted in Chapter 1-3), they can nevertheless provide an 
insight into what trajectories policy innovations can follow in order to challenge 
incumbencies not necessarily beneficial to tackling transnational objectives 
beyond the traditional remit of national energy and policy frameworks. 
 
6.4.1 Regulatory state diffusion facilitators 
A lot has been written about the relative success of various forms of community 
and decentralised energy provision in other European countries. Denmark and 
Germany in particular regularly feature in the academic literature surrounding 
this topic as their national policy frameworks provide more certainty and better 
coordination in relation to support structures (see Chapters 1,2 and 3). 
It is just built in from the beginning and in Denmark it is that they have a strong 
history of cooperative ownership of assets, same with farms and community 
buildings and so it was just a natural development to do that with wind energy, 
for example. [...] We don’t have the kind of cultural attachment, the cooperative 
ownership structures as they do in Denmark, in spite of what a lot of NGOs are 
saying we just don’t do things like that here. It would be nice if we did but we 
don’t. (BU9) 
As this head of a sustainable energy agency points out, the UK has been 
comparatively less successful at decentralising energy production due to the 
absence of structures that allow certain ownership structures of energy 
generation assets to thrive. As mentioned above, the UK’s energy market 
structurally favours large scale developments, with the result that its community 
energy niche is patchy, slow to develop and at a negligible scale. Part of this 
development dichotomy can be linked to a lack of political backing for smaller 
scales and alternative ownership structures as the intra-UK comparison 
between England, Scotland and Wales indicates. This is of particular interest as 
these countries within the UK are linked through energy policy and governance 
regimes, even though specific regional and local support frameworks for 
specific development scales apply. 
Scotland already has support mechanisms for local communities and they are 
very well aware that renewable energy supports local communities to stay 
where they are, so they are using it and it is profitable, it makes money. (MO4) 
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The UK government is also well aware of the potentials and possibilities within 
the UK energy policy and planning framework to facilitate community energy 
development, as this statement by a government representative indicates. 
If you look at the Scottish and Welsh examples, they’ve developed a lot of their 
community energy through Community Development Trusts, where there is a 
blueprint for the spend of the money before there is the money. The whole 
community engagement happens around the vision for the community and the 
renewable energy is much more about how does that fit in and how does that 
finance some of the things that we can’t do otherwise rather than the whole 
argument about whether it’s worth that we should be doing something on 
climate change. There is a much wider context within those community 
development trusts that places renewable energy within a context that is much 
more palatable to a far greater number of the communities. (TD4) 
The economic regeneration benefits associated with the diffusion of 
decentralised energy provision innovations have therefore been recognised in 
Scotland, and to a lesser extent in Wales, and many change agents and 
intermediaries lobbying for this scale of energy generation argue that it is 
exactly this realisation that enables community energy to flourish. Despite the 
more beneficial landscape of provision for the development of community 
energy in Scotland, however, issues still remain regarding replicability. Its niche 
of community energy remains structurally dependent on a framework focussing 
more on short-term market dynamisms that provide occasional stepping stones 
towards development, rather than a stabilising governance framework. 
[Scottish community energy projects] haven’t led to down the scale of replicable 
models because they have been grant funded and the communities have done 
it themselves and once they have looked after themselves they are happy so 
there is no cumulative capacity being built and there is no one successful 
project that doesn’t need some money for the next one and you’ve just got the 
situation of all this interest in community energy, everyone just scrapping for 
tiny amounts of grant money and competition finance and there is no real 
market for it. (MO5) 
Grant funding, as mentioned in the previous chapter, potentially widens the gap 
between communities as it excludes those communities not fortunate enough to 
receive funding, despite the comparative success of community energy projects 
based on their availability. Arguably the FiT can also widen the gap between 
communities as the capacity to exploit its possibilities more often than not 
depends on access to change agents with sufficient knowledge and skills, which 
is evident from Chapter 5. Despite its shortfalls, however, the FiT is creating 
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more sustainable support and growing interest in this scale of generation in both 
England and Scotland is proof of its capacity to sustain support. 
 
6.4.2 Regulatory state diffusion niches 
Grant eligibility and FiT access and eligibility nevertheless require a review 
concerning fairness and equality. Grant funding support tends to help primarily 
established organisations and communities and limits replicability to similarly 
established organisations and communities. The FiT, according to Park 
(2011b), is also ‘not useful for people with less capacity’ but this access to 
capacity issue might be more of a structural issue. 
If the FiT was primarily a regulatory measure for medium size (community) 
energy developments, [...] the wind FiT, for instance, would have to be higher in 
relation to the PV FiT. In some countries, particularly France, this is already 
done to an extent. (Lob1) 
The main benefits of the FiT are that it provides both contractual certainty over 
income and an interface with the energy market. It can also attract external 
finance to provide a solid foundation for internal cash flow (Lob1). As previously 
mentioned, however, the diffusion potential of the UK FiT is restricted by its 
scalar restriction. This is also evident from the following example from a 
representative of a social enterprise fostering the development of community 
energy projects. 
Our model is focused on a funded programme, rather than simply a delivery 
mechanism that the customer can finance, and then if you are funding [...] our 
funders need to be very comfortable with the risk profile that’s being taken on. 
And PV is fundamentally, at this point, more predictable in terms of the risk 
profile that it represents than wind is. (BU5) 
Once again this shows how the FiT in the UK diffuses innovations primarily in 
relation to technological simplicity, rather than maturity (adapted from Rogers, 
1995). This statement also highlights the difficulty of achieving scale in 
community settings. Wind would be the obvious technology if communities were 
to provide a serious contribution to renewable energy generation but the 
planning risks beyond the scope of energy policy still imply that potentially less 
efficient and more expensive choices are made. As long as this is not 
addressed, community energy in the UK can be questioned regarding its overall 
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contribution to the transition to a low-carbon economy and climate change 
mitigation. 
The question is at what point does renewable energy become less cost 
effective than a new cycle route or a community bus scheme that reduces 
carbon through an alternative to energy, transport being the most obvious 
because we have the biggest problems reducing the carbon emissions from 
transport. [...] There are some issues around that and as we go forward to 2050 
and the 80% target, what does community energy’s role in that play? (TD4) 
An integrated long-term strategy should place community energy within a 
broader framework of carbon reduction but the competitive framework 
dominating the energy market fails to take anything but the perceived need to 
‘keep the lights on’ with a financial bottom-line in mind into account. As long as 
this paradigm prevails, it remains to be seen in how far new scales of 
generation can be considered a serious option for both renewable energy 
generation and the development of local capacities to deliver and maintain 
technologies, thereby contributing to the creation of jobs and support for a local 
green economy (adapted from Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
  
6.4.3 International innovation diffusion niches 
Based on the statement that ‘you couldn’t say that compared to some other 
European countries that we have a generally supportive policy environment’ 
(BU6), the following comparison places the UK’s support system relating to 
community energy in a European context. The UK FiT may have obvious 
similarities with the FiT systems in other countries, as it is designed to reflect, if 
not replicate, the successful rollout of renewables in countries that pioneered 
this support mechanism (HMG, 2009a). The FiT-pioneers, however, have been 
crucial for pushing the price of RETs ever closer towards grid parity (Mondoca, 
2007) but this learning process is not necessarily linear as many factors 
determine the diffusion beyond financial limitations and viability. 
In the solar PV sector it is likely that costs will drop when a FiT is in place. 
However, for other technologies this is less likely as PV follows the price of 
silicate while the price of other technologies relies more on economies of scale, 
which is not always possible considering restricted resources or space for their 
provision. [...] At the same time, the government expects the cost of 
technologies to drop. (Lob1) 
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In the UK, the recent introduction of the FiT compared to its European 
counterparts limits its scope in many ways. This relates to the 5MW cap as well 
as the lack of regulatory co-evolutions that allow FiT scale technologies to 
diffuse successfully in other countries. Certain national decentralised energy 
diffusion systems are therefore proving more successful at diversifying scales 
and ownership structures, although the exact enablers are difficult to pinpoint. 
We have got a feed in tariff, which is higher in kilowatt hours than in Germany, 
we have got solar resources that are comparable to Germany, wind resources 
that are probably twice as good as Germany, we have got farms so therefore 
we have AD resources. [...] If you compare the elements that have made it 
possible in Germany and the elements that, of those elements which are in 
place here the answer is most of them are in place so the next question is 
which are the missing ones and why are they missing and where the elements 
are in place why are they not working. Why are local authorities not managing 
to do what they have done in Germany? Why are these Quangos not being 
successful as they are in Germany? (MO5) 
In other words: what specific circumstances allow certain technological and 
associated social innovations to diffuse? The argument made by this community 
wind energy advocate singles out the local authorities as barriers to innovation 
diffusion relating to renewable energy but the problem of lacking interaction 
between public and private sectors in driving innovation is not only confined to 
local authorities. It is also necessary to bear in mind that direct comparisons 
such as this example need to be treated with caution, as is evident from 
Chapter 1. 
[The feed-in tariff] is what Germany’s had [...] but we are twenty years too late 
to have all those other things grow as part of the industry alongside the support 
mechanism that was in effect when most of the development was being done 
by smaller community based groups and actually, I think, if you look over the 
history, the big utilities tended to come in quite late into the renewables market 
in Germany relative to it, but Germany is still putting in more wind capacity per 
year than we are. [...] By putting the feed in tariff in place now it’s important but 
there is still a lack of attention to all the other components that therefore haven’t 
emerged that did emerge in Germany because the feed in tariff was in there 
from the beginning so you had a very low risk process. (BU9) 
The co-evolutionary process of policy, demand and the diffusion of RETs 
described by this sustainable energy agency representative has therefore 
created a self-reinforcing system that transcends the surrounding NEF and 
associated governance arrangements. Even Germany’s spatial planning has ‘a 
kind of economic development industrial policy feel about it’ (BU9). In contrast, 
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UK planning and energy policy fail to take potential knock-on effects into 
account. Other policy objectives, such as economic development and the 
diversification of the economic production base are therefore not integrated. 
The result is that ‘in terms of production [...] we are just covering our arses 
basically’ (BU9), a sentiment held by many of the interviewees as the following 
quote indicates. 
I think we’re stuffed when it comes to manufacturing in this country so I don’t really 
hold out much hope [for turbine manufacturing]. (Ins2) 
A holistic approach rather than the technocratic approach which focuses 
narrowly on getting ‘kit in the ground’ (BU9) might address both multi-scalar 
potentials of decentralised energy provision as well as the economic production 
and regeneration potential. 
There are probably going to need to be changes to the way the industry is 
regulated at present, just basically to facilitate that, because quite often these 
are non-energy-experts, they’re not large multinational companies with teams of 
lawyers and specialists and the industry really, the actual rules and governance 
arrangements are not particularly suitable at the moment to make that an easy 
option for people to pursue. It’s possible and some changes have been 
introduced recently, although they haven’t been tested but my personal opinion 
is that more needs to be done to make the conditions easier to allow the sort of 
ESCos to flourish at a local level. (TD3) 
Increasing interconnection with other European countries as proposed by the 
proponents of a European Supergrid (SUSPLAN, 2011) is also not likely to 
happen within the current political decision-making timeframe as ‘judging on the 
history of how European legislation and regulation has developed, it’s a very 
slow and arduous process’ (TD3). The UK NEF focus hereby represents a very 
confined market-based technological facilitation process as examples from 
other countries indicate that an environment nurturing the development of 
community and decentralised energy provision as well as energy efficiency can 
be established and fostered through policy and regulation. 
It’s very difficult to rely on an individual sector to have a real vision of what the 
potential could be. They don’t think in terms of community empowerment, it 
doesn’t compute for them. It doesn’t address the potential to deliver services 
this way unless it’s for their balance sheet. It also has a habit of crowding out 
other types of innovation. [...] If the government is concerned about the lack of 
competition and transparency from the Big Six they then appeal to people in 
other sectors and small energy companies to step in and the first thing those 
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energy companies say is ‘we can’t compete on price, all we can offer is a better 
service’. (EA4) 
What this implies is that the UK’s energy policy landscape is characterised by a 
lack of coordination regarding (minimal) top-down command and control 
regulation, market-based instruments incentivising change and ‘good 
governance’ related instruments encouraging more bottom-up approaches 
through empowerment as is more common practice in other European countries 
(adapted from Vaze and Tindale, 2011, Toke, 2005a). Their niches for various 
scales of decentralised energy sometimes take the form of regional 
protectionism. Chapter 5 indicates the difficultly of setting up local or regional 
supply chains for renewable energy deployment, in this particular case solar 
PV, while some regions in Spain specify the share of regional economic benefit 
from new wind developments. 
In Spain, bless them, they took a very parochial approach to the planning and 
procurement rules and basically developed an industrial and planning strategy 
that sat alongside each other such that in each region planning was entirely 
linked to the sourcing of renewable energy kit, so if you want to build a wind 
farm in Galicia you have to source 65 or 70% of the content of the wind farm 
from the manufacturers in Galicia. That kind of builds an economic benefit 
straight away into the construction and the development of the project. (BU9) 
In the UK, on the other hand, much of energy related regulation has been 
postulated as hidden subsidies for nuclear power (Mitchell, 2011) and other 
forms of large scale centralised generation infrastructure. In relation to other 
scales the critical point raised by academics (see Hoggett, 2010) and the 
interviewees alike, as is evident from Chapter 5, is the lack of a government 
backed investment sources. Once more, this is where Germany has 
advantageous structural provisions due to the existence of federal banks. 
The German co-ordinated market economy approach (adapted from Jackson, 
2009) shows how a co-evolution of innovation trajectories, employment patterns 
and financial provisions has distributed responsibilities. In the area of energy 
provision this has fostered innovation in terms of shared responsibilities through 
cooperation at local and regional levels. This stands in contrast to a more 
market liberal approach to economic development in the UK, which is more 
about competition between corporations than cooperation between different 
sectors of the economy (Vaze and Tindale, 2011). 
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I think it will be nice to get to a situation similar to the German situation whereby 
community ownership is driving legislation but we’re a long, long way off that. 
You know if in the UK 1% is community owned then that’s the extent to, being 
cynical, that’s the extent to which our lobbying power rests. (MO4) 
Germany’s presence of a capital market supporting this development trajectory 
by favouring long-term horizons influences the stability of decision-making 
(Nelson et al., 2006). The UK government and its underlying innovation 
framework, on the other hand, prioritises ‘a level playing field’ (TD4; Mitchell, 
2008). Communities within the system of energy provision are therefore not 
entitled ‘to have access to funding that nobody else is enabled to access’ (TD4). 
This is to encourage communities to do ‘the right scale projects in the right 
places with a business plan that is commercially sensible’ (TD4). Policy aims 
should support experimentation and innovation which help to build awareness 
and familiarity of what is possible so local authorities and community groups 
come forward for ideas in support of renewables (Rydin, 2011). 
The whole feed in tariff lobby was built around the premise that Germany has 
managed to deliver a lot of renewables. Why? Because they have got a feed-in 
tariff and the UK government to some extent claims to base its policy in part on 
Germany, yet it chooses to ignore some of the key bits and one of the bits that it 
has ignored is the community angle and the genuine generation angle. (MO5) 
This view from a community wind advocate is not to say that the FiT and energy 
policy in general could not be skewed more in favour of community energy. To 
be successful, not only in getting communities to consider renewable energy 
generation but also in developing meaningful generation scales, tariff levels or 
other forms of incentives would need to differ between household (solar PV) 
scales and collective (wind) implementation scales. 
 
6.5 Consolidating the innovation diffusion niche 
As mentioned above, the concerted approach in other European countries also 
extends to the planning regime. As is evident from Chapter 3, wind farms in 
Germany, for example, are more generally ‘permitted activities’ and in Italy 
regulation also ensures favourable treatment whereas English planning only 
commits itself to ‘a presumption in favour of sustainable development’ (Planning 
Portal, 2012b) without specifying what comprises sustainable development. 
Wind farms might be considered a form of sustainable development but their 
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applications are easily denied through judicial reviews and repeals. This 
problem could be overcome by explicitly including renewables in planning laws. 
Essentially, they ‘should be considered a good idea as long as they are not 
erected in AONBs’ (BU1). The planning procedure could also be sped up at a 
lower cost by excluding judicial reviews. These changes, however, will be of no 
avail as long as industry does not take into account concerns at community 
levels and benefit distribution issues relating to utility driven policy (Lob1). 
Further reasons for the lack of success of community energy projects in the UK 
is the lack of local energy advice centres and the lack of funding for those that 
have been established. Some energy agencies that were set up to support 
charitable organisations or community groups now find themselves competing 
against the companies they were formerly supporting. Examples in the 
Southwest include Regen SW and Community Energy Plus. DECC is ‘95% 
offshore wind’ (BU1) and this implies that they neither have resources nor the 
interest to pave the way for establishing simple and economically viable 
business plans for community energy. 
Other than very small scale trivial applications, those who want to do something 
more substantial, who are not part of the central generation and supply process 
will have obstacles put in their place whether explicit or implicit, implicit in terms 
of the detail then the complexity, which means that for example getting the FiT 
for that wind turbine, if I weren’t a very determined person and more 
knowledgeable, although I’m not that knowledgeable, but more knowledgeable 
than most, I probably would of given up because the actual process is firstly 
complex and is handled by people who are indifferent and incompetent both 
and who have no wish in facilitating the process. So that will continue to be the 
experience which means that if you want to do something you essentially do it 
not despite the policy assertions but behind the policy implementation process. 
(EA1) 
The difficulty of facilitating decentralised energy generation is obvious from this 
statement but blaming specific government departments or political decision-
making processes does not provide the solutions to the community energy 
dilemma. Several interviewees pointed out that the real driver for policy 
innovation might be found in the political structures of responsibility at the 
community level itself. 
We assume that it is government policy that has been driving the renewables 
revolution in Germany but it is the other way about, it is community groups that 
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are driving it there. It is community groups that have influenced government 
policy to get the policies they want. (MO4) 
Evidence shows that in Germany, Denmark and Spain, attitudes change along 
with changes in energy derived benefit distribution and the argument of 
communities potentially driving policy innovation might be reinforced if there is a 
genuine possibility of local economic regeneration through ‘area-based 
approaches’ (CAG Consultants, 2010). Changing the model of ownership and of 
local benefits ‘would make a massive difference’ (Lob2), according to a legal 
expert on energy law. 
The possibilities associated with the co-evolution of planning, finance and policy 
is best illustrated with the example of the German federal state of Rheinland-
Pfalz. Its federal social-democrat/green coalition government passed a law 
reducing the restrictions on wind energy developments in order to encourage 
more development of this type. Locally, planning is determined by a land-
use/zoning plan, which is set up, maintained and updated by each local 
authority individually. These local plans replace the old regional plans with 
priority and exclusion zones whereby only the former could be considered for 
the development of wind turbines. The more localised approach enables each 
community to decide on renewable energy planning in accordance to German 
and European land-use and conservations legislation and unlike their English 
counterparts, many do so as it is considered an economic necessity for 
communities struggling with their finances (MO11; Hammermann, 2012; 
Seydewitz, 2010). 
A particular community energy example, the so-called Energielandschaft, or 
‘energy landscape’ in the village of Morbach was developed on a brownfield site 
following unsuccessful attempts to lure in theme park investors in 2002. Initially, 
many farmers were signing concessions for wind farm developers, which at the 
time was causing unease among the wider public. The local authority then 
decided to become an active player in the deployment of RETs and set up a 
local development plan specifically for the development of renewable energy. A 
renewable energy company then decided to invest in wind turbines in the 
Energielandschaft and the local authority contract of lease now guarantees a 
decent six figure income for the local authority. Nowadays, a public-law 
institution would be set up by the local authority to manage the renewable 
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energy developments, which would guarantee even larger incomes. The local 
authority is now considering this option for a new wind farm, which might be a 
host for the new generation E-126 7.5MW wind turbines (MO11). 
 
6.6 FiTs and fuel poverty - Is community energy just for the Muesli-belt? 
Moving away from the upside effects of regulatory intervention, the introduction 
of the FiT as a specific regulatory measure within the framework of energy 
policy also has considerable downside effects. Its potentially beneficial 
capacities of influencing aspects beyond the traditional scope of energy policy, 
including carbon reductions, security of supply and economic regeneration, has 
altered the possibilities for large sections of society to participate in climate 
change action and access local energy derived benefits. However, this stands 
in contrast to more conventional characteristics of energy policy, particularly 
regarding the high FiT levels for solar PV. 
If the purpose of the subsidy is to bring the price down because you don’t do 
that to cut carbon, that’s about the last thing you do to cost curve to cut carbon. 
The point of it is to develop a market and bring the cost down. (BU9) 
This point of view, which was voiced by the head of sustainable energy agency, 
raises the important question of what the consequences of widening 
participation through the FiT is actually achieving, particularly regarding 
community energy. According to Church (2012), it tends to be the well-off 
communities of the ‘Muesli-Belt’ with strong social capital and natural and 
intellectual resources that have sufficient capacities to develop community-led 
RET deployment or at least reap considerable benefits from commercial 
projects developed in close proximity. Geographical communities that do not fit 
this description, on the other hand, are less likely to have either the capacities 
or the financial resources to invest and develop community energy projects that 
go beyond the deployment of solar PV panels nor to benefit from commercial 
developments. At worst, the FiT can be therefore be interpreted as a measure 
soaking ‘up an awful lot of money to feed very rich people making even more 
money out of little old ladies who could ill afford to pay it on their electricity bills’ 
(BU9), without actually contributing significantly to widening participation or 
decarbonising the electricity sector. 
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Arguably, the FiT indirectly excludes non-beneficiaries from its benefits due to 
its regressive nature, rather than providing widespread access to low-carbon 
energy generation. This generally applies to policies designed to target 
emissions through increases in the cost of energy as they disproportionately 
affect lower-income households (Roberts, 2008). Some of the interviewees, on 
the other hand, link potentially different outcomes to the encouraged uptake and 
deployment of renewables, particularly solar PV as this statement by a 
representative from a community interest company indicates. 
If we link smart energy management thinking to PV, well then there’s lots of 
very useful demand management dynamic demand mechanisms that can help 
more of the PV generated power will be used locally, less of it to be wasted to 
grids, and more of the grid imbalances to be evened out if you like. (BU5) 
What is interesting about solar PV in relation to misdistribution arguments is the 
way other countries have gone about issues regarding fuel poverty. In 
Germany, for example, fuel poverty has not really entered the political arena as 
welfare recipients get their entire energy bills paid for by the state, even though 
some recipients of social welfare are getting their supplies cut off as they can ill 
afford rising energy prices (Der SPIEGEL, 2012). The German Housing 
Assistance Act also supports the renovation of buildings inhabited by low-
income families with loans and credits (FinSH, 2010). These measures provide 
a means of addressing long-term fuel poverty issues but they do not alleviate 
fuel poverty resulting from higher energy bills which are linked to deployment 
support mechanisms, particularly regarding households that do not, or do not 
chose to receive social welfare. In Belgium, low-income households receive an 
energy allowance for free, sufficient to maintain basic services and a basic 
standard of living (Elbe and Neubacher, 2011; Tindale and Vaze, 2011). Energy 
policy related knock-on effects on fuel poverty in the UK can therefore at least 
partly be put down to the general lack of a strategic approach, particularly 
concerning longer term measures such as housing quality (Snodin, 2008), as 
well as more general issues of inequality. 
The issue of energy policy effectively subsidising those who can afford access 
by pushing more households into fuel poverty is an issue that might be 
addressed by a combination of green deal measures and a more favourable 
treatment of specifically low-income focussed solar PV schemes. It is also an 
issue of scale as purely commercial installers rolling out rent-a-roof schemes 
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are unlikely to provide more than free electricity in return for a roof lease. More 
socially inclined developers, on the other hand, will provide a greater stake in 
generation by lowering fuel bills as well as providing free electricity (EA4, Ins4). 
Ironically, their scope for action, as is evident from Chapter 5, is entirely FiT 
dependent. A line therefore needs to be drawn where FiT beneficiaries, 
including community groups, make windfall profits thanks to inappropriate tariff 
levels. 
It’s still a misdistribution of the benefits and [...] if you want to invest community 
aimed money into renewables. [...] I also think there is a limit how many times 
you can go “Well, maybe slightly different rule for community owned stuff” [...] 
I’m afraid I’m not going to lose a lot of tears or sleep over the fact there is some 
community share issues that were reliant on getting massive subsidiaries [...] 
We need to complete the circle in terms of thinking about it. [...] It would be 
better if people were thinking about wind projects. (BU9) 
The same change agent also runs workshops in communities which revolve 
more around the question of “How can we best make our contribution to a low 
carbon future round here?” rather than “What are you going to do about cutting 
carbon emissions?” With the help of an architectural model, which has a mixed 
urban/rural landscape along with various types of renewables built around it, 
people start making trade-offs between available options. This frames the space 
for action and discussion and encourages people to build ‘focus [which] helps 
tap their best and uplifting spirit rather than at worst rejecting “not around here” 
kind of spirit’ (BU9). These sessions deliver evidence that ‘applying localism 
with a low carbon tinge work and there are signs that if you think about Big 
Society and that need to regenerate the social processing and relationship with 
energy policy you can get a lot further’ (BU9). A similar point is made in relation 
to economic development by a community representative. 
It seemed more auspicious to promote the economic benefits of a low carbon 
economy and that is based upon the view that energy is something completely 
mundane and that people simply require the ‘where-with-all’ to do things which 
is all energy is, and so it’s not a technical issue it’s not a marginal issue it’s a 
completely main stream issue embedded in the socio-cultural and economic 
environment. (EA1) 
This is a crucial point in relation to energy related decision-making in the UK. It 
appears as though the FiT represents lip-service to energy related 
empowerment while the scales promoted and achieved by the overarching 
agenda of market liberalisation disconnect the population from energy 
194 
 
generation. The process of offshoring renewable energy development might be 
further proof of this development, which appears to be promoting an ‘out-of-
sight out-of-mind’ approach to energy generation in line with a BAU approach 
required to keep people spending. If the UK is seriously committed to the 
diffusion of RETs below the large (and mostly offshore) utility scale of 
generation it therefore needs to change its approach, ranging from the NEF 
surrounding planning to the FiT itself. 
If you want to be serious you need to look at what the major league players 
have invested. Look at what the Germans have invested in their feed-in tariff 
and it’s a lot more than £900m. If you want to be a serious player it’s going to 
cost you some serious money. (Pla1/TD1) 
This cap reduces the FiT’s impact on fuel poverty but it fails to address the 
difficulty of encouraging onshore diffusion of large-scale RETs as required to 
achieve carbon reduction commitments. The space requirements for larger RET 
scales, particularly wind, on the other hand, imply that rural areas have a 
greater opportunity to act. This is also where a disproportionate share of fuel 
poor households in the UK is located (Baker et al., 2008). The comparatively 
few sources of income in rural areas suggest that the deployment of RETs can 
diversify the income resource base, promote resilience as well as provide some 
local relief from fuel poverty (Snodin, 2008). It is also questionable in how far 
the FiT cap represents a key driver for keeping fuel poverty below a certain 
threshold as by comparing Germany, Denmark, Spain and the UK, Snodin 
(2008) discovered that there is no association between high levels of fuel 
poverty and high renewable energy penetration levels linked to support policies 
such as FiTs. 
 
6.7 The diffusion of policy innovation 
The complexity of support mechanisms implies that it is difficult to quantify the 
direct effects of the diffusion of these scalar technologies on society as a whole 
in terms of costs. It is generally accepted that offshore wind will remain more 
expensive than onshore wind for the foreseeable future but economies of scale 
are likely to reduce the costs in the long term (Moore, 2011; UKERC, 2010; van 
der Zwaan et al., 2012). The same holds true for other offshore RETs. For other 
scales of generation, such as solar PV owned by new market entrants or even 
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private individuals, where the feed-in model appears to be the primary driver, it 
is easier to draw a direct line between technological diffusion and rising energy 
prices. Energy policy’s direct effects on energy prices and rebound effects 
effectively increasing demand, thereby driving up prices, are more difficult to 
quantify and therefore beyond the scope of this analysis. 
It is nevertheless evident from this research that different scales and ownership 
models of RET diffusion rely on different aspects of regulation. For large-scale 
developments, particularly offshore wind, designed and operated by market 
incumbents, the UK’s supposedly competitive market-based framework has 
proven very successful. The success of this scalar technological rollout, 
however, puts into question the underlying currents determining the political 
decision-making process. 
The nature of the regulation in the UK creates these kind of silos that are very 
difficult to break out of. [...] The outcomes of regulation are not always the 
intention. [...] There’s a sense that the level of consultation and involvement just 
feels like lip service. You go along to conferences and events organised by 
DECC and they’re dominated by these young guys from the energy companies 
who seem to be there most of the time to steer the debate and stymie any 
initiative they do not control. (EA4) 
The dominance of market incumbents in terms of the share of electricity they 
generate, as outlined in Chapter 1, as well as their lobbying and overall political 
leverage implies that alterations to the system, such as new ownership 
structures in relation to community energy, pose a threat to the prevailing 
structures. Within this context, community energy might need to be interpreted 
as ‘Trojan horses’ (Allen at al., 2012: 271), threatening the system’s stability. 
Abrupt changes to the regulatory framework surrounding the FiT may therefore 
be attempts to nip community energy development in the bud, as this statement 
by a community energy activist indicates. 
The macro national/international aspects of energy regulation had almost no 
impact on what we’re doing other than informing the background of those of us 
who are interested in those issues. […] So we are straight forwardly exploiting 
as we were instructed to, the potential of the feed-in tariff. […] Now all that 
sense of rationing of the feed-in tariff is of course completely spurious because 
the feed-in tariff is not a tax it has nothing to do with the treasury, nothing to do 
with concerns of DECC or treasury, but the subtle and rather mischievous 
assertion that somehow it relates to issues of national fiscal policy, means that 
there was a legitimisation of essentially undermining a scheme which was 
succeeding. [Chris Huhne] was not protecting the community schemes, he was 
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harming them. […] That is the nature of the regulatory process so I do trust 
regulation to do its implicit best to stop us doing what we’re doing. (EA1) 
According to this point of view, the incumbency dominates every scale and 
structure within the UK’s energy provision system. Even the origins of 
renewable support mechanisms in UK energy policy, such as the RO and the 
preceding NFFO, can be traced back to the incumbency of the system and the 
underlying market liberal paradigm. 
In the UK [...] we had a support mechanism that came out of the back of the 
non-fossil fuel obligation that was designed for nuclear but also then kind of 
wrapped round it all with a neo-liberal market to determine the best outcomes. 
(BU9) 
These statements from interviewees working close to the policy-making scale of 
community energy related decision-making indicate the political determination 
of not openly ‘picking winners’ discussed in earlier chapters although the case 
of offshore wind indicates otherwise. Both the NFFO and the RO were 
apparently ‘just being driven as a facilitation of renewable energy and [they are] 
relatively blind to who it was who was developing [generation infrastructure]’ 
(BU9). The FiT, on the other hand, is less market driven but the political 
commitment to this scale remains questionable, particularly with respect to the 
many reviews and reductions in the overall budget. 
In terms of policy, it’s the standard experience that assertions are made but the 
delivery doesn’t occur whether through successful lobbying by those who are 
hostile to renewables or whether because of some blanket treasury discomfort 
with any sort of decentralised investment. (EA1) 
The UK’s energy policy landscape therefore remains highly skewed towards 
market incumbents. This reinforces notions of lock-in (Unruh, 2000), ranging 
from the likelihood of infrastructure being replaced on a like-for-like basis 
(Fielder, 1996) to policies favouring dominant scales and ownership structures, 
despite obvious failures within the system in delivering overarching objectives. 
What we’ve ended up with is this system where the private sector has 
essentially inherited all that infrastructure but I don’t see any evidence of the 
private sector being highly successful in putting in that infrastructure. They 
didn’t, they’ve benefitted from it but they didn’t make the investment. There’s an 
argument that it takes Government to do major infrastructure projects. (EA4) 
This is not to say that change within the private sector driven energy system is 
not possible or new scales of development or alternative ownership structures 
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unimaginable, although it tends to be the regulatory interventions that set 
change in motion. In particular, certain forms of command and control 
regulation, especially regarding efficiency improvements, appear to be highly 
successful, such as mandating condensing boilers (Pearson and Watson, 2012; 
see also Chapter 2). Another example of successful command and control 
regulation relating to environmental legislation at a local authority level is the 
introduction of the Landfill Allowance and Trading Scheme (LATS), even though 
it is scheduled to run out after the 2012/2013 year in England (DEFRA, 2012). 
Introduced on 1 April 2005 it enables the trading, banking and borrowing of 
allowances by all waste disposal authorities. By diverting waste from landfill, 
surplus allowances can be sold to generate income while reducing the total 
amount of waste sent to landfill. The financial incentive encourages the amount 
of landfill waste to be considerably reduced and if appropriate mechanism could 
be transferred to the energy system it might spark the development of regional 
utilities, the lack of which ‘can be considered a market failure’ (Lob1). 
I think the cold hard fact is that if you just let the invisible hand of the free 
market continue without any centralised direction, we, the country, would not 
get the level of investment in low carbon generation of any scale that the 
government requires to meet the targets. (TD3) 
Evidence throughout this thesis suggests that this point has been recognised by 
government and a more controlled approach to energy policy in the UK is 
underway. Shifting the focus on security of supply and low-carbon generation in 
its broadest sense is concentrating efforts and scales on the development of 
nuclear, CCS and renewables, whereby renewables are split up between 
biomass and offshore wind. Nevertheless, uncertainties even among the 
consortiums aiming for the development of new nuclear power in the UK and 
the ongoing difficulties of launching a competition for CCS are increasing 
uncertainty (Harvey, 2012; Thorpe, 2012), rather than encouraging investment 
as envisaged by government. However, energy policy remains focused on 
these areas with little scope for support regarding the development of more 
decentralised scales and ownership structures. 
The government’s made it relatively clear that it’s going to have to be very 
roughly a lot of new nuclear to replace our existing fleets, bucket loads of off 
shore winds because that’s where the wind is, significant amounts of gas, still, 
because not only for the security of supply reasons so we have diversity of 
supply, but it’s all just the nature of the generation itself. I mean nuclear is just 
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baseload. You can’t turn it up and down quickly, wind only works when it’s 
windy, but gas is the sort of the flexible back up source that can meet peak 
demand when the wind isn’t blowing, but equally, there’s still potentially a role 
for carbon capture and storage which may mean the coal stations are working 
so where does that leave decentralised electricity? Well you know, whatever’s 
left at the end of the day. (TD3) 
The benefits of this large scale bias engrained in UK energy policy, on the other 
hand, are that the associated planning procedures for developments exceeding 
50MW, as elaborated on in Chapter 3, are considered to be of strategic national 
importance. Resulting planning procedures do not require local decision making 
processes as proposed in the Localism Act. This allows for fast-track planning 
decision-making but it puts into question government’s overall commitment to 
public engagement. 
Consultation? It’s like saying I’m the king, I’ll make the decision at the end of the 
day anyway so what’s the point? There’s absolutely no point, is there! (Ins5) 
In fact, government appears to be moving away from public engagement and 
consultations despite previous planning procedures necessitating local 
consultation in the past, both for centralised as well as community scale 
projects (Pla2/TD5). It is therefore becoming increasingly obvious that 
government is concentrating its policy innovation and technological diffusion 
efforts in areas of energy policy and generation where immediate results are 
most likely to emerge, as this statement by an energy agency representative 
indicates. 
Their strategy appears to us, working on the ground, is to influence the targets 
that they have the most influence over so we’re seeing a large roll out of 
offshore renewables, particularly offshore wind where there’s the ability to get 
large GWs of installed capacity. (MO9) 
The commitment to smaller scales or different ownership models ranks 
accordingly low in government priority as it requires a holistic approach which is 
unlikely to suit the market liberal domination of the regulatory state paradigm 
(Mitchell, 2008). On comparing O’Brien and Hope (2010) with this approach to 
community and decentralised energy it once more becomes evident that 
community energy can itself be seen as a by-product of a two tier-system within 
the two-tier system of UK energy policy. 
 
199 
 
6.8 The diffusion of social innovations: How to go about setting up successful 
community development in the UK 
The question remains how community energy can become established within 
the UK’s NEF and its governance arrangements. Without the backdrop of a 
structural support framework beneficial towards the development of various 
scales and ownership models of decentralised renewable energy 
developments, the success of community energy often depends on 
advantageous local and structural circumstances, such as the availability of 
change agents, resources and skills, as analysed in Chapter 5. 
My question back to local authorities, to government and private sectors is ‘how 
can we get communities over that initial hurdle to realise that real exciting 
potential that is there in terms of community enterprise?’ Partly this is at-risk 
finance but it’s also about being clever from a policy point of view about how 
policies develop so it doesn’t have unintended consequences. (EA3) 
As this community developer points out, it is not a lack of interest at the 
community level but rather the lack of consistent provisions and adequate 
support frameworks which would allow the diffusion of new technological 
innovation scales to be considered. The barriers to development, however, 
extend as far as the lack of an official recognition and definition of community 
scale renewable energy, as this statement by a government official indicates. 
Communities turn around to me and say ‘well, where do we fit in?’ ‘Well, you’re 
non domestic because you’re more than one house at a time’ but it doesn’t feel 
as if they belong anywhere because they are talking about doing lots of 
domestic. [...] So in terms of policy I think there is language gap. [...] They really 
haven’t developed a language or mechanism or an understanding of the 
business to community or the government to community dialogue. It’s a new 
area, potentially, that needs to be explored in how do you communicate with 
them so that they feel empowered, part of the agenda because they don’t 
necessarily fit into the old style labels that we have. (TD4) 
This statement indicates the lack of government understanding of development 
scales that cannot be determined by an invisible hand approach (with added 
consumer protection) to the energy market. A centralised support framework is 
essential to allow an appropriate legal and financial framework to develop. 
Arguably, the UK’s market-based as opposed to a holistic SNM approach to 
decentralised energy is easier for government to regulate and with this 
framework currently (and structurally) being favoured, the success of 
community energy more often than not depends on the organisational model of 
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change agent support. Many of the interviewees working towards the bottom-up 
and middle-out scale of development are currently following this pathway 
towards change in order to deal with the shortfalls of the system regarding 
structured support. 
My personal thing is [that] a good combination of a social enterprise working in 
partnership with local community groups that are also set up as social 
enterprises and then bringing in the money, the delivery partners and all the 
other stakeholders [...] is the right way to do [community energy]. [...] You need 
social enterprise organisations as a kind of interlacing and the driver behind it 
and they can be backed up by massive PV firms and big utilities but to get the 
trust at a local level I think it helps to have a smaller friendly social enterprise. 
(MO5) 
Their direct connection to the local community is essential for the development 
of trusted relationships between the public and what might be viewed as entirely 
commercially oriented enterprises using the community as a vehicle to get 
planning consent. Overarching organisations that pool the capacities of change 
agents and their organisations therefore represent the next step towards a 
structured support framework, despite the remaining issue of the missing link 
between top-down regulation and bottom-up desires. 
There are bits where it makes sense to run things centrally and so on, the 
community support side where Communities4Renewables is going, it is going to 
perform a number of functions. The website which will help people get going 
understanding what their options are, technology options, how to set up a 
group, set up a business plan and part of the guidance for setting up a group 
will be saying “Look you need this range of people” and most communities have 
them in one form or another but it might not occur to a bunch of retired 
engineers that when they first start setting up that actually they need to find 
someone who understands facebook and they need to find someone who is 
with the local council and that kind of thing. Then there is the shared resources 
pool of shared resources, cumulative knowledge building and then the lobbying, 
the national level and local level, developing an enabling policy, all those kind of 
things which create the viable environment for community energy. And then 
there is a more kind of hands on role that is needed which is what I have done 
with [one community], which is once you have got a group set up with some 
kind of vision and the right sort of team you actually need someone who knows 
what they are doing, sat with them for a year two years helping them make it 
happen. (MO5) 
This guidance to the development of a community energy support framework 
was provided by a community wind energy advocate working with a social 
enterprise business model. It works entirely within the current framework of 
regulation, planning and finance and the ambitions of both the change agents 
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and the community are of a scale rarely considered in the UK. It partly leads on 
from the recognition, as anticipated by government, that ‘in terms of investment 
other than the capital costs, the planning costs, the feasibility costs, most of 
those are not proportional and therefore you may as well be doing 8MW rather 
than 1MW’ (TD4). This form of support advocated by this community wind 
developer also avoids all the pitfalls relating to the wheel-reinvention associated 
with many community energy projects in the UK (EA2). This problem has also 
been recognised by government as this provides the opportunity to show 
commitment towards community energy without altering the overriding principle 
of a level playing field. 
We are talking to Carbon Leapfrog about it. It’s this charity that has done some 
work, and we are talking to them about whether or not, where they’ve got heads 
of terms, the IPR rules and some of the business planning, that they can make 
them available on an open source kind of basis so that communities can take 
them to their local solicitors and have them tailored but knowing that there is a 
sound legal basis for the context of the document. [...] The problem is, as 
always, most lawyers keep the IPR and therefore are not available on an open 
source and we are looking at ways to try to make it more available as one of the 
measures to support community energy. (TD4) 
Encouraging a more open-source approach allows more communities to 
engage with and consider the option of implementing something at the bottom-
up scales of community energy. However, it fails to address the middle-out 
scale, including projects with local authority involvement, and government is still 
undecided regarding a framework capable not only of supporting a wide range 
of bottom-up models but also of scales between the bottom-up to the top-down. 
[We] are talking about two different elements, one for the local authorities and 
one for the communities because the procurement rules, the legals, the 
financials are all very different for both those two groups so you need to provide 
replicability for each of them. (TD4) 
Local authority involvement is essential when considering communities with 
transient populations and a less geographically bound populace. In order to 
enable community energy to develop in urban settings, organisational forms 
might therefore need to move away from geographically bound investment 
models. People who live in London might be more willing to invest in a 
community wind scheme in Cornwall, where their second home might be 
located, rather than in a neighbourhood in scheme in London where the urban 
environment provides fewer incentives and possibilities to generate significant 
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amounts of energy than rural environments. This would also promote the idea of 
rural energy landscapes providing (renewable) energy to urban 
conglomerations (TD4).  
Local authorities could provide guarantees that would make this form of 
investment more attractive. Local ownership, on the other hand, provides a 
better framework for retaining benefits in the areas where generation facilities 
are located. By retaining business rate revenues from new renewable energy 
projects (i.e. local tax that is paid by the occupiers of all non-domestic/business 
property), local authorities would also have a greater stake in promoting their 
development and in encouraging community generation. This might also 
encourage a more balanced distribution of benefits. The Committee on Climate 
Change advised on targets for councils (CCC, 2012b) and this is seen by some 
as a further incentive for local authorities to consider the possibilities provided 
by local energy generation. Similarly, an introduction of a duty on councils to 
draw up climate action plans would encourage a local stake in development 
(Lob2). 
 
6.9 The diffusion of renewable energy and associated social practices 
induced by regulatory incentives: A concerted transition effort or just the 
icing on the cake? 
It is clear from most of the statements and opinions within this and the previous 
analysis chapter that there is a missing link between community interest and 
government facilitation. In the table on the following page (Shaw, 2011: 17), 
which shows how increasing equity implies higher risk and higher return, this 
missing link is the ‘joint venture with equity partner’ in the middle. 
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For most communities the ‘self-develop’ option is not possible due to missing 
capacities, both in terms of expertise and at-risk finance while the ‘sell land 
option/lease’ tends to put communities at a disadvantage in light of the 
bargaining power of large utilities. It is therefore necessary to develop 
capacities of intermediary change agent bodies capable of bridging this divide 
as it is the most promising option for the diffusion of decentralised RET 
innovations necessary for the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
For speed and scale, it does need to be private investment, as […] there is 
scope to build, in the medium term, rather than this year, investment coming in 
from the communities themselves, but we’re not doing that on day one. (BU5) 
The FiT plays an important role in pushing communities to consider the self-
develop option in favour of the sell land/ lease option but it fails to adequately 
empower communities or other decentralised developers with the capacities to 
go for scales even remotely capable of scratching the dominant energy 
policy/infrastructure paradigm. Its small scale and alien ideology within the UK 
NEF imply that associated developments are likely to remain a niche within the 
niche of renewable energy. In general, however, it is difficult to assess what 
exactly the principles behind potential outcomes resulting from certain pieces of 
energy policy and regulation are, particularly in light of a dynamic governance 
framework that appears to be taking new principles aboard that were not 
previously considered part of the remit of energy governance. 
Figure 6.2: Scales of decentralised development (adapted from Shaw, 2011) 
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This analysis points towards the situation whereby government considers 
community energy as a niche not worthy of mainstreaming and constant 
reviews of the FiT and planning policy reinforce this notion. Big Society appears 
to imply that citizens should take a bigger role in shaping their future but energy 
appears to be exempt although this is an area where a great variety of 
engagement practices has sprung up in recent years. However, attracting public 
support is vital for the development of a low-carbon infrastructure as part of the 
transition to a low carbon economy which is not only based on technological 
fixes but also aims at meaningfully engaging people both in the consumption 
and generation of electricity in order to provide a basis for demand reduction 
and the re-evaluation of what centralised energy infrastructure dependence 
implies in a resource constrained world. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
7 Introduction 
Following the aims and objectives laid out in the introduction, this thesis 
covered a wide range of issues surrounding the governance of community 
energy, its embeddedness within the UK NEF as well as the capacity of the FiT 
to encourage the development and sustaining of community energy related 
diffusion of technological and social innovations. Starting with the position of 
decentralised electricity generation infrastructure in a European context and the 
constraints that characterise systemic infrastructures in the introductory chapter, 
various theories surrounding the governance of energy, technological diffusion 
and social innovation were evaluated in order to determine the particularities of 
the NEF in which community energy is embedded in the UK. The policy 
framework chapter narrowed the focus of the thesis on support policies for 
renewable energy, particularly the FiT, while the methodology chapter 
described the methods used for the analysis of community energy and change 
agents within the UK NEF. The analysis chapters interwove concepts of 
previous chapters with practical issues surrounding the challenges that energy 
activists and change agents are confronted with in the development of 
community energy projects. 
 
7.1 Discussion of aims and objectives 
This following three sections show how the objectives from the introduction 
were met through this thesis’ analyses. This is followed by the discussion of 
theories which indicates how they feeds back into theoretical concepts of 
change and governance. The conclusion ties these together to form a section 
resembling a policy recommendation. The final section takes a more reflective 
and critical view on issues surrounding growth economies and systems of 
energy provision and also includes a recommendation regarding further 
research requirements. 
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7.1.1 First objective – To identify how energy policy, specifically the feed-in 
tariff and the surrounding national energy framework, influence the 
diffusion of community energy 
The analysis of the first objective of this thesis, the identification of how energy 
policy, specifically the FiT and the surrounding NEF, influence the diffusion of 
community energy points towards complex interactions between the NEF and 
community action. However, thanks to the interviewee’s varied approaches to, 
and experiences of, both energy policy, particularly the FiT, and community 
energy, they have provided this thesis with valuable insights into the intricacies 
of community energy development and the governance thereof. 
The diffusion of community energy is currently inhibited by many aspects 
relating to the FiT and the surrounding NEF despite increasing recognition of 
the technological and social innovation capacities associated with decentralised 
energy. As a result, the UK community energy agenda is currently being driven 
primarily by energy activists and change agents aiming to increase ownership 
and retention of benefits derived from electricity generation locally. 
Those in favour of a bottom-up approach would like to see the provision of 
government backed capital to overcome the at-risk stage of development, the 
expansion of the definition of ‘permitted development’, a specific FiT that would 
only apply to constituted community groups and the retaining of business rates 
to encourage community energy generation. Those in favour of a more top-
down commercial community energy approach tend to be more supportive of 
hybrid organisational models or commercial developments with community 
benefits a necessity for any scale of renewable energy development as they 
encourage societal acceptance of unavoidable yet necessary developments. 
The FiT plays a crucial role in the development of community-led energy 
business models as well as innovative top-down engagement practices at the 
community level in general. Many of the interviewees consider the FiT, leaving 
the uncertainties aside for the moment, the first concerted policy effort by 
government to provide a niche that allows energy generation and ownership of 
renewable energy technologies to develop beyond the locked-in and path-
dependent dominance of incumbents and the exclusively top-down approach to 
energy provision. By breaching traditional producer/consumer divides, the FiT 
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also provides the relative freedom to develop experimental and innovative 
business and investment models that might have the potential to be replicated 
in other geographical settings while driving technological learning towards 
efficiencies also at the lower end of the scale of energy generation. 
More critical voices would like to see the FiT more geared towards innovation 
by making it time limited and by introducing degression to ensure that the 
supply chain is not fed unduly as prices follow the general degressing trend. 
Priority should lie in driving prices of technology towards grid parity as soon as 
possible to get as many technologies to the commercial stage rather than 
providing an expensive subsidy not only for communities in the ‘Muesli-Belt’ but 
also for better-off households and businesses to effectively just engage with 
energy and benefit from local generation. This is of particular importance to 
those concerned that the combined output of FiT eligible technologies is likely to 
be negligible in the bigger picture and to those who would like to see priority 
given to the eradication of social issues such as fuel poverty rather than the 
provision of ‘the icing on the cake’. There might also be better ways of reducing 
carbon emissions and engaging people in energy issues than the provision of 
windfall profits for those who can afford both the investment and the time 
required to move projects from the planning to the generation stage. 
 
7.1.2 Second objective – To critically examine the role of change agents in 
developing the niche for technological and social innovation 
associated with the diffusion of community energy within a changing 
energy policy landscape embedded in a liberalised energy market 
Moving any non-commercial, especially community-led energy development 
from planning to implementation, however, is heavily reliant on change agents. 
The second objective therefore set out to critically examine their role in 
developing the niche for technological and social innovation associated with the 
diffusion of community energy within a challenging policy environment 
embedded in an unfavourable NEF. The interactions between change agents 
and the NEF in the delivery of community energy as well as for the development 
of appropriate energy policy and government stimulation appears to follow a 
pathway of co-evolution, particularly if government’s role in enabling certain 
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developments or innovation trajectories is interpreted as that of a principal 
facilitator or change agent. 
However, government alone is not entirely responsible, nor capable of providing 
all the requirements of decentralised community energy as various lock-ins and 
path-dependencies have developed over time through complex interactions 
between physical landscapes, infrastructural properties and political feedback 
loops. Various scales between the self-sufficiency focussed off-grid community 
energy development level and transnational climate change mitigation and 
energy security frameworks nevertheless allow for a great diversity of change 
agent and agency foci to influence the trajectory of energy generation and 
consumption in relation to communities. 
Regulation and policy set out by government but ultimately influenced by a 
range of external as well as internal factors is shaping the governance within 
regimes in which the niches of change are developing. The FiT represents one 
of these niches and it is critical in driving the current argument for community 
renewables, at least in the short to medium term. The evolution of these niches 
might represent an important aspect of reducing the financial skewing of energy 
economics towards big business in the long term and the work that change 
agents invest into making this happen plays an important role in determining the 
pace, scale and trajectory at which community energy in the UK is likely to 
develop. 
As it stands, change agents, particularly at the bottom-up community-led scale 
of development, face an uphill battle as policy remains skewed in favour of 
large-scale developments and utilities due to the lock-in and path-dependencies 
depicted and analysed throughout this thesis. There appears to be a void in 
between top-down facilitation through the FiT and the rhetoric surrounding 
community energy, grid access and planning and financial provision systems, 
especially regarding the governance arrangements in which they are 
embedded. 
Intermediary (government) bodies such as local authorities have an important 
role to play in spreading facilitating interaction between top-down facilitation and 
bottom-up action. In particular, there is a need to distribute the benefits of 
energy policy and regulation more equally as the FiT is only capable of creating 
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more sustainable support, which is likely to widen the gap between communities 
depending on access to capacity as well as external expertise. By combining 
and managing the requirements and interests, these intermediary bodies ‘can 
be beneficial for a community of tax payers (financial communities) rather than 
communities of interest (SM)’. Without adequate facilitation, bottom-up change 
agents in particular are left developing the ‘skills [that] are fundamentally lacking 
in the UK to drive renewable energy developments both at the community 
diffusion and the manifestation level’ (BU8). This is essential for the 
development and sustaining of the community energy niche but its nature 
remains fragile without more dedicated middle-out government support. 
As it stands, there is great potential for greater sustainability buy-in by 
increasing community influence on energy generation and consumption. 
However, poorly coordinated and insufficient government support is reducing or 
inhibiting the capacity and potential for communities to act as well as change 
agents actively driving the community energy agenda to contribute to 
community energy development. The change agents’ networking capacity and 
increasing interconnection increases possibilities to scale-up and replicate but 
stronger signals from central government are required to encourage a wide 
range of community energy scales, in terms of governance arrangements and 
institutional embeddedness (Peters, 2011). 
 
7.1.3 Third objective – To evaluate the capacity of community energy within 
the wider national energy framework in relation to the diffusion of 
decentralised renewable energy technologies 
The position of community energy within the UK NEF is therefore confined to a 
niche within the decentralised renewable energy niche which is sustained by the 
FiT and to a lesser extent the RO. Evaluating community energy’s capacity for 
diffusing RETs in this context is a difficult task but this thesis points towards a 
diverse range of technological and social interactions at the community level 
that are challenging assumptions about the limited innovatory capacities at this 
scale of technological diffusion. 
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This thesis indicates that the UK’s energy governance arrangement considers 
the FiT a non-market relevant ‘learning pace’ while the technological ‘innovation 
effort’ continues to be determined by industry (adapted from Hanson, 2011). 
Government relies on industry to reduce costs while the FiT allows financially 
well-endowed individuals, businesses and communities to dabble with RETs. 
Innovative communities and change agents, however, are setting up various 
business models for various scales of development that are set to exploit the 
current framework to its maximum possible extent. Their desires and drive also 
indicate that the FiT can be conceptualised as both an enabling and a limiting 
factor. Greater scales and diversities of development can be achieved with 
greater government commitment towards FiTs and price-based support 
systems in general that are capable of pushing innovation not only in its 
technical sense but also in more widely applicable and diffusible ‘packages’ 
such as community energy innovation. 
This requires government recognition of community energy’s potential in 
relation to support measures. From a technological diffusion perspective a FiT 
attempts to promote a decentralised energy system that is cheap in operational 
terms but expensive in capital terms, which is more or less the polar opposite of 
the choices likely to be favoured by the shot-termism of the market which 
favours low initial capital expenditures and optimistic ignorance towards 
operational expenditures. From a social innovations perspective, the differences 
are even more clear-cut as the incumbent bias towards the latter inhibits the 
diffusion of more engaging yet expensive technologies. The co-evolution of 
technological and social innovations simply does not feature in market-based 
approaches to energy provision and the governance of energy systems. 
Learning associated with the diffusion of technological and associated social 
innovations, however, has the capacity to enhance the cumulative capacity for 
effective action.  
What this thesis also reveals in this context is that the UK NEF surrounding 
RETs remains indifferent towards ownership. Community-led projects face the 
greatest challenges and require the most commitment from energy activists and 
change agents alike within the RET diffusion arena but the resulting generation 
capacities remain low due to the lack of supportive structures enabling the 
development of medium to large-scale projects. For scales beyond the FiT’s 
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5MW threshold, which currently covers most renewable energy deployment in 
the UK, the aforementioned ‘bribes’ (Yeo, 2012) are more or less a necessity to 
encourage more widespread diffusion of onshore renewables. Figure 7.1 
indicates the technological vs. social innovation dilemma. Where communities 
are willing to accept money from commercial developers, larger scales of 
technological diffusion than comparable community-led developments can be 
achieved. 
 
 
Issues of growing technological complexity can be overcome and the renewable 
energy resource potential is freed from the regulatory technological lock-in 
imposed by the FiT. However, pouring money into a community from a 
commercial (renewable energy) development does not guarantee greater 
engagement as it feeds back to the lock-in of producer/consumer divides. 
Community-led developments, on the other hand, provide greater potentials for 
engagement and acceptance, albeit at the price of small generation capacities 
due to the limitations of the FiT. 
Competitive markets can ensure that iterative learning processes continue 
despite the failures of certain technological pathways and it might be too much 
to expect public policy to drive the low carbon and energy security agendas. 
However, the incentive and institutional governance framework provided by 
government has the capacity to determine the flow of capital (UKERC, 2006) 
Figure 7.1: The UK community energy innovation system (compiled by the author) 
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and various macro-scale issues require holistic frameworks capable of 
channelling these flows in socially and environmentally desirable directions at 
scales (regimes and niches) below the overarching (landscape) determination. 
The question therefore remains what a liberal market framework is willing to 
impose on society and its markets or in how far civil society can influence the 
decision-making relating to large infrastructures within a liberal market 
framework. Community energy appears to be driven by desires for a society at 
least partially influencing the decision-making relating to energy generating 
infrastructure while market incumbency appears to favour the confinement of 
these desires within the FiT niche. The capacity and position of community 
energy in the UK NEF therefore depends on how envisaged changes to the 
energy policy landscape will pay tribute to the capacity of more inclusive 
technological diffusion approaches than the one currently practiced in the UK. 
 
7.2 Discussion of theories  
Beyond the practical issues surrounding community energy, this thesis also 
raises some interesting questions in relation to the theories applied to its 
analytical framework. Going back to the position of community energy and the 
FiT within in the larger picture of carbon reduction commitments, renewable 
energy targets and the drive towards energy security, the conceptualisation of 
community energy as a niche within the niche of renewable energy within the 
UK NEF might be expanded using the MLP framework (Geels, 2002). 
As shown below in Figure 7.2, which is an adoption of the MLP framework, the 
political economy provides the paradigm for decision-making within both the 
centralised and the decentralised diffusion systems and it is dominated by fiscal 
austerity, liberalisation, climate change related policies and the drive towards 
energy security. The decentralised diffusion system is partly shaped by path-
dependent government responses to the constraints of the macro landscape 
and partly by locked-in feedbacks from the centralised diffusion system (see 
Figure 4.1). These feedbacks often relate to the present day outcome of 
historical responses to macro landscape issues, such as the energy gap. 
Primarily, this level is dominated by the overarching paradigms of liberalisation 
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and challenging concepts such as decarbonisation and it provides the structure 
for the decentralised diffusions system. On this level, resource prices, 
technology prices, support mechanisms and infrastructural 
constraints/provisions determine the way the objectives laid out at the 
centralised diffusion level are met. 
This can be broken down further to include a bottom-up niche provided by 
support measures for RETs. They have the capacity to appeal to actors aligned 
with either of the diffusion systems. In this framework, local authority and 
council driven, facilitated or operated schemes are considered part of the 
centralised diffusion system. Within this niche, new forms of ownership are 
developing in relation to generation, particularly from renewable sources. It is 
dominated partly by the RO, the FiT, the Microgeneration Strategy, the UK 
Renewable Energy Roadmap and several other policies that have yet to make 
substantial impacts such as the RHI and the Green Deal as well as the current 
and future planning system. In a way, government is attempting to regain 
control of the diffusion of renewable energy technology innovations when 
analysed through the SNM framework. 
 
 Figure 7.2: The UK community energy related NEF (compiled by the author) 
214 
 
This apparent expansion and increase of governmental control over this niche 
indicates that government recognises the need for a more strategic and 
coordinated governance approach but a big question mark still hangs over the 
willingness of government to take the decentralisation of energy generation 
seriously. The diffusion framework suggests that government rates the 
innovation potential of price competitive top-down or hybrid models more highly 
than the innovation potential of more protected bottom-up models initiated by 
energy activists or constituted community groups. For the immediate rollout of 
large-scale renewable energy generation facilities this might prove beneficial. It 
also avoids the necessity to develop, potentially with the need of complex policy 
and regulation, an institutional response to the need for grid access, at-risk 
finance and a planning regime that would provide more incentives for bottom-up 
community led development. This approach, however, is neglecting the 
geographical diffusion potential and the diverse range of potential benefits a 
multi-scalar approach can provide. 
The overall lack of multi-layered and multi-scalar decarbonisation incentives 
points to a two-tier energy policy system. The FiT is providing an incentive to 
develop community energy and other geographically decentralised 
developments at negligible scales but uncertainties relating to constantly 
changing tariff structures and the surrounding framework do not encourage 
meaningful niche protection for up-scaling. Government in its position as key 
change agent and facilitator needs to strike the balance between having a tariff 
structure that allows for windfall profits and a tariff structure that quenches all 
attempts at up-scaling collectively organised energy projects. Even if 
government finds a middle ground through the tariff structure, however, the 
surrounding NEF is not favourable towards the development of bottom-up or 
middle-out community energy. 
As it stands, the hybrid public-private model that makes use of centralised 
guarantees and decentralised expertise, finance and innovation potential is also 
not as successful as it might be, particularly in relation to wind energy. The 
density of installed wind turbines in the UK and particularly in England is well 
below its European counterparts, as is evident from Table 1.3, and the 
emphasis by government on the expansion of offshore wind generation capacity 
is not likely to change the approach towards onshore installations. Therefore, 
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government appears to be favouring the path(-dependency) of facilitating  
generally expensive centralised (renewable energy) technologies, which 
arguably can foster technological learning, over a decentralised bottom-up 
approach that requires more barriers to be tackled but ultimately has the 
potential to promote social as well as technological learning accompanied by 
localised resilience to energy price shocks and supply constraints and greater 
engagement potentials with energy. In particular, this niche that provides the 
basis for social and technological learning arenas may ultimately drive the 
diffusion of low-carbon innovations much more along the line with the 
prevention paradox, which states that making very large changes to a small 
number of people will make no discernible difference to the population but 
making moderate differences to the whole population makes very substantial 
measurable differences. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
A recurring theme throughout this thesis is the difficulty of establishing and 
sustaining a niche for both energy related technological diffusion and social 
innovation in community settings in the UK. This is intrinsically linked to the 
policy landscape and infrastructural embeddedness of decentralised renewable 
energy generation within the UK NEF which are determined by unfavourable 
governance arrangements. The analysis thereof reinforces notions of the path-
dependent and locked-in nature of energy systems and how this incumbency is 
restricting the capacity of political decision-making to encourage greater 
diversity in terms of scales, ownership structures and geographical distribution 
of RETs. 
The analysis of community energy provides a lens through which the 
development of new scales and ownership structures of decentralised energy 
generation becomes tangible. It reveals that community energy in the UK is 
currently far from what might be considered mainstream. In most cases, the 
development of successful projects is confined to either remote communities, 
such as the Isle of Gigha or the Orkneys where high electricity prices tend to act 
as a push factor and strong winds combined with policy incentives as a pull 
factor, or communities that are fortunate enough to have energy activists and 
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change agents capable and willing to drive local energy agendas in face of a 
generally unfavourable framework. Where the push factors are less prominent it 
therefore comes down to what might be considered thick social capital, financial 
capital, time, expertise and patience which allows communities to consider 
community energy. This is where the pull factors need to step-up in terms of 
sustaining sustainable policy incentives, providing adequate finance and 
enabling grid access with the prospect of sustaining and growing efforts rather 
than just allowing for the development of one-off installations on parish church 
roofs and back to BAU. 
What the UK is lacking in this context of technological diffusion and social 
innovation is an appreciation of the capacity of community energy beyond the 
installation of electricity generating infrastructure and its liberal market bias is 
inhibiting the diffusion of decentralised RETs below the point where economies 
of scale apply. This centralised trajectory in turn reduces the opportunities to 
challenge behaviour and consumption practices through technologically and 
socially innovative engagement and organisation structures, especially 
community energy as the smallest unit of collective action capable of generating 
enough momentum to move from idea to implementation. 
As described in the theory chapter, the challenge in providing adequate support 
is increased due to the inherent non-linearity and unpredictability of challenging 
factors that locked-in and path-dependent large-scale innovation systems are 
facing (adapted from Leach et al., 2007). This might lend itself towards a rather 
loose regulatory framework that allows the market to determine winners and 
losers but this ignores the general market bias towards increasing growth and 
the provision of energy for this trajectory. It is precisely the non-linearity and 
unpredictability that requires a stable framework, even though this implies that 
some technologies chosen to ‘win’ will inevitably fail. This process indirectly 
resembles that of the rule of law in a constitutional state that painstakingly 
defends even the worst of criminals as any less would imply a loss of state 
responsibility over equal treatment, be it for better or worse. 
The introduction of the UK FiT has created spaces for technologies and 
ownership structures to be picked as ‘winners’ by providing opportunities for 
communities as well as individuals, businesses and other non-traditional market 
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players to engage in electricity generation. Its restriction to generation 
capacities below 5MW, however, limits its capacities for both engagement and 
generation to a niche within the niche of renewable energy. The competitive 
nature of the RO, which works in tandem to the FiT for generation capacities in 
excess of 5MW, on the other hand, is proving too complex for most 
communities to consider taping into large generation scales.  
Community energy itself therefore appears to have been conceived by 
government as a separate niche primarily within the FiT’s policy niche, which in 
itself is an outcrop of the disparity relating to the parallel energy policy strands 
that define the UK’s energy market. This can be linked to the parallel 
developments Seyfang and Smith (2007b) identified within the UK’s sustainable 
development strategy, ecological modernisation and technological innovation 
versus community action and the social economy, even though this thesis 
points towards a dominance of separate technological innovation and 
community action arenas rather than interweaving ecological modernisation and 
social economy. 
The latter would imply an appreciation of the wider benefits of community 
energy more akin to the German and Danish examples highlighted throughout 
the thesis. In a NEF dominated by one-sided large-scale technological 
innovation, community energy is confined to a junior partner within the 
incumbent model of energy provision (adapted from Van Vliet and Chappels, 
1999.) This thesis therefore reinforces Walker and Devine-Wright’s (2006) point 
that community energy in the UK is more likely than not to remain a co-provider 
of energy within a niche rather than a challenger of the regime as long as its 
surrounding framework does not provide more stable and targeted support. The 
unwillingness of the National Grid to consider these scales of generation worth 
connecting (Jenkins, 2012) is further proof of community energy’s low standing 
in the long list of political priorities. 
The German and Danish examples indicate that different trajectories are 
possible but that it takes more than energy policy to steer innovations towards a 
particular trajectory. A positive NEF provides the basis which determines the 
degree of planning acceptance achieved, which in turn is largely a function of 
the degree of local acceptance (Toke et al., 2008). Factors determining the 
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social and political environment relating to wind energy and other renewable 
energy technologies include the dominant ideological preferences in countries 
and their governments and the institutionalised power of dominant actors such 
as energy companies. Wind power policy as an example can therefore be path-
dependent as it reflects cultural dispositions, which in the case of the UK also 
includes a cultural disposition towards landscape alteration and in the case of 
Denmark local political activity as well as institutionalised preferences in the 
energy domain. 
In Germany, it appears as though some of the more successful renewable 
energy technologies, particularly onshore wind and solar PV, developed as 
incremental innovations. Arguably, their diffusion has not been as successful in 
the UK as their properties are more in line with what Freeman and Perez (1988) 
describe as radical innovations in the context of the UK NEF’s innovation 
system, particularly its scalar bias. 
What this analysis therefore points towards is a situation where various niches 
can develop alongside incumbent regimes and with sufficient political and 
social/public backing but that a multiple-provision system can and arguably 
needs to development in order to allow for sufficient flexibility in light of energy 
and climate insecurity. Support systems for niches and regimes therefore also 
need to cater for increasing flexibility without reducing certainty and 
predictability. This fine line is where the UK has proven particularly trigger 
happy, thereby reducing certainty and predictability and indirectly favouring 
incumbents with sufficiently extensive portfolios capable of balancing failing 
projects linked to uncertainty or policy induced boom and bust developments. 
German and Danish energy policy systems, on the other hand, are more stable, 
also thanks to a strong solar and wind lobby, although recent changes hint 
towards a more volatile policy landscape. Both countries have also provided 
ample opportunities for various niches to develop within the renewable energy 
regime. The success has led to a domination of renewables, particularly wind, 
to an extent which suggests that they are now the dominant regime determining 
grid development and expansion as well as the portfolio of supporting 
technologies due to their volatility in terms of fluctuating generation patterns. 
219 
 
The downside of niche-building support systems is primarily linked to the high 
costs which are transferred to consumers and which has spurred the debate on 
fuel poverty. One of Germany’s success stories in the noughties, its solar PV 
industry, was developed entirely on the back of indirect transfer payments by 
the public through their electricity bill. The collapse of this niche with a loss of 
tens of thousands of jobs in Eastern Germany in light of Chinese competition 
bears testament to the downsides of hanging on to a rigid FiT system for too 
long. FiTs can move technologies from niche towards regime but once the 
regime has been successfully challenged, new forms of support are required. 
The upside of this development, on the other hand, is that solar PV technology 
as such has taken off thanks to Chinese investment in production facilities and 
is set to become a globally applied and diffusible technology, even capable of 
supplanting diesel generators, at least during sunny daylight hours. Energy 
technologies that cannot be mass produced on similar scales, such as wind 
turbines and offshore technologies, on the other hand, still benefit from FiT 
systems. Whenever expertise in terms of knowledge relating to technological 
sophistication is geographically bound thanks to existing supply chains, location 
in terms of natural resources or workforce specialisation, on the other hand, a 
superior locked-in context may exist that cannot be challenged by external 
competition. 
This relates to the ‘sticky’ knowledge concept (Gertler, 2004), which suggests 
that territorial proximity provides a superior context for innovation because of 
localised learning processes. Localised learning processes in this context 
involve specific and partly tacit knowledge as opposed to more generic global 
knowledge. Policy-makers need to make difficult choices in terms of who can 
and should be allowed to thrive and which niche ought to be abandoned. This is 
also a question of who governs transitions, whose systems framings count and 
whose sustainability gets prioritised (Smith and Stirling, 2008). Bearing this in 
mind, a community energy approach is always more likely to affect a wider 
range of people than centralised generation and subsequent knowledge 
embedding is more likely to build resilience not only in face of external 
competition but also external threats. 
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The challenge, however, is now shifting from technological niches towards the 
delivery of packages, or tenders that can guarantee a certain generation pattern 
over a given period of time. This is where the public increasingly enters the 
realm of energy  as the likes of virtual power stations require the public to play a 
greater role in balancing and active generation as a greater portfolio of 
(potentially complementary) renewable generation technologies can be 
developed at various scales, ranging from communities to transnational energy 
coalitions. At the micro level it is important that balancing technologies 
themselves do not increase energy consumption to an extent that would make 
smart grid systems unviable. Niches for development, however, should enable 
sufficient facilitatory and participatory experimentation (Foxon and Pearson, 
2007) and allow for mistakes in order to encourage policy, technology and 
social learning rather than assuming a one-size-fits-all approach. 
 
7.4 Outlook and recommendations 
However, challenges to these theories of technological diffusion and transition 
also arise in this thesis as the scales of renewable generation required to 
supplant incumbent fossil-fuel based generation infrastructures surpass what is 
viable in terms of community-led or co-owned development. It also remains 
questionable whether community-led projects have the capacity of providing 
‘new ways of satisfying societal needs, in particular new forms of organisation, 
new regulation or new lifestyles’ identified by Zapf (1989, adapted from 
Schreuer, 2010) as necessary for social innovation or if they just represent a 
greenwashing exercise for the south-facing middle classes. 
The multi-scale development niche of community energy reflects the multi-
scalar nature of likely new forms of energy development. International projects 
such as Desertec (Desertec Foundation, 2009) as well as household-size 
renewable energy installations are becoming increasingly important as the 
pressures from energy security and climate change are altering energy policy 
and generation landscapes. This process is associated with developments in 
post-Fordist social regulation. Rescaling energy policy through the FiT enables 
compatibility of economic with environmental objectives as money flows are 
redirected to communities and individuals who can now act as energy 
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producers (Gibbs and Jones, 2000). A positive by-product of community energy 
lies in its potential to decarbonise as a by-product of new entrepreneurial 
developments and social innovations. 
The experience of the UK FiT relating to community energy with respect to SNM 
theory appear to reflect Hoogma et al.’s (2002) assertion that this theoretical 
concept has failed as positive feedback circles (in this case relating to 
technology) are both weaker than expected and take longer than expected to 
develop. Actors in the UK are not changing their strategies to accommodate this 
new form of development and large investments or changing investment 
strategies have yet to develop for successful community energy development 
(not just technological diffusion as suggested by Hoogma et al. in relation to 
sustainable transport). 
However, it is evident that the failure of this concept also applies to human-
energy interactions as such. When we talk about a transition towards a low-
carbon economy we need to bear in mind that only two energy transitions have 
taken place in human history – fire and fossil fuels. The problem is that they 
took hundreds if not thousands of years and were driven by market forces, in 
that the gains were so obvious that new markets developed automatically. Long 
time-cycles on supply and demand side, dedicated networks and path-
dependency imply very sluggish change if any change at all. Required transition 
must take decades, not centuries and it will not be driven by markets as 
required transformations will go against most people’s interests. Nevertheless, 
imposing changes in infrastructure need to be facilitating rather than requiring 
(Keay, 2011). 
Similar to the ‘post-political’ claims of sustainability (Swyngedouw, 2007), 
transition management also needs to take on more political aspects in order to 
establish when and how interventions are to take place as they will never be 
inclusive or contingent. A problem throughout the various scales of community 
energy is the questions identified by Smith and Stirling (2008) on who governs 
transitions and the diffusion of innovations, who benefits from their 
implementation, whose system framings count and whose sustainability gets 
prioritised. Governing transitions is another area that has yet to be specified as 
institutional arrangements and mechanisms to revise in the light of challenging 
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events and developments are non-existent. It also assumes that transitions are 
being managed for benign outcomes although most transitions in history have 
had exactly the opposite intentional outcome. According to Shove and Walker 
(2007: 8), ‘the outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable 
and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and ironically, 
it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management’. 
What ultimately needs to be questioned is therefore the prioritisation of 
innovations and their diffusion in modern political, economic and environmental 
thought and policy-making. Ever since Jevons’ (1866) pointed out that 
technological innovations increasing efficiency paradoxically increase their use 
across society by making the technologies as such more useful, innovations, 
even environmental innovations, are not guaranteed to provide the solutions to 
the environmental dilemmas our economic practices are increasing our 
vulnerability towards. Technological fixes (Weinberg, 1966), even with an 
associated social component in terms of derived benefits or even social 
restructuring according to changing nature of provisions, such as intermittent 
community energy supply, remain entrenched within the system of production 
and consumption that is necessitating innovation in the first place. 
According to the Khazzoom-Brookes postulate (Saunders, 1992), which argues 
along similar lines as Jevons did in C19, more efficient use of energy reduces 
the unit costs, which leads to increased consumption of goods, thereby 
improving the application of goods, which in turn leads to lower price ranges. 
These new goods are likely to be more complex applications, often consuming 
more energy through manufacturing, use and dismantling than the original 
good. Microprocessors or mobile phones are good examples of this. The drop in 
energy intensity per GDP while overall energy is increasing is another good 
example. 
When it comes to energy generating technologies this is no different. If we 
assume that our innovative and implementary capacities are sufficient to 
decarbonise the energy sector by, say 50% by 2030, how do we ensure that 
‘cleaner’ energy generation will not increase our tendency to waste it? Will 
funds freed by renewable localised energy generation not be spent on items or 
actions that may not entail an equivalent CO2 footprint but a much larger 
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environmental footprint than the original energy consumption supported by 
longstanding infrastructures and supply chains? 
It is beyond the merit of this thesis to answer these questions but further 
research can only contribute to the disentangling of these feedback loops and 
rebounds inherent in incumbent systems requiring, generating and wasting 
resources and waste sinks as we do in our age of mass consumption. 
 
 
 
 
224 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Methods       
  
 
 
D - Documents, FW - Fieldwork, CS - Case Studies, HA - Historical Analysis, I - Interviews, Q - 
Questionnaires, QlA - Qualitative Analysis, QtA - Quantitative Analysis, OM - Other 
Methods, TP - Theoretical Paper 
  
 
 
Author Year Study Methods 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on community energy 
  
 
 
Adams and Berry 2008 Community energy projects D, CS, HA 
Schweizer-Ries 2008 Community energy projects I, Q, QlA, QtA 
Allen, Sheate and Diaz-
Chavez 
2012 Community energy projects D, CS, I, QlA 
Schreuer 2010 Energy Co-operatives D, HA, TP 
Walker 2008 
Barriers and incentives for 
community energy 
D 
Hoggett 2010 Community energy projects D, CS 
Walker and Devine-Wright 2008 
Community renewables 
I, CS, OM 
Munday, Bristow and 
Cowell 
2011 
Community wind 
D, CS, I 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on the FiT and community energy 
  
 
 
Philips 2010 FiT and Community energy D, I, QlA 
Fudge, Peters, Hamilton and 
Parag 
2011 Community carbon reduction D, I, QlA, OM 
Saunders, Gross and Wade 2012 
Fuel poverty reduction 
through community FiTs 
D, CS, I, QlA 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on transition theories 
  
 
 
Shove and Walker 2007 Critique of transition theories D 
Smith and Stirling 2008 
Transition 
management/governance 
D, TP 
Hielscher, Seyfang and 
Smith 
2011 
Sustainable transition through 
community innovation 
D 
Kern and Mitchell 2010 Critique of transition theories D 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on energy policy and the diffusion of innovations 
  
 
 
Jacobsson and Johnson 2000 
Analytical framework for the 
diffusion of innovations 
D, HA, TP 
Jacobsson and Lauber 2006 
Policies for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA 
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Foxon and Pearson 2007 
Policies for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA, TP 
DTI 2005 
Policies encouraging 
community benefits from RE 
D, CS, Q 
Pollitt 2010 
Policies for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA 
Toke 2005 
Energy policy comparison/ 
wind energy and ownership 
D, I, Qla 
Negro, Hekkert and 
Alkemande 
2010 
Policies for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA 
Negro, Hekkert and Smits 2008 
Policies for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA, CS 
Stenzel and Frenzel 2008 
Energy policy comparison/ 
wind energy and ownership 
D, CS, I 
Woodman and Baker 2008 
Policies encouraging 
decentralised energy 
development 
D 
Toke, Breukers and Wolsink 2008 
International policy 
comparison 
D, I, Qla, CS, Qta 
Breukers and Wolsink 2007 
Energy policy comparison/ 
wind energy and ownership 
D, I, Qla, CS 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on diffusion niches 
  
 
 
Smith 2006 
Niches for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA 
Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2006 
Grassroots diffusion of 
innovations 
D, HA 
Coenen, Raven and Verbong 2009 
Niches for the diffusion of 
innovations 
D, CS 
Seyfang and Smith 2007 
Niches for grassroots 
innovations 
D, TP 
Parag and Janda 2010 
Middle-out approach to 
innovation 
D, TP 
  
 
 
Studies focussing on diffusion niches in relation to community energy 
  
 
 
Verbong, Mourik and Raven 2006 
Embedding socio-technical 
innovations 
D, HA, TP 
Walker and Devine-Wright 2006 
Embedding socio-technical 
innovations 
D, CS, I, QlA 
Seyfang and Smith 2006 Community innovation D, HA, TP 
Walker et al. 2010 
Embedding socio-technical 
innovations 
CS, I, Q, QlA, QtA 
O'Brien and Hope 2010 
Embedding resilience through 
a community approach 
D, CS, I, OM 
  
 
 
Other relevant studies 
  
 
 
Bergman et al. 2008 Modelling transitions D, HA, OM 
CAG Consultants 2010 
Area-based sustainable 
energy solutions 
D, CS, I, OM 
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Moore 2011 
Potential of renewable energy 
targets 
D, OM, TP 
Rogers et al. 2008 
Public perceptions of 
community energy 
opportunities 
I, Q, QlA, QtA 
Watson and Devine-Wright 2011 Scales and policy D 
Woodman and Mitchell 2011 
Renewable energy support 
mechanisms 
D, HA 
West, Bailey and Winter 2010 
Perceptions of renewable 
energy and policy 
D, OM, QlA, QtA 
Bergman 2011 Social innovaitons D, CS 
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Appendix 2 
1. Energy policy and regulation (Basic question surrounding their 
importance) 
1.1. The pre-FiT stage (On what basis business plans were developed 
before the introduction of the FiT) 
1.2. Effect of policy reviews and inconsistency (How policy reviews have 
influenced the development of renewables) 
1.3. Predictability and trust (How reviews have influenced the trust in 
policy and regulation) 
1.4. Risk (How policy determines the risk relating to investment, planning 
and development) 
2. Feed-in tariff (Specific questions about its potential) 
2.1. Interpretation of official purpose (What were people’s assumptions 
about the FiT) 
2.2. Potential (How and why it diffuses renewable energy innovations) 
2.3. Effect on willingness-to-pay (How and why it encourages more 
people to generate energy) 
3. Community energy (How collective interest in energy generation arise) 
3.1. Interaction with regulation (How communities perceive and act on 
policy and regulation) 
3.2. Interaction with planning (How communities perceive and act on the 
planning system) 
4. Planning (The importance of planning for the diffusion of RETs) 
4.1. Barriers to community energy (Why some projects fail while others 
thrive) 
4.2. Enforcement of barriers (How the planning system is perceived as an 
obstacle) 
4.3. Localism Bill/Act (How the Bill/Act influences decision-making) 
4.4. National Planning Policy Framework (How the Policy Framework will 
influence decision-making) 
5. Finance and Investment (What are the barriers to securing finance and 
investment) 
5.1. Financial benefits (How can communities benefit from the diffusion of 
renewables) 
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5.2. Internal vs. external investment (Pros and cons of bottom-up and 
top-down investment models) 
5.3. Investment sources (The difficulty of sourcing at-risk finance) 
5.4. Investment models (How successful projects come about) 
6. Change Agents (The importance of intermediaries in the diffusion 
process) 
6.1. Position as change agent (Why and how intermediaries interact with 
communities and renewables) 
6.2. Role of change agents (How policy and regulation is diffused) 
6.3. Local authorities as change agents (The role of local Government in 
decision-making and their potential as intermediaries and 
developers) 
6.4. Skills required for community energy (How knowledge and skills are 
developed and diffused) 
6.5. Breaking down barriers (Intermediaries’ position in making 
renewables more accessible) 
6.6. Position within the network (How knowledge and expertise is shared 
and replicated over space and time) 
7. Participation, new entrants and changing perceptions (How the 
understanding of energy generation is changing) 
7.1. Effect of policy and regulation on perceptions (Whether views on 
renewables are becoming more favourable in community settings) 
7.2. Barriers to participation and changing perceptions (The middle-
classnes of community energy and the dangers of elitism) 
8. Replicability (How the reinvention of the wheel might be avoided) 
8.1. What constitutes a replicable element (Determining replicable 
elements without taking a one-size-fits-all point of view) 
8.2. Possibility of replication (Where and why procedures might succeed) 
9. Knock-on effects (How community energy is embedded in the larger 
picture) 
9.1. Employment (What skills are developing as a result of the diffusion of 
community energy generation technologies and practices) 
10. Generation (What scale is achievable and/ or desirable) 
10.1. Capacity of community energy (From single panels to wind parks) 
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10.2. Post-generation (Potential long-term consequences of renewable 
energy  deployment) 
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